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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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2 April 1991

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Likely Outcome of Gorbachev's Shift to Right Studied

91UN1110A Moscow *KOMMERSANT* in Russian No 5,
28 Jan-4 Feb 91 p 30

[Article by Political Scientists Igor Bunin and Yuriy Markov: "The President's Deviation to the Right: What Will Happen Now"]

[Text] In January, the central authorities' policy of curtailing democratic reform in the political sphere and establishing direct control over the economy's market mechanisms has finally taken shape. The sum of the decrees recently issued by the President of the USSR permits us to talk about the beginning of a counter-reform course, that is, a course that gradually "confiscates" the results of democratic development during the last three years.

However, experts are inclined toward the opinion that Gorbachev's deviation to the right must be examined within the context of the conflict with the republics—as a weapon of the political struggle for power and not as a long-term program.

There is a high degree of probability that resolution of the conflict will result in relative stability. However, the period preceding this, which various sources estimate as being from three to six months in length, may turn out to be extremely serious.

Political Scientists Igor Bunin and Yuriy Markov analyze possible variations of the development of events.

What Is Occurring?

On the whole, it is obvious that the President's deviation to the right must be perceived within the context of his conflict with the republics which has clearly entered its concluding phase in recent weeks.

According to various assessments, three to six months remain until the conflict comes to an end. During that time, essentially the following question must be resolved: Who—the republics or the center—will get power in the country.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, no matter how the conflict ends, a period of relative stability will follow.

However there also is no doubt that the impending six-month period in and of itself may be fraught with serious social upheavals—everything depends on which weapons the adversaries use in the political struggle.

The President's Weapons

Mikhail Gorbachev is extremely limited in weapons at the moment when the fundamental question is being resolved for him—the question of power. The President essentially has left at his disposal the army, KGB, and financial structures as a weapon to impact monetary turnover.

The President also actually uses them for want of something else: Bringing troops into the Baltic Region, monetary reform, and the Decrees on Patrolling and "Economic Sabotage."

Naturally, weapons also determine political allies.

The groups that today have become his only political support in the rivalry with the democrats are a serious factor that orient Gorbachev toward counter-reform: The conservative portion of the Party-State and military nomenklatura, the Soyuz parliamentary faction, and structures similar to them. Judging by everything, the president's current entourage—Yanayev, Pavlov, Maslyukov, Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo—serves as the spokesman for the interests and ideology of these groups.

However, the danger consists of the fact that, in so doing, the President is in the position of a bicyclist. If he stops, the republics will move even farther ahead in their initiatives and this will already deprive the center of real power.

Actually, the question is reduced to how far the President, who is losing power and is inhibited in the selection of weapons, will risk going?

Strategic Choice: Five Variations

The President theoretically has the choice of five variations at his disposal.


- 1) An attempt at "hard" implementation of counter-reform;
- 2) "Soft" (creeping) counter-reform, that is, its gradual conduct using weapons that prevent the grossest violations of the Law;
- 3) Drawing out the climax and indecisive conduct (something like "two steps to the left, two steps to the right, a step back and a step forward");
- 4) A gradual, conscious transfer of power to the Federation Soviets, that is, actually keeping himself aloof from making decisions and accepting responsibility and acquiring the status of the "British Queen;" or,
- 5) The creation of a left-centrist bloc, breaking with today's allies and an attempt to return to himself the position of leader of the democratization process by an abrupt leap to the left.

Practical Probability: Extremes Are Excluded

The first and last variants are most likely excluded.

The "hard" variant of counter-reform, in which the primary role is assigned to unconstitutional power weapons, underwent its first tests in Lithuania and Latvia. The essence of hard counter-reform was very clearly formulated by Yuozas Yarmolavichus, the person representing the Committee of National Salvation of Lithuania: "No laws whatsoever are in force and a struggle is occurring—who is who" (b No. 3 (53)). As a

The President's Strategy: Possible Variations



Key:

1. September 1990—Rejection of the "500 Days" Program
2. December 1990—4th Congress of People's Deputies
3. January 1991—Events in the Baltic Region
4. You are here, February 4, 1991
5. Referendum date, possible critical point
6. 3-6 months—dangerous period of sharp confrontation
7. Power to the Federation Soviet (according to some proposals under the Chairmanship of B. Yeltsin)
8. Compromise (the most probable variant, under which a division of power between the Center and the republics occurs)
9. Power to the President (practically the only path to this variation is employment of extremely strict measures based on the referendum)

result of events in the Baltic Region, Gorbachev's December reflections to the intelligentsia on protection of the Union's integrity as on the defense of the "last trench" (a report on this meeting was published in IZVESTIYA, December 1, 1990) ceased being a metaphor. However, the President's statements that "the report about the tragedy took everyone by surprise" (b, No. 3 (53)) and also on the inadmissibility of unconstitutional methods to come to power (IZVESTIYA, January 23, 1991) that followed these events demonstrate that he has decided to reject that weapon to attain his goals in this case because, from all appearances, the consequences of these actions simply seem threatening to his own goals.

In this sense, "Red Colonel" Viktor Alksnis' reaction to the Vilnius tragedy is very indicative: "Moscow has abandoned us," "The President has betrayed us," and "The comrades from Lithuania are also in despair." (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 4, 1991).

Furthermore, the Baltic events provided an impetus to the intense consolidation of the enemies of the center's dictatorship (the position of the Federation Soviet, B. Yeltsin's statement, the Kuzbas miners' demand on the government's resignation and departyzation of the Army and KGB, creation of a "Democratic Congress" that would have united the country's independent parties and movements, etc.)

Finally, the West's position: The loss of many credits and President Bush's polite rejection of the summit meeting planned for February must show Gorbachev that his domestic and foreign policies are much more strongly linked than he would obviously like them to be.

As for the left-centrist strategy, its realization would demand from the President not only a decisive and public condemnation of his own policy in the Baltic Region and the total replacement of his new team (including "handing their heads" to Ministers Pugo and Yazov), but also rejection of attempts to preserve the

Union in its present form. In other words, he would have to "go to Canossa" [to humble himself] and nevertheless lose the party, having yielded the first roles in the political game to Yeltsin and his democrats. Psychologically, for Gorbachev this path is most likely closed.

The variant of actually transferring power to the Federation Soviet is just as unacceptable to him—although because, in the words of S. Shatalin from his open letter to the President, "The fear of losing power—is a natural instinct of a normal politician and not suicide" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, January 22, 1991).

So, in the near future, Gorbachev's possible courses of action are either creeping counter-reform, drawing out decisive events and drawing out the conflict, or various combinations of these variants.

At the present time, it is perfectly obvious that we are witnessing the implementation of measures from the "soft" counter-reform arsenal: The confiscated exchange of currency, Yazov's and Pugo's joint order and the President's Decree that followed it on MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and SA [Soviet Army] Joint Forces Patrolling in Major Cities, the President's Decree "On Measures to Support the Struggle with Economic Sabotage" that assigned practically unlimited economic monitoring functions to the KGB and MVD....

This Cannot Be Extended for a Long Time

However, "soft" counter-reform is not nearly a panacea. It is difficult to presume that the President will succeed in achieving what he desires using it.

The conduct of counter-reform will begin very quickly and to an increasing degree its own inevitable negative consequences will impede it. Ineffective administrative economic stabilization measures will only result in still greater deterioration of the economic situation and will further discredit the center. Populist acts on the struggle with the Mafia as a sort of exchange of large currency denominations and the KGB's and MVD's increased authority—in the absence of any results whatsoever—will just irritate the population. This will promote the inevitable increase of corruption under conditions of granting extraordinary monitoring powers to law enforcement organs.

Naturally, the opposition will exploit all of these opportunities to criticize the center.

Under these conditions, the erosion of the counter-reform bloc—is only a question of time. A certain part of it, having seen in counter-reform a weapon to insure legality and order, will most likely be easily reoriented to republic leaders (and first of all to Yeltsin).

Actually, the possibility of "building bridges" between Yeltsin and traditional union-wide institutes, in particular, the army, does not seem so improbable right now. From this point of view, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Colonel General K. Kobenits' statement is extremely interesting: "I think

that we, the military, also do not need to enter into any kind of confrontation. We need to repeatedly make attempts to search for civilized ways out of difficult situations. I am absolutely firmly convinced that we can find a common language with the republic leadership" (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4, 1991).

A certain portion of the counter-reform bloc can "avoid matters" in general and, using Saltykov's and Shchedrin's term, "make do." Others will form the extreme right-wing opposition to all that is occurring and will begin to openly form a bloc with the small in number, but potentially influential, organizations and movements that preach the ideas of the "Great Empire," "the special path," messianism, national exclusiveness, or "the worldwide conspiracy of shady operators [teneviki] and/or masons." The remaining people are rallying around the presidential chair (it is the chair and not the individual) only because they do not have enough resolve to take any other steps.

This, besides everything else, will signify the further reduction of the intellectual potential of the structures that support the process of elaborating and making presidential decisions.

When Will This End? and With What?

A noticeable increase in the inconsistency of the President's actions may become the result of these processes. It has not been ruled out that counter-reformist-minded decrees will begin to coexist with measures of a directly opposite nature already in the next few months. It is already impossible to talk about any sort of precise center strategy here. Gorbachev's actions will become purely situational and will be based on perceptions of self-preservation in a short-term context.

In circumstances like the current ones, "critical points" are extremely important when the state of affairs is drastically and qualitatively changing. The price increases already being planned by the central government may become that next point. However, the moment when the totals are summed up for the referendum on the issue of the existence of the USSR which is planned for March 17 is sooner turning out to be the culmination of the political struggle. Any referendum result will make the resolution of the issue on power in the country unavoidably necessary. Who will obtain this power certainly depends on the results.

The referendum can provide one of three results:

1. The majority is against preservation of the Union.
2. The majority is for preservation of the Union.
3. The majority throughout the country is for preservation of the Union however, the population of a number of republics is against it.

Naturally the first variation will mean a defeat for the President and a loss of power by him with its probable

transfer to the Federation Soviet. However, the probability of this variation is low.

The consequences of the second variation are not so obvious. It significantly strengthens the President's position however, it does not provide a solution of the situation in practice. In all probability, the second variation will mean that the conflict and, along with it a period of instability, will extend for a time that is difficult to predict, until the next critical point which it does not appear possible to define. In so doing, it hardly precludes the fact that this result of the referendum will give the President the political capability to adopt the maximally strict measures against the rebellious republics.

However, the third result of the referendum is most probable and in all probability negotiations or, more accurately, bargaining for power will be its result. The result of the negotiations will depend on the number of republics whose population opposed the Union.

USSR Supreme Soviet Rescinds Acts on Forced Resettlement

*91US0372A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2*

["Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Repeal of Legislative Acts in Connection With the Declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet 14 November 1989: 'On Acknowledging as Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts Against Peoples Subjected to Forced Resettlement, and on Securing Their Rights'"]

[Text] Guided by the declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 14 November 1989: "On Acknowledging as Illegal and Criminal Repressive Acts Against Peoples Subjected to Forced Resettlement, and on Securing Their Rights," and proceeding from the political and social significance of fully resolving all issues related to restoration of the rights of peoples subjected to unjustified repressions, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To repeal acts of the highest organs of USSR state authority which serve as the basis for unlawful, forced resettlement of individual peoples from their place of permanent residence, for restricting the rights of citizens belonging to these ethnic groups, and for the illegal elimination of certain national-state formations.

To remove from USSR legislative acts the stamp "Not for Publication" and the security classification stamp from resolutions of the former USSR State Defense Committee.

To direct the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to declassify appropriate acts of the USSR Government.

2. To repeal:

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 August 1941: "On the Resettlement of Germans

Residing in the Volga Regions" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1941, No. 38);

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 7 September 1941: "On Administrative Structuring of the Territory of the Former Republic of Volga Germans" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1941, No. 40);

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 27 December 1943: "On Elimination of the Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] and Formation of Astrakhan Oblast Within the RSFSR";

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 30 June 1945: "On Transformation of the Crimean ASSR Into the Crimean Oblast Within the RSFSR";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 13 December 1955: "On Removing Legal Status Restrictions From Germans and Members of Their Families Located in Special Settlements";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 17 March 1956: "On Removing Legal Status Restrictions From Kalmyks and Members of Their Families Located in Special Settlements";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 27 March 1956: "On Removing Legal Status Restrictions From Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Members of Their Families Located in Special Settlements";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 April 1956: "On Removing Special Settlement Restrictions From Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Turks Who Are USSR Citizens, Kurds, Khemshils, and Members of Their Families Who Were Evicted During the Period of the Great Patriotic War";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 16 July 1956: "On Removing Special Settlement Restrictions From Chechens, Ingush, Karachay, and Members of Their Families Evicted During the Period of the Great Patriotic War";

Article 3 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 22 September 1956: "On Removing From Special Settlement Registration Certain Categories of Stateless Persons and Former Stateless Persons Accepted for Soviet Citizenship";

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 9 January 1957: "On Formation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast Within the RSFSR";

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 31 October 1957: "On Removing Restrictions From USSR Citizens of Azeri Nationality Resettled in 1944 Out of the Georgian SSR";

The ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 29 August 1964: "On Introducing Changes to the Ukase of

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 August 1941: "On the Resettlement of Germans Residing in the Volga Regions" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1964, No. 52, p 592);

Article 2 of the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 5 September 1967: "On Citizens of Tatar Nationality Residing in the Crimea" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1967, No. 36, p 493);

Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 5 September 1967: "On the Procedure for Application of Article 2 of the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 April 1956," (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1967, No. 36, p 494);

Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 30 May 1968: "On the Procedure—With Respect to Turks, Kurds, Khemshils, and Azeris Who Are USSR Citizens and Previously Resided in the Georgian SSR—for Application of Article 2 of the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 April 1956, and Article 2 of the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 31 October 1957," (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1968, No. 23, p 188).

3. To acknowledge the necessity of the USSR president and USSR Cabinet of Ministers to repeal, within one month's time, decisions of the former USSR State

Defense Committee and of the USSR Government on matters of forced resettlement of individual peoples and restricted rights of citizens belonging to these ethnic groups.

4. The repeal of normative acts stated in this Resolution does not automatically signify the resolution of questions of national-state structuring and administrative-territorial division which have arisen as a result of the forced resettlement of individual peoples. To recommend to the supreme soviets of republics that they examine these questions, proceeding from their competence, and make necessary decisions in their regard, not tolerating any encroachment upon the rights and legitimate interests of citizens today residing in the applicable territories.

5. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers will organize prior to the end of 1991, jointly with the highest organs of state authority and governments of the republics, practical restoration of the legal rights of repressed peoples, to include affording appropriate privileges to citizens mobilized into work columns during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and will establish, as economic and social conditions become established, procedures, amounts, and mechanisms for providing material compensation to persons directly subjected to forced resettlement.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 7 March 1991

Baltics

TASS Accused of Rumor Mongering

91P50124A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "TASS and Commentaries"]

[Text] In yesterday's issue of this paper we reported a "sensational item" being spread by TASS which was immediately picked up by the program Vremya—that allegedly Lepo Sumera, minister of culture and a composer, while in Finland had secret instructions from Premier E. Savisaar to form an Estonian government in exile. Lepo Sumera categorically denied this fabrication.

It is obvious even from a distance that this is a foolish idea. And actually, if the instructions had been secret, then why would a member of the government begin to spread them to a correspondent of some Finnish newspaper? And why, in general, would the minister of culture be engaged in forming a government; surely it is enough that we have ministers of foreign affairs?

Incidentally, another false report of this same ilk was spread through TASS channels—"borrowed" from EESTI EKSPRESS and also heard on Vremya—that one million rubles [were being offered] for a list of KGB collaborators in Estonia. The author was one Albert Maloveryan.

Annus Interviewed on Baltic Solution, Future

91UN1053A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 20 Jan 91 pp 3, 6

[Interview with Lembit Annus, Estonian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee secretary and Estonian Supreme Soviet deputy, by S. Vagin, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent: "I Am Against Intrigue...."]

[Text] The beginning of this year was a difficult one. The economic crisis led to price increases unbearable to all of us. The consequence was the aggravation of contradictions between the "upper" and "lower" levels. The flames of interethnic discord, which seemed to have abated, flared up again. Rifles and automatic weapons talked instead of people. Blood was shed. A noose was put around the infant neck of democracy. We buried some people yesterday, and tomorrow someone may be burying us. I am not exaggerating, such is the reality. Have we lost our minds, and are we unable to find a peaceful solution to problems? These topics were discussed by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent S. Vagin with L. Annus, Estonian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee secretary and Estonian Supreme Soviet deputy.

[Correspondent] We had just folded the funeral flags of mourning for the blood which was shed in Lithuania, and another news item spread around the world: failure to solve the Persian Gulf crisis peacefully.

[Annus] I believe that this is a misfortune for all nations in the world, including those who started the combat operations. War means blood and suffering. As someone involved in politics, I have never supported nor do I support now the solution of problems by military means. When we speak of war, we must always see the reason behind it. Therefore, while condemning the war initiated in the Persian Gulf area, on the one hand, I also condemn the aggression committed by Iraq against small Kuwait, on the other. I am convinced, however, that the political leaders did not make full use of talks and dialogue in looking for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Unfortunately, history proves that whenever the interests of a great power are affected, the military interfere. I am referring to the United States. This can trigger nothing but condemnation. That is why the outbreak of this war makes me feel pain and disappointment. The people have the right to die of natural causes.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, such is not always the case, as recent events in Lithuania have shown. The situation both in Latvia and in our country, in Estonia, is tense. The people fear a repetition of the Lithuanian case. How do you assess the present political and economic situation in the Baltic area and, particularly, in the Republic?

[Annus] As to the current situation, it is worrisome and explosive. Your question is absolutely right. Here we must see both political and economic problems. I would begin with the economy for, as we know, it is the concentrated expression of politics, as V.I. Lenin said. His monuments may be brought down but the laws governing social development cannot be abolished. That is why I have always considered disastrous [a political solution] without taking the economic situation into consideration. Yet that is precisely what is happening in our country. If three out of the four authors of the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] say that the IME is nothing but a political document, then, forgive me, why are we deceiving the people when we say that we have a clear program for improving the well-being of the Estonian population and for enhancing the Republic's economic potential?

The same can be seen in other republics as well. Today economic integration has reached a level at which to live in isolation is impossible; nor can we do without having strong Union ties. Relying on the West, on the help of foreign businessmen (there has been a lot of hullabaloo on this topic in our country) has not been justified. Actually, how could it? We turned to the West, holding out our hand, but businessmen, as we know, do nothing for free. We, however, have undertaken to change everything overnight and... the result is clear: empty shelves in our stores.

Now as to politics. I have never been able to understand intriguers who, speaking for the people, say that they have been elected by the people and that they are the legitimate people's government. I too was elected to the Republic's Supreme Soviet. I have certificate No 6

proving that I am a deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. Now, it is true, one can hear that in our country allegedly there is no longer an Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Yet it was precisely that same Supreme Soviet which was elected by the people. Incidentally, the same happened in Latvia and Lithuania. Deputies to the Supreme Soviet were elected in accordance with one set of laws but are now acting on the basis of another.

When we speak of a law-governed state (that is precisely what we would like to see Estonia be), it cannot be created by violating existing laws. Yet that is what we are doing. Here are the results: political tensions have appeared. Why? Let us try to find out. When it is claimed that the government represents the people, this should mean the entire people. But when a policy of giving priority of one nation over another is beginning to be pursued, and when it is claimed that one nation is better than other nations, history convincingly proves what this could lead to, and the tragedy which could follow. What is happening in our country? Is it possible to ignore the fact that in our Republic one-third of the population does not speak the state language? Yet this is being ignored. It is a fact. When Russian-speaking people peacefully demonstrate (incidentally, people go to Vyshgorod to defend their rights and the members of the government do not deem fit even to meet them) what is achieved? Do they consider such people to be second class? This has already happened twice. And is it not a sacrilege when so-called "observers" of people who are holding meetings sit on top of the domes of Aleksandr Nevskiy Cathedral? Who intended to attack these peaceful people? Who does the government fear? Its own people? No one intends to bring the government down. It will fall by itself, for it is practicing an antipeople policy. It was no accident that mixed with political there were economic slogans at the meeting. The demands which they raised were justified. For example, last summer, when the government told us that price increases are allegedly caused by the lack of Union government subsidies, all of a sudden Mr Savisaar said that we had received a subsidy for 27 million rubles for fish purchases. Did he say where this money went?

After the meeting, our representatives met with A. Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. This was a discussion between deaf people. The leadership is unwilling soberly to assess the existing situation. The situation, I repeat, is extremely explosive. Now, while you and I are talking, two Republic Supreme Soviet deputies have begun a hunger strike as a protest against the policy of the government. They are Sergey Petinov and Vladimir Lebedev.

[Correspondent] Will there be strikes in their support?

[Annus] I have always opposed strikes as a method of struggle. However, our other methods have been exhausted. I have been informed that a mass political strike has broken out. Considering our weak economy, it would be very damaging. But what else is there to do?

We, communists, will do everything possible to avoid conflict situations and see to it that strikes are as well organized as was the meeting. The government must know that the workers will be able to defend their rights.

[Correspondent] A great deal is being said currently about the creation of a National Salvation Committee, as was the case in Lithuania.

[Annus] A Coordination Committee has already been set up in Estonia, which is coordinating the efforts of all social organizations and movements. The Estonian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee is being represented by Central Committee Secretary Pavel Panfilov. One of the tasks of the committee is for the actions which will be carried out in support of the demands of the working people not to result in dramatic conflicts. The democrats say that a revolutionary perestroika is taking place in our country. As we know, however, a revolution must be organized. Such is the function assumed by the Coordination Committee.

[Correspondent] Nonetheless, is a diarchy not developing in our country?

[Annus] Frankly speaking, a triarchy already exists in the Republic: Supreme Soviet, Citizens' Committees, and Interregional Council of People's Deputies. This, however, is anarchy. Therefore, the power should belong to the people, who must appoint their deputies who will represent them in the Supreme Soviet. But if the Supreme Soviet rubber stamps laws against the people it must go. That is precisely what the labor collectives are demanding now. Why is it that the government, acting like an ostrich, sticking its head in the sand, does not hear these demands?

[Correspondent] In the present stressed situation I have also heard views, such as "the Communists have lost their authority and in order to seize the power once again they will ally themselves with the military."

[Annus] Let us begin with the rumors. Rumors and the exacerbation of passions are not accidental. Listen to Estonian radio and watch the television. Are they not heating up the passions? Yet they, in any case, one would assume, are the official organs of the Republic's government. People have already forgotten the fact that the Communist Party voluntarily surrendered its power. But what happened in our country? Our entire tragedy is that the power of one party shifted to another. All of us know that in order to become a minister, in the past one had to be a member of the CPSU. Now one must be a member of the People's Front. Furthermore, the same governmental methods remained. We do not have to go far to look for examples. The so-called defense of the Toompea Palace, which no one intended to rush, was organized in the worst traditions of Stalinism. The fact that the diktat from the center could turn into a diktat by the Republic, which the Communists warned about, is already seen in the scorn displayed by the government toward a segment of the Estonian population.

It is being said that the Communists intend to overthrow the existing power in Estonia. It is not the Communists who intend to overthrow the regime but it is the regime that is overthrowing itself through its actions.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that the Communists are not aspiring to rule?

[Annus] Our objective is not the seizure of power but the forming of a coalition government with representatives not only from the People's Front but also with Communists, independent democrats, Vaba Eesti, the Christian Democratic movements, etc. I am convinced that, sooner or later, such a government will appear. It is then that civil peace and tranquility will prevail.

The Communists are the party of the social protection of the people and that party will defend its principles through civilized methods and not with the help of army units.

[Correspondent] In that case I would like to ask you the following: various so-called "defense detachments" are being created in the Republic. To what purpose? What makes them necessary in the present situation?

[Annus] My attitude toward this is negative. But let us get to the bottom of things. Kaytseliyta and Kotukaytse detachments have begun to be created. In politics as in physics, however, there cannot exist one extreme without another. As a counterbalance, we have begun to create worker units. Now we have three organized forces opposing each other. With a feeling of full responsibility we must realize that it would take even the slightest flash for these three forces to swing into action. Incidentally, to the best of my knowledge, both physical training and ideological work are taking place in these three detachments. In practical terms, we are creating one more explosive hotbed, which could lead to unpredictable results. This must be understood by everyone, the government first of all. Personally, I would like for all such formations to be disbanded, leaving only the legitimate authorities. Unfortunately, no one intends to do so.

[Correspondent] I would like to ask you one more question. Two conflicting views exist on the subject of B. Yeltsin's arrival and the signing of documents. Some consider it a victory, whereas others speak of Yeltsin's treason.

[Annus] Let us start with the history of the event. Until recently, we were being accused of being "the party of the night." However, no one even mentions the existence of the People's Front of the night. Yet it was formed during the night, in the April days of 1988, in the premises of Estonian Television. Let us extend this parallel. Why did Boris Yeltsin have to come in Estonia precisely at night? Why the hasty trip? Enough of that.

Here is something else that unwittingly comes to mind. Why is it that the leader of Russia, who came to defend Russian interests in Estonia, did not deign to see their representatives. It is true that our deputy groups were

nonetheless able to meet with him briefly, but that was all. That was why slogans appeared at the last meeting, charging Yeltsin with treason.

[Correspondent] There were other posters as well, however.

[Annus] Naturally. This is legitimate. The people are free to express their views and assess various events. Time will show who was right and who was wrong. As a communist, I do not support such actions. Why all this haste, this show? Let us speak honestly and frankly: all of this was aimed at the president of the USSR. Is it that Russia is not now part of the USSR? Does Yeltsin have to turn to the United Nations? I do not understand such actions.

[Correspondent] However, as we say, what happened happened. In your view, how will events develop in the future?

[Annus] I am no prophet. I see only one possible way: all of us must sit around the conference table. In the matter of price setting, for example, we should go back to the starting point, for prices are also a political matter which should also be part of a single trend. Anarchy can bring nothing good.

[Correspondent] Now that prices have been mentioned, it seems to me that currently politicians and economists no longer think alike.

[Annus] Economics is always specific while politics is the art of compromise. Unfortunately, our politics has turned into intrigue. If we were to remove the intrigues there would be nothing left. One of the deputies described the Savisaar program as the program of the bright future. However, it contains nothing but declarations. When dilettantism appears in economics, economic solutions become primitive. That is why the people also raised the slogan, "The Government of Dilettantes Must Resign." Problems cannot be solved at the expense of the consumer, for otherwise we shall bring the Republic down to a state of poverty. Incidentally, those who raise the slogan of being hungry but free are by no means hungry themselves. Many of them earn quite high salaries.

We must stop and soberly assess the situation. The solution to the existing situation should be solved through the sober joint thinking by politicians and economists. I believe, however, that this can be accomplished by a different government.

Or else here is another example of intrigue. The Law on the Language was passed. The passing of such a law was necessary. But what is being done to implement it? Nothing. We are impetuously coining laws but have no mechanism with which to enact them. How can we speak of such a mechanism and of the fact that Estonia has become a state when we even lack a constitution. Yet we

have decided to live according to the law. The legal mechanism which now exists in our country is one of the sources of our difficulties.

Here is another case of intrigue. The Law on the Economic Border was passed. However, this is a fig leaf. Why do we need to play such games? Yes, I am in favor of Republic sovereignty. We already have it. We do not have to travel to Moscow, as was the case in the past, to seek approval of a recipe to make pickles.

Is this not intrigue when we have two ministers of foreign affairs? One is in charge of international policy with the West and the other with the East. Incidentally, when a great power, of which Estonia is a part, is described as the side of light, the East, this once again characterizes the ignorance of our pseudo-politicians. It is this economic and political break with the Union, which we are noticing today, which would hit us even worse tomorrow, in my view. We engaged in propaganda based on ignorance. It was claimed that we shall buy raw materials low and sell goods high. Everyone understands, however, that nothing will be given to us for free.

[Correspondent] If I may, here is a "provocative" question. In Mr Savisaar's position, what would you do?

[Annus] First of all, I do not aspire to be in the position of our Mr Savisaar or in any other person's place. But now that you asked, I would first of all gather around my cabinet and the deputies and would ask all of us to think together as to how to come out of the existing situation. I would demand the implementation of the demands of the working people concerning a price review. I would approve a moratorium on price increases until this question has been resolved throughout the country. And, speaking honestly, I would accept the IME as a political document and would say that I do not have an economic program and would then resign. I would begin to work in an area in which I can accomplish something. I do not understand people who try to swim against the current. How long could one swim against the current, perhaps a month or a couple of months, after which one would be exhausted. Incidentally, the demand for the resignation of the Savisaar government is not a communist invention. You may recall that slightly over a month ago this was demanded by other movements as well.

[Correspondent] Could this situation bring about a presidential rule?

[Annus] Everything depends on us, on our confrontation. At present, a presidential rule is somewhere beyond the horizon. However, should the confrontation intensify and, God forbid, should blood be shed, as in Lithuania, at that point, naturally, we shall have no other solution. Today, however, we still have the possibility of solving problems on a civilized basis, and of preventing the worst from happening. We shall see.

From the editors:

Without sharing many of the assessments and conclusions expressed by the Estonian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee secretary, we are publishing this interview so that, in our troubling times, the readers may be informed of the views of the leader of a major party on basic problems which are causing stress and confrontation within society today. In order to have a dialogue, we must listen to one another.

New Latvian Farmers' Party Formed

91P50131A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 3

[From the column "Pages of the Latvian Press" compiled by Ina Oskaya: "From the newspaper LATVIJAS JAUNATNE: There Is Such a Party"]

[Text] The time has come to put an end to the argument of whether farmers need to have a political organization. This month, the Farmers' Union of Latvia [Krestyanskiy Soyuz Latvii], a party which has left a deep imprint on the history of the republic, renewed its activity. The names of two of Latvia's presidents, Karlis Ulmanis and Alberts Kviesis, as well as many other famous political figures are connected with this party.

Speaking at the founding congress, A. Berkis (who was elected the first chairman of the reborn party) emphasized that the basic political line of the Farmers' Union is the defense of private property in rural areas. "Only the re-establishment of small-scale private ownership can renew working morale," he said.

'Equality' Faction's Nonparticipation in Parliament Explained

91UN1028A SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
13 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by A. Reshetnikov: "Parliamentary Opposition's Diary"]

[Text] Why are deputies in the "Equality" faction still not working in the parliament? What sort of issues do they consider at their sessions?

We give the floor to Deputy A. Reshetnikov, a member of the faction's secretariat.

Over the past 10 days (from 2 to 12 February) deputies belonging to the "Equality" faction have been giving their principal attention to thoroughly analyzing the laws and legislative acts adopted by Latvia's Supreme Soviet from the standpoint of their conformity to international human rights pacts. The faction's detailed document on this issue is in the final stage. We intend to present it to the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, and also to send it to a number of international organizations.

Full responsibility for the fact that the factions are still working separately lies with the radicals from the

Latvian People's Front, who have persistently thwarted the start of work of the Consultative Conciliation Council, which is made up of equal numbers of both factions' deputies. For its part, "Equality" has presented a list of five deputies who are prepared at any moment to begin work on the council. That proposal was made in the parliament for the first time back on 29 January. At its Monday, 11 February, meeting the Latvian People's Front faction once again failed to approve the makeup of its half of the Conciliation Council. That happened despite the fact that J. Dinevic, leader of the Latvian People's Front faction, met with our faction on that same day, and an agreement was reached to begin the work of the Consultative Conciliation Council the next day. On that same day, we prepared for discussion in the council our proposals for the agenda of upcoming plenary sessions of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet. They are as follows:

1. A Supreme Soviet declaration on cooperation with parties, public and political organizations.
2. An addition to the temporary rules of order guaranteeing the rights of the parliamentary minority.
3. Discussion of a regular channel and station on Latvian television and radio for the factions of the Supreme Soviet.
4. A Supreme Soviet decree on citizenship.
5. A Supreme Soviet declaration on the observance of human rights in Latvia regardless of nationality, political convictions, religious belief, or occupation.
6. Discussion of the responsibility of the mass media that express the government's view.
7. The law on voluntary militia's aides.
8. A discussion of militarized formations of the Latvian Congress of Citizens (aizsargi).
9. Discussion of the activities of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and Internal Affairs.
10. A report by the minister of agriculture on the economic consequences of privatization in agriculture.
11. A report by the cabinet of ministers on the structure and proposed budget of the department of defense.

Our draft Supreme Soviet declaration on cooperation with parties, public and political organizations is offered to readers today.

Draft of the "Equality" Faction, 11 February 1991

Declaration of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet

Under the conditions of the actual multiparty system that exists in the Latvian Republic, the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet deems it impermissible for it to enter into agreements regarding the coordination of its actions with any party, political or public organization.

The policies of parties, political and public organizations are followed in the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet only by factions and individual deputies.

A.V. Gorbunovs, chairman,
Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet.

Rubiks Assures Voters He Will Remain in Latvia

91UN1028B SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
14 Feb 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by I. Kharlanova, with the Latvian CP Central Committee's Press Center: "A.P. Rubiks: 'I Will Remain With You'"]

[Text] These words of the USSR and republic people's deputy met with unanimous and prolonged applause from the audience gathered on 12 February in the assembly hall of the Riga Civil Aviation Flying and Technical Academy. It was the site of A. P. Rubiks's regular meeting with his constituents. And the questions, of which, as usual, there was no shortage, was the following: "Is it true that you intend to leave the republic to accept a promotion in Moscow?"

"Honestly, I have never even thought of any such thing, although I have received and keep receiving the most flattering and tempting offers. For me, quitting the arena of such difficult sociopolitical life in the republic at this time would mean running away from difficulties and betraying the interests of the tens of thousands of republic inhabitants who, along with me, have not abandoned hopes that we can keep anyone from turning the democratic transformations in the republic onto a dangerous path of development."

I think this answer by Deputy A. P. Rubiks will reassure the many Communists who, hearing the provocative rumors spread by the "democratic" press that claims to be the republic's most truthful press, shared their concern in telephone calls to the Latvian CP Central Committee. One could not help but agree with their arguments as to the intentions that motivated the organizers and disseminators of those rumors: to strike another blow against the Latvian Communist Party. Many tens of thousands of Communists link their membership in it with the leader whose example is helping them overcome their anxiety in the face of the obvious danger with which the republic's "democratic" forces are presently confronting the Communists.

There was no false emotionalism in these sincere words expressing rank-and-file Communists' gratitude to the leader of the Latvian Communist Party. At the aforementioned meeting with voters, Alfreds Petrovich, for example, cited numerous facts indicating that anticommunist attitudes are gaining strength in the republic. Among those facts are the following: In the settlement of Vestien in Madonskiy Rayon, in broad daylight the tractor driver J. Vilcins burst into the apartment of Kh. Vanag, second secretary of the Latvian CP Rayon Committee, with the words: "Get dressed and get outside! We are going to shoot you right now!" E. Kunkulis, first

secretary of the Latvian CP Orgskiy raykom, who, incidentally, took part in the 1940 events to restore Soviet power in Latvia, has been continually subjected to similar psychological attacks. He was recently even forced to spend the night away from home in an attempt to save himself from fanatical psychological persecution. In Balvskiy Rayon deputies belonging to the People's Front, pursuing openly political aims, forced Communist P. Ozolins to quit his office as chairman of the Tilzhskiy Rural Soviet. In Tsisis, Communists are being refused allocations of land plots for individual farms.

After the truly bloodcurdling facts that were heard, the question, "How much further does the situation in the republic have to be 'complicated' in order for M. S. Gorbachev to introduce presidential rule here?" represented a kind of logical transition. "Or doesn't history sufficiently teach us that the most terrible threat to democracy and human rights is anticommunism?"

"Today our fate depends to a large extent on us ourselves," said Alfreds Petrovich in reply to this. "And it is closely bound up today with the broad general problem of whether the USSR is to be or not to be. Everyone who cares about its fate—not in the old sense of the word, but in the new sense of a renewed union in which the republics receive the maximum autonomy—should so declare with his vote in the referendum scheduled for March 17."

In this connection Alfreds Petrovich quoted an excerpt from a speech by D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet, at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists that was broadcast by Latvian Television on 31 January. "If we permit this Moscow referendum, we cannot know how many more people will have to be shot in order for the referendum's results to be favorable to Moscow." You do not have to be a genius to understand that the sort of person who could allow himself to say such a thing is by no means a politician with the kind of cool intelligence with which everyone who stands at the helm of power needs to be endowed today in order to avoid pushing society into a national disaster. Those are the words of a politician concerned with one thing—in the name of his own unslaked ambitions, to kindle tension in society, even at the price of forcing his own people, the love for whom he tirelessly professes, to lay their heads on the executioner's block.

The fact that this observation, which A. P. Rubiks has made repeatedly to various audiences, is not groundless, was confirmed by yet another question from the hall: "Why doesn't the republic press write anything about the facts that the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA uncovered regarding the January events—in particular, about the fact that many Finnish and Swedish journalists turned in plane tickets on the very day, 20 January. After all, that is direct evidence that the bloody provocation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs building, in which the special-purpose militia unit [OMON] was involved, was premeditated, and that those who arranged it wanted

very much to draw the maximum attention of the world public through accredited foreign news media."

"Those same foreign journalists are not refusing today to provide objective testimony to investigators on how the events actually developed on that Sunday, testimony which differs greatly from the version that the mouthpieces of the 'democratic forces' have been trying to drum in day in and day out. But as a person who has official authority, I shall refrain from offering any opinions on that matter until the investigation is completed by competent bodies."

A. P. Rubiks shared his opinions on other important current matters in social and political life and reported on his own activities in the country's Supreme Soviet and in the "Equality" faction in the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet. He answered many questions asked by the constituents.

Survey of Latvia's Political Parties

91UN1012A Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY
LATVII in Russian No 9, 10, Sep, Oct 90 pp 147-155

[Article by Rasma Vitolinya, Latvian CP Central Committee Ideological Commission consultant: "Who's Who: A Guide to the Latvian Political Map"]

[Text] The multiparty system has long been a reality of our times. The spectrum of political parties, movements and social and political organizations in our republic is already quite broad today, ranging, as the saying goes, from anarchists to monarchists. And more and more new stars continue to appear in the political sky.

Using programmatic documents and independent publications published by social and political organizations and movements as well as the republic press Rasma Vitolinya, a Latvian CP Central Committee Ideological Commission consultant, has prepared informational and analytical materials on the activities of new political movements and parties. Below we begin our publication of those materials. We hope that this guide will help you better orient yourself on the political map of Latvia.

It should be noted that many of the new parties' programmatic documents are not ideologically comprehensive. A number of positions held by organizations aligning themselves with various political orientations essentially coincide with and often repeat the basic themes of the political reform underway in our republic. Furthermore, many of the social and political associations which are emerging today have not yet become stable formations with well-developed structural and organizational ties. Among them there is often competition between various groups, each of which lays claim to leadership and influence within specific political orientations. Therefore our guide looks only at the fundamental documents of organizations which have a conceptual purpose, reflect their specific nature and allow us to assess the party's place in the broad spectrum of our republic's political life.

Latvian Green Party

The Latvian Green Party (LPZ [Latviyskaya partiya zelenykh]) was founded on 13 January 1990 in Jurmala at Lielupe. The membership is approximately 250; the members form groups, and the groups comprise sections. A central дума has been empowered to function until the 2nd Congress of the Provisional Coordinating Council.

The main party documents are the Manifesto and the Charter; work on a working program continues.

The Provisional Coordinating Council consists of 12 elected individuals. The party is headed by three co-chairmen: Olegs Batarevskis, Valts Vilnitis and Juris Zvirgzds. Ilmar Tirmanis is editor of the party newspaper LPZ VESTNESIS. The views of the Latvian Green Party are represented in the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet by seven deputies: Skaidrite Albertina, Olegs Batarevskis, Ilma Brinke, Indulis Emsis, Anna Seile, Dzintars Abikis and Arvids Ulme; at the present time these deputies support the People's Front platform.

The essence of the Latvian Green Party's activities is ecological problems and possible solutions to them. The Greens favor absolute compliance with environmental protection laws, uncompromising execution of those laws at every step, salvation of the nation and ensuring of proper ecological conditions for the nation's development. They do not support excessively pragmatic or technocratic ideas sometimes introduced in parliament and within the government accompanied by an appeal to establish order in the economy while putting the environmental struggle on hold. Survival must not be put off until tomorrow! The Latvian Green Party's slogans are: "For a free and green Latvia!" and "Refuse in order to live."

In the Latvian political spectrum the Latvian Green Party is in the center of political movements, just as the color green is located in the middle of the color spectrum.

Thus far the party's only cooperation with other political groups has been with the Latvian People's Front, in conjunction with which it entered the elections. The party will express its attitude toward changes in the Latvian People's Front following the latter's 3rd Congress, when it becomes clear what political position the People's Front will take.

The Latvian Green Party is an outgrowth of the Environmental Protection Club. The Environmental Protection Club remains the basis for the Green movement. The Latvian Green Party is the Greens' nerve center, while the Environmental Protection Club performs the role of radical informal initiator. The Latvian Green Party functions as a political department of the Environmental Protection Club.

The 2nd Latvian Green Party Congress is slated for November 1990.

Environmental Protection Club

The Environmental Protection Club (KZS [Klub zashchity sredy]) is an informal organization comprised of anyone who wishes to engage in environmental protection work. The Environmental Protection Club is a free and open structure; anyone may attend, speak, realize his or her ideas and leave the club without any sort of voting or resolutions. Each Environmental Protection Club member does practical work in his or her section.

Activities focus primarily on two areas: 1. matters pertaining to the army, its effect on nature and the ecological effects of its presence in Latvia; 2. the drinking water problem.

The Environmental Protection Club defines its place in republic political life as on the radical wing. It is willing to cooperate with any movements and parties to solve environmental problems.

The president of the Environmental Protection Club is Arvids Ulme, a Latvian Supreme Soviet deputy.

Latvian Liberal Party

On 28 January 1990 it was decided at the founding congress of the Latvian Political Union of Cooperatives to proclaim the establishment of the Latvian Liberal Party (LLP [Latviyskaya liberalnaya partiya]). A Latvian Liberal Party manifesto was adopted and the party leadership elected. The party chairman is Janis Danoss.

The party is not represented in the republic Supreme Soviet.

The Latvian Liberal Party's manifesto states that the party will seek paths to a social system which will ensure everyone the opportunity to take full responsibility for their own work and which will give people freedom of actions as personalities and individuals. "Our fathers lived in a free and independent Latvia, and it is our duty to ensure that our children will live in a country like that."

In the political realm the highest human value is individuality. The party rejects deification of any authority or a monopoly on the truth on the part of either an individual or a group of people who comprise the majority. Party members reject any dictates by state authority with regard to the molding of people's minds. They categorically reject assessment of people on the basis of class, caste or racial characteristics.

In the economic realm the right to property extends only to individuals. Every person has a right to own property and to conduct activities, for the results of which that person assumes full responsibility. The party rejects equal rights for various forms of property ownership, favoring priority for private property. The remaining forms of property are merely the sum of private holdings and also the products thereof.

In the social realm protection of the rights of the individual and property rights are the main and primary task of state authority. Charity is one of the essential hallmarks of a civilized society, and one which is contrasted with anonymous and standardized distribution of aid to the poor. Social assistance should be distributed only to various types of people crippled by accidental circumstances and not adequately socially provided for. Imposed social tutelage degrades the individual and is considered a crime by the party. The party condemns any and all violence against the individual regardless of the ideology for the sake of which it is committed. It opposes all wars, as well as glorification of any army.

Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party

Last year the Social Democratic movement in Latvia was reestablished, aided by both external and internal factors: a significant rise in respect for the international social democratic movement; specific instructions by the Foreign Committee of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party to step up work within Latvia itself as part of the struggle for national independence; and growing anti-communist sentiments in various segments of society.

On 26 July 1989 an initiative group brought individual party members together and formed the Riga Committee, which did the work necessary to create the All-Latvian Organization of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (LSDRP [Latviyskaya sotsial-demokraticheskaya rabochaya partiya]). On 7 September a working conference was held, and there the party's Charter and Provisional Program were adopted (these documents were published in the newspaper PADOMU JUNATNE between 5 October and 12 October).

On 2-3 December 1989 Jurmala was the scene of the 20th (Restorative) Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party Congress. The congress adopted a Charter and Program and elected the party's leadership organs, the Central Committee and the Central Committee Presidium.

Valdis Steins, a docent at Latvian University, candidate of geographical sciences, republic Supreme Soviet people's deputy and a member of the Latvian Committee, was elected party chairman.

His co-chairman is P. Butlers and the party secretary is N. Belskis.

At the beginning of 1990, before republic Supreme Soviet elections, the party split over political disagreements. Several structural units were expelled from the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, one of them, the Riga Organization, which comprised almost one-half of all members, approximately 360, as well as a group of old members. The formal reason for the expulsion was failure to comply with the Charter, but in fact the party members were being punished for their post-communist orientation. In April 1990 a new party based on the Riga

Organization was formed, the Latvian Social Democratic Party. It included the entire Russian-speaking section of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party.

The Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party has its own publications: the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT (published in Latvian and in Russian) (V. Steins, editor) and a second organ, the monthly NAROD I VLAST (L. Ladusans, interim editor).

From the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party Charter:

The All-Latvian Organization is the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party's permanent component in Latvia, and together with the Foreign Committee of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party it continues the work begun by the party established in 1904.

That means that in Latvia there is one social democratic workers' party, and the Foreign Committee constitutes a component of it. The head of the Foreign Committee is Vilnis Zalkalns, deputy chairman of the entire Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party.

The goal of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party is to create a united, democratic, well provided-for society. Its main tasks are to encourage realization of the commonly accepted ideals of social democracy with the aid of legislation and executive authority; to restore the Latvian Republic as a state entity; to preserve and perfect the cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities and to ensure equality of civil rights.

Principles for action: parliamentary, reformist and socially cooperative based on the principles of parity and partnership. Party membership: a Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party may be any citizen over the age of 18 regardless of ethnic or social background, religious beliefs, place of residence or membership in other social and political organizations who recognizes the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party Program and Charter and the ideas of social democracy and aids in the realization thereof.

The organizational structure consists of groups, which are organized into district organizations, which in turn are grouped into regional organizations (Kurzem, Zemgal, Seliy, Vidzem, Latgal and Riga), and the regional organizations form the All-Latvian Organization.

A Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party Youth Section has been established (Janis Tomels, chairman), but over the long term there are plans to transform it into a separate Latvian Social Democratic Youth Organization intended to unite the young people of both social democratic parties according to the principle of confederation.

From the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party Program:**Goals:**

A. political—creation of a cohesive, democratic, civilized society in a free and independent Latvian State. Development of society may not be subordinated to any privileged ideology;

B. economic—elimination of the state monopoly on ownership in areas of production and distribution of national wealth. Transition to a free market economy. Decentralization of production through the creation and implementation of a new tax system. Equality among all forms of property.

Creation of independent currency, banking and financial tax systems.

Implementation of agrarian reform, immediate elimination of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, and restoration of peasant farms. The land should be distributed to the farmers. All payment in kind and mandatory delivery of harvests to the state should cease.

C. ideological—creation of a society of social democracy to ensure freedom, justice and solidarity.

Categorical rejection of the doctrine of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and rejection of Marxist class theory, economic doctrine and explanation of the history of societal development.

The party's ideological primary sources are ethical socialism and the social democratic views of Raynis.

Assessment of the historical past. Attitudes toward the socialist orientation: the despotism of the party and the state has reduced society to a state of deep and universal crisis. We continue to live under the parasitic economic system of monopoly capitalism.

In June 1940 the Latvian Republic was occupied. Latvia was incorporated into the totalitarian structures of the USSR against the will of its people. The model of socialist development has been defeated throughout the world.

Attitude toward perestroika: the CPSU is not capable of controlling the processes of democratization of society and directing them.

Attitude toward the CPSU: openly negative and antagonistic. Though the program itself does not state this with complete clarity, nevertheless in many interviews and in newspapers it is being unambiguously declared that communist party activities in Latvia must be banned.

The stance of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party is anti-communist, and in that sense is close to the Republic Party. It prefers the Congress of Latvian Republic Citizens over the Supreme Soviet.

Attitude toward the nationalities question: defends the idea of cohesive ethnic coexistence and opposes incitement of ethnic hatred;

—equality and cooperation of all nations and peoples, the right of a people to strive for state independence;

the right of nations to self-determination; combination of national rights with human rights;

—a law to ensure the rights of national and ethnic groups in the Latvian Republic is essential.

Ecological problems: ecological restoration is a survival issue. It is essential that we conduct research, pass appropriate legislation, and mold ecological thinking and education. Market-based economic regulators to protect the environment should be introduced.

Moral values: liberty (of beliefs, speech and action), justice, solidarity, democracy (political, economic, solidarity-oriented and internationalist). Compliance with commonly accepted human rights.

Social base: the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party is a party of the working people, open to all people of social-democratic orientation. A Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party member should not be a member of any other parties.

Tactics and methods of operation. Attainment of voters' support. Development of alternative draft laws and programs. Support for citizens' initiative and sponsoring of charity events. Study of public opinion and propaganda for social-democratic ideas. Publishing activity.

Latvian Social Democratic Party

In April 1990 the Latvian Social Democratic Party (LSDP [Latvijskaya sotsial-demokraticeskaya partiya]) was founded. However, it should be kept in mind that as of today the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party and the Latvian Social Democratic Party are actually one party which split soon after its congress. Presently 90 percent of the Latvian Social Democratic Party's ranks are comprised of former Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party members.

The Latvian Social Democratic Party feels that in the balance of political forces its place is with the democratic center with a slight inclination to the right; it has a close affinity to the non-party center of the Latvian People's Front and the moderate wing of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia.

Assertions that the independent Latvian CP has joined forces with the Latvian Social Democratic Party are completely unfounded. In this connection the Latvian Social Democratic Party has stated the following: "The Latvian Social Democratic Party remains an independent party; no merger with the independent Latvian CP has occurred. The independent Latvian CP has begun evolving in the direction of social democracy, but the result of that process is not subject to prediction. The independent Latvian CP will most likely adopt a purely social democratic program and name, yet even with balance among the interests of various small groups it will hardly be able to realize modern social democratic policy in practice. Most likely it will become a left socialist party of democratic orientation. Roughly the same as European social democracy was in the 1950's

following its decisive break with the traditions of the democratic Marxists. It is possible and essential to work together with a party of this type as with any other political force, i.e. on the basis of the principles of parity and partnership, with the goal of restoring the independence of the Latvian Republic and reestablishing democracy. Membership in a democratic political party is the result of a personal and completely free choice, not the decision of a collective where everything is decided by the majority. It is impossible to become social democrats merely by changing a party's name, just as it would be impossible thus to become liberals or conservatives."

The activities of the Latvian Social Democratic Party are based on the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party's program guidelines, i.e. the Latvian Social Democratic Party's program is still under development. An Latvian Social Democratic Party declaration has been adopted, setting goals for the near future.

From the Latvian Social Democratic Party declaration: the ethical foundation of social democracy is people and their interests. Social democracy is a party for which social problems are of the greatest importance. It is a party which favors humane democracy. It is closely aligned with the social-democratic ideas of E. Bernstais and J. Rainis.

Social-democratic policy:

- social democracy is a value system the goals of which are to create a life worthy of human beings, in which each generation works anew for revival of humane values. Its fundamental values are liberty, justice and solidarity;
- supports real people's power; favors an independent, democratic and rule-of-law Latvian Republic; favor a neutral Latvia free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as part of a free Europe;
- recognizes the rights of minorities and rejects any dictatorship, including a dictatorship of the majority. Social democrats believe that the most important forms of democracy are political, economic, solidarity-oriented and interethnic;
- political democracy is interpreted to mean a society in which all ideology is separate from the state, and in which discrimination is not permitted and there are no privileges;
- economic democracy is interpreted to mean a legal system which guarantees protection for all forms of property, civilized competition and legislation restricting monopolies;
- solidarity-oriented democracy is interpreted to mean the totality of judicial laws and moral standards which guarantee equal rights of access to information, safeguarding of individuals and legal protection which aids in adaptation if the situation in society changes suddenly;

—favors interethnic democracy which will ensure all ethnic groups equal rights, cooperation and cultural development and will not permit ethnic protectionism and will support the right of a nation to its own state.

The chairman of the Latvian Social Democratic Party is Janis Dinevics, a Latvian Supreme Soviet deputy, head of the Latvian People's Front faction, candidate of technical sciences and former senior instructor at Latvian University. The co-chairman of the Latvian Social Democratic Party and the chairman of the Latvian Social Democratic Party's Russian-speaking section is Yakob Briskin, a Latvian People's Front member. Publications: the weekly newspaper NEDELYAS LAPA, which has been published since 4 April 1990 (M. Kravalis, editor); and the newspaper of the Russian-speaking section, MENSHEVIK (V. Volkov, editor).

Latvian Agriculturalists' Union

On 15 April 1989 the founding congress of the Latvian Agriculturalists' Union (SSL [Soyuz selskokhozyaystvennikov Latvii]) was held. At the congress a Charter and Program were adopted and a League Council, Central Board and Auditing Commission elected. The league's chairman is Alberts Kauls, and its deputy chairman is Aivars Bertulis.

Concerning the status of the Latvian Agriculturalists' Union: it is a voluntary public organization of agricultural workers and persons who facilitate the development of agriculture, a league of like thinkers bound together by their common interests and purposeful work. The Agriculturalists' Union is a social and commercial organization which works in the realm of administration of the agricultural complex, is creating a structure for cooperative-type management and is rendering practical help to agricultural enterprises, tenant farms and peasant farms with finding solutions to their economic, legal, political and commercial problems, including improvement and strengthening of production-related and economic ties with foreign firms (excerpted from the Latvian Agriculturalists' Union program).

The Latvian Agriculturalists' Union's principal demand is that peasants be ensured the opportunity to acquire the means of production, lease land and have a guaranteed inheritance right.

The Latvian Agriculturalists' Union favors the establishment of a rule-of-law state and republic sovereignty; equal rights for and free development of various forms of property, commercial activity and sales, the economic development thereof and provision of constitutional guarantees; and a free transition from one form of commercial activity to another.

The Latvian Agriculturalists' Union cooperates with the Latvian People's Front and all progressive forces, with the Kolkhoz Council and with the Farmers' Federation of Latvia.

At the union's founding congress there were lengthy discussions of what sort of league it should be, whether a social-commercial or social-political organization. A majority of the delegates were inclined toward the status of a commercial organization. A little more than a year later the same question is still a timely one: do rural areas need their own party? If so, then what kind of party? These issues will be settled at the upcoming Latvian Agriculturalists' Union congress.

During the precongress period various opinions were expressed on this issue. It is clear that the Agriculturalists' Union should carry out both commercial and socio-political work. In order to carry out commercial activity and defend the interests of rural producers (individual and collective) it is essential to develop political activism and pursue a bold and well-reasoned political course.

Today there is not a single political party which consistently defends and protects the interests of rural workers.

The republic parliament has thus far kept its distance relative to rural problems; a political vacuum has arisen in rural areas. In parliament the Agriculturalist' Union is represented by 25 deputies (many of whom are members of various other political organizations as well).

In society discussion is underway regarding options for the future status of the Latvian Agriculturalists' Union:

- as a social-commercial organization (during elections a coalition of parties and social movements to protect the interests of rural residents would be formed);

- as a political party;

- as a social-commercial organization, but with a political party to be established in parallel as the political backbone of the Latvian Agriculturalists' Union.

There are plans to hold the 2nd Latvian Agriculturalists' Union Congress on 24 November 1990.

The Agriculturalists' Union's press organ is the newspaper ZEME (in Latvian) and ZEMLYA (in Russian); its editor is Aivars Zile.

Latvian Farmers' Union

On 5 July 1990 Riga was the site of a conference of those who supported reestablishment of the work of the Farmers' Union. This conference was attended by 115 people, among whom were seven Latvian Supreme Soviet deputies.

At the conference it was stated that according to preliminary data the Latvian Farmers' Union (LKS [Latviyskiy krestyanskiy soyuz]) had 384 members, among them 32 so-called "vecbiedri" (members of the former Latvian Farmers' Union), with 68 percent coming from rural areas and 87 percent peasants. A commission was established to make preparations for a Latvian Farmers'

Union congress, with 22 commission members. A Charter was adopted and a Program heard in its first reading.

The founders of the Latvian Farmers' Union regard themselves as the successors of the Latvian Farmers' Union (the party of K. Ulmanis) dating from the time of the Latvian State. It is their opinion that a united peasant party should be created out of the former farmers' political parties of the Latvian Republic.

Historical Background:

In the Latvian Republic (from 1918 until May 1934) there existed four independent peasant parties: the Latvian Farmers' Union (the party of the large-scale farmers); the Union of New Peasants; the Party of New Farmers and Small-Scale Land Owners; and the Latgale Union of Christian Farmers.

In the 1918-34 period Latvia changed governments or cabinets of ministers 18 times. In 16 of those governments the main coalition party was the Latvian Farmers' Union, and in 11 governments the President of Ministers was a Latvian Farmers' Union representative.

The Latvian Farmers' Union is a parliamentary party. The main postulates of party activity are independence, democracy and stability. The Latvian Farmers' Party structure is this: primary cells at the volost level; party members or "zemsaviesi" who operate in society, in parliament and through the press (members may not simultaneously be members of other parties).

The Latvian Farmers' Union's efforts are directed at implementing agrarian reform and restoring private property. It encompasses various differing positions. The radicals feel that the land should be turned over to private use immediately and that the rights of the former owners should be restored on an obligatory basis. In the opinion of the "moderates" this should be done only in those cases in which the former owner is able to work the land himself. At the upcoming party congress the party's position on this issue will be conclusively defined.

The Latvian Farmers' Union's social base: 17 percent of all workers are employed in agriculture (by way of comparison, in Ulmanis' time this figure was 70 percent).

There are various opinions regarding who may be a Latvian Farmers' Union member. Some say only peasants, others feel that kolkhoz members, the rural intelligentsia and blue-collar workers and engineers employed in agriculture should be included as well, while yet others feel that it is essential to get the women's movement and rural students interested in party affairs, make contacts with Scout and Guide organizations, and get schoolchildren (mazpulceni) interested in the party.

In the opinion of P. Krugalyauzha, "in order to realize commercial interests we must have laws and representation in parliament. Economics and politics are interconnected and interact with each other; without laws there is no power. The Latvian Farmers' Union is counting on the support and assistance of the Latvian Farmers' Federation and the Union of Agriculturalists of Latvia."

The Latvian Farmers' Union's allies are the supporters of the Latvian People's Front, the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia and the citizens' committees. On citizenship issues the Latvian Farmers' Union's position coincides with the opinion of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia and the Citizens' Congress.

There are plans to hold a Latvian Farmers' Union congress at the end of 1990.

Latvian Farmers' Federation

On 28 April 1990 the founding congress of the Latvian Farmers' Foundation (LKF [Latviyskaya krestyanskaya federatsiya]) was held. In attendance were approximately 250 delegates from all the republic's rayons and 100 guests, including guests from Denmark, England, Finland and Sweden.

The Latvian Farmers' Federation is a commercial organization which protects the commercial interests of farmers. The federation's chairman is Andris Rozentals, chairman of the Saldusskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. Its board is comprised of six people.

The Latvian Farmers' Federation has defined its priority goals:

- negotiations with the government regarding termination of financing for unprofitable collective farms and transfer of the funds thus made available to peasant farms;
- development of cooperatives in rural areas;
- use of existing enterprises and establishment of new enterprises to process agricultural produce;
- solutions to economic and consumer problems in rural areas;
- study of foreign experience and development of recommendations.

Farmer Fund

The Farmer Fund (KF [Krestyanskiy fond]) was established in March 1990. The head of the fund is Vitalijs Teivans.

The Farmer Fund is an independent commercial and financial organization which renders assistance to peasant farms. The Farmer Fund's work is based on seven programs. These are programs for social orientation, foreign economic relations, financial aid, technical

service and material-technical supply, domestic marketing and trade, restoration and construction of peasant farms and establishment of local production facilities.

An informational bureau is being established.

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Lithuania's Vice Premier Sees Need for Government Apparatus Changes

91UN1101A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
13 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Republic of Lithuania Deputy Prime Minister Vytautas Pakalniskis; place and date not given: "The Government Carries Out the Will of the State"]

[Text] Our new government has been working for one month now at a time that has been very difficult for the Republic of Lithuania from a political and economic point of view. At the request of ELTA, Deputy Prime Minister Vytautas Pakalniskis has agreed to share his thoughts on the beginning of government work, and to discuss his vision of the activities of government members, the composition and interaction of individual structures in its apparatus, and the style of work of the government.

The deputy prime minister said: First of all, I would like to stress that the present government was formed under abnormal circumstances, even spontaneously. Undoubtedly, this hampers the initial stage of our operations. At the same time, we should say that this government does not intend to destroy what the previous government has done; perhaps, some corrections will have to be made concerning its legacy. Endeavors that have commenced should be continued, and the ones that have not should be initiated. The main point is that our work will be accomplished in the name of the same common goal.

Of course, both the circumstances and tasks have changed. Apparently, we may consider changing some priorities. However, executing laws adopted by the Supreme Council should be the main function of the government as an organ of executive power; the government should enjoy the confidence of the council. I have happened to hear and read in the press that, supposedly, this government obeys the will of the majority the Supreme Council too much. However, this is natural. This is what I think: If the laws adopted by the Supreme Council do not conform to the line of the government, the latter may attempt to reconcile these differing approaches by submitting different drafts and exercising the right of legislative initiative. If this becomes impossible, the government should resign. Its activities will be destructive otherwise.

I believe that the current government should pay more attention to domestic policy and managing the economy. We should engage in the basics of developing a market

economy in a very serious manner so as to make economic and commercial organizations interested in efficient work. It is necessary to find ways to reassign labor and production structures so that necessary things will be produced instead of production being performed for the sake of production. On the other hand, a collective of like-minded people should be put together in the government with a view to achieving these goals. People subscribing to various political views may find a niche for themselves in the Cabinet of Ministers, certainly, as long as they are helpful to an independent Lithuania because the government should express the policy of the state.

A well-organized working apparatus should also be created if the government is to operate normally. It should be quite independent. I understand that all of us think differently and feel differently. However, we have a duty to be able to subordinate ourselves to a common goal. At the same time, I would like to refute rumors concerning our intentions to fire all former apparatus employees to a man.

It is equally important to staff efficient structures that will not duplicate each other. The following structure existed—the prime minister, his deputies, and the Administration of Affairs to which departments, counselors, and other specialists reported. As I see it, this structure was not effective enough. This is how I view the functions of the newly formed apparatus. The Administration of Affairs will be a service with support, mostly economic, functions. Government counselors in specialized departments will form another group. A separate division, a secretariat, will consist of direct counselors, aides, and advisers to the leadership who will analyze and collate the work of specialized departments and engage in forecasting. I believe that all ministers should simultaneously act as deputy prime ministers for their area of responsibility in order to have an opportunity to work independently and effectively. A new position should also appear, that of a minister without portfolio. He will coordinate and ensure the purposeful operation of the entire government apparatus and its interaction with ministries and departments. We are abandoning some departments and other nonfunctional structures in order to enliven the operation of the ministries and the ministers themselves.

We should form a working apparatus that will not suppress the ministries, and will eliminate duplicating structures. At the same time, we need to reinforce the monitoring of the execution of adopted resolutions because, as I have noticed, some people have a simplified notion of carrying out government instructions. It would be profoundly wrong to consider everything accomplished just because one has presented a draft at a meeting of the government, and it has been discussed and referred for execution.

I think that we will form the nucleus of the apparatus within several weeks. It is possible that all ministers will be confirmed. Perhaps, at that point we will have more time for a multitude of our immediate responsibilities.

In summation, I would also like to say that the government will not consider itself infallible. However, it will also defend its views insofar as this will be in the interest of the people, Lithuania, and the state.

Lithuania's 'Green' Party Leader Interviewed

91UN1104A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
26 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Geographic Sciences Irena Ignataviciene, senior of the "Green" Party of Lithuania, by EKHO LITVY correspondent R. Osherov; place and date not given: "Harmony Is Our Goal"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The "Green" Party immediately conjures up numerous protest actions against the Ignalina AES [nuclear power station] and other similar events. Therefore, is environmental protection your main goal?

[Ignataviciene] Not quite. Harmony is our main goal—harmonious relations between man and nature, between people, between different nationalities, as well as achieving harmony on our little piece of land called Lithuania. Hence the points of our program the implementation of which furthers this end: the protection of nature, ethnic languages, and people. Our ideals include an independent Lithuania and life in freedom, which is full of human joy, when the people are free to live comfortably and peacefully in an environment of goodwill, and be physically and morally healthy.

[Correspondent] Should the "Greens" perhaps have a political and economic program, like any other party?

[Ignataviciene] We advocate a so-called "Green" economy, that is, in addition to a high level of economic development, which goes without saying, our party believes that, first of all, nature should not suffer. We are in favor of ecologically pure production facilities, in favor of the people not killing themselves and everything around them in the course of their operations.

It is certainly necessary to engage in vigorous political activities in order to successfully practice our principles. Our party has four deputies in the parliament of the republic. We consider work with the masses to be very important, and we meet with the public on a regular basis.

It appears to me that our environmental-protection activities will not be entirely effective while enterprises reporting to the Union remain in Lithuania; we are working "with our hands tied." Serious and, most importantly, effective decisions may be made only when Lithuania is free.

[Correspondent] My impression is that the situation with environmental-protection activities will be even more complicated in an independent Lithuania... Electricity will be needed; you cannot get by without it. They say that nuclear electricity is the cheapest. In addition,

the newspapers are now reporting openly that an increase in electricity rates is the result of efforts by the "Greens" regarding the Kaisiadoriai GAES [peak-storage plant].

[Ignataviciene] Our line is firm: We will not change our position. We will do everything to have the Ignalina AES closed. Of course, jobs should be provided for the entire work force; these people should not suffer. However, the very existence of Lithuania, as well as of the entire region, cannot be put at risk. The consequences of a possible accident at the Ignalina station will surpass Chernobyl, and such an accident is possible.

As far as the Kaisiadoriai GAES is concerned, the "Green" movement fought it even before the party was set up. At present, we are discussing this problem with the participation of specialists and scientists. Our party still has not taken a position on this issue.

We should not forget that alternative types of energy exist that are already being used throughout the world: wind, river, and solar energy, as well as geothermal energy, of which Lithuania has considerable underground resources. In addition, we should not forget the efficient use of electricity. Judging from the experience of European countries, considerable reserves are found in this sphere. We feel that our position and proposals are supported by the leadership of the republic.

[Correspondent] You have mentioned the "Green" movement separately from the party. Are these phenomena different?

[Ignataviciene] Our party has been spawned by the "Green" movement. Of course, our tasks are similar, and our contacts are quite close. We hold many events, such as picketing and actions, jointly. However, more mature, older people have joined the party, whereas the movement consists mostly of younger people: schoolchildren, students. Accordingly, there are some differences.

[Correspondent] I heard that your position on the duty of military service is one of them. As a rule, the "Greens" in other countries are against serving in the army. Meanwhile, Z. Vaisvila, one of the three seniors of the party, even headed the Commission for the Defense of the Land...

[Ignataviciene] We are against war. We believe that in the future the world will be able to do without armies. However, there is nothing that can be done about it as long as states such as Iraq and others exist. For now, it is necessary to defend the land. Of course, the following is good, it is ideal: The people will hold hands, and a live chain of people will be able to protect everything and stop all tanks. Unfortunately, the world is not like that yet, as shown by the recent events in Vilnius.

[Correspondent] You said that harmonious relations between nationalities are one of the goals of the party. How is this to be accomplished?

[Ignataviciene] Interethnic relations are a very important issue. Our party has addressed it from the very beginning. Our opinion is that the people of different nationalities mutually enrich one another as they enrich themselves. This has been the case in Lithuania for a long time, and in the future we will strive for this. Of course, there are problems, but we cannot say that they are unsolvable. We should look for, and find a common language. We will certainly understand each other if we want to. If we go on acting like this we will be able to achieve a lot. There will be enough bread, enough space, and enough sun for all of us in Lithuania.

At present, the "Green" Party views not only mutual relations between man and nature as its main task, but also the restoration of human relations between the people who live on Earth side by side.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

Lithuania's Liberal Union Chairman Interviewed

91UN1103A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
14 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Vytautas Radzvilas, chairman of the board of the Union of Liberals of Lithuania, by correspondent O. Osherov; place and date not given: "Liberals—Philosophers or Business People?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] It is said that the Union of Liberals is a philosophers' party....

[Radzvilas] Truly, it all began with a group of intellectuals—lecturers at Vilnius University primarily, philosophers and legal scholars—organizing a Liberals Club in March 1990. Many of them were active participants in Sajudis activity and had drawn up its documents, including an alternative election program, which was not adopted, it is true.

Theoretical debate was conducted in the club on Lithuania's most urgent problems—chiefly on legal and economic subjects. A manifesto calling for the creation of the Union of Liberals of Lithuania was published in June. A constituent congress of the union was held 24-25 November in Vilnius, and its statutes and program principles were adopted.

[Correspondent] What are the aims of the Union of Liberals of Lithuania?

[Radzvilas] The rules say that our aim is limitation of the authority of state power to the protection of personal rights and liberties and also the citizens' property. Whence our main tasks—the building of a civil society, the creation of dependable legal guarantees of the rights and liberties of the individual and the liberalization of economic life on free market principles.

[Correspondent] Limitation of the authority of state power... Would this not lead to anarchy, permissiveness?

[Radzvilas] The point is that the civil society and its life are built on laws, but when we speak of this, we need to have a clear idea of what we are talking about. For instance, Soviet laws are not laws by the criteria of liberal thought—they are the decrees of the people who hold power. The source of a real statute, however, is the law. And the law, in turn, should be based on the citizens' free accord, as a kind of rule whereby we communicate with one another. Such rules, according to the theory of liberalism, should ensue from people's mutual consent.

[Correspondent] I fear that we are still far away from mutual consent... But in your opinion, how close is Lithuania to the creation of a civil society?

[Radzvilas] I believe that the transition from a totalitarian state to one based on a social contract (the creators of the theory thereof were the classics of political thought, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Locke) will take quite a long time. In Western countries this took several centuries. Of course, with their experience before us, it may be hoped that in Lithuania the foundations of the civil society will be restored far more quickly, but such a transition will, nonetheless, require a rectification of the old structures of state power and a change in people's actual way of thinking. Not to mention the need to create a whole number of legislative instruments guaranteeing this condition of society.

[Correspondent] What can you say about today's political situation in Lithuania and about the subsequent development of events?

[Radzvilas] I believe that the situation in Lithuania depends to a large extent meanwhile on the situation in the Soviet Union, however much some people are unwilling to recognize this.

[Correspondent] The union's program says nothing about interethnic relations...

[Radzvilas] The priority of the individual and his unconditional worth in the civil society—all this implies equal rights for all. I believe that national problems could hardly be acute in a truly liberal society and that, were they to arise, they would be resolved on a strictly legal basis.

The Union of Liberals of Lithuania has from the very start of its activity been a supporter of the kind of decisions that have been adopted by the republic parliament most recently. We need to go further in this direction, we believe.

[Correspondent] I know that liberals pay particular attention to the economy. What is your position on the question of privatization?

[Radzvilas] The Union of Liberals emphasizes primarily its legal basis. This means that each citizen of Lithuania should have the right to private property. The privatization program was drawn up by Academician E. Vilkas,

and we support it, on the whole. There are no political possibilities of its implementation at the present time, it is true.

I would like to emphasize particularly our fundamental principle concerning the return of property. Liberals believe that such an act is impossible from both legal and economic considerations. There can be no question even of a return of the so-called means of production and also land. Only partial compensation for lost property confined to the financial and economic possibilities of the Republic of Lithuania and effected over quite a lengthy period, lest the interests of other citizens of Lithuania suffer, is possible.

[Correspondent] And price liberalization? Prices were raised recently, and we remember how this ended...

[Radzvilas] There is a big difference between an automatic increase in prices and their liberalization. In addition, it is essential first, to extensively introduce private trade in order to involve the state in the practice of competitive struggle, and, second, price liberalization should be gradual, for the state's accumulation of resources for social protection. The source of these resources will be the high prices of commodities that are not basic necessities.

[Correspondent] Are you not afraid of the Union of Liberals remaining a group of intellectuals?

[Radzvilas] No, I think not. We even now have many supporters. The liberals do not intend to be a party merely for intellectuals. Our ideas must attract sober-minded politicians and people for whom economic freedom is very important—industrialists and entrepreneurs. That is, we hope to make our union a party of truly business people.

Provisional Law on Lithuania's Border Guard Service

91UN0822A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
6 Dec 90 p 7

[Text of Lithuanian Republic Provisional Law on the Border Guard Service, signed by Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis in Vilnius on 8 November 1990]

[Text] General Provisions

Article 1. The Border Guard Service is a subdivision of the Territorial Defense Department [department po okhrane kraya] attached to the government of the Lithuanian Republic, which safeguards the state borders and implements procedures within the border zone and also extends assistance to the Customs Service of the Lithuanian Republic in fulfillment of its functions.

The Border Guard Service and the Customs Service of the Lithuanian Republic are not organizations subordinate one to the other.

Article 2. The border guard service is governed by the provisional Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the Lithuanian Republic, the international agreements of the Lithuanian Republic, the laws and normative acts that regulate the activities of the Border Guard Service, the Law on the Territorial Defense Service, and by the following legal acts regarding the Border Guard Service:

- The disciplinary statute;
- The statute on internal service;
- The statute on front-line service;
- The statute on the Border Guard Service;
- The rules of procedure for the border zone;
- and also the orders and instructions of the Territorial Defense Department.

Article 3.

1. The Border Guard Service is directly subordinate to the general director of the Territorial Defense Department.

2. The Border Guard Service is directed by a chief of the Border Guard Service named by the government on the recommendation of the director of the Territorial Defense Department.

3. Officials of the Border Guard Service are appointed by the general director of the Territorial Defense Department on the recommendation of the department chief of the Border Guard Service.

Article 4. Officials of the Border Guard Service swear an oath to the Lithuanian Republic with the following content:

"I (first and family name), in your presence:

- do swear, sparing neither effort nor life, to defend the Lithuanian state and its independence;
- do swear diligently to carry out the laws of the Lithuanian state and the orders of my commanders;
- do swear to hold sacred all secrets entrusted to me, not to transmit any information to the enemies of Lithuania, and to communicate immediately everything that I know about them to my commanders.

So help me God!"

Note The oath may also be given without the final sentence.

Procedures for receiving the oath are established by the statute of the internal service for territorial defense.

Article 5. The Border Guard Service functions in border zones and other places established by the government of the Lithuanian Republic. The border zone represents a

sector of land with a width of up to five kilometers extending from the administrative border into the territory of the republic.

The rules of border zone procedure are approved by the government of the Lithuanian Republic on the recommendation of the Territorial Defense Department.

II. Structure and Organization

Article 6. The border guard service has the following structure:

- 1) The Border Guard Service department [otdel] of the Territorial Defense Department;
- 2) Mobile border guard units;
- 3) Border detachments [zastavy];
- 4) Border posts.

Article 7. An official of the border guard service in the fulfillment of service obligations is a representative of the authorities.

Article 8. Persons are accepted into the Border Guard Service, on a voluntary basis or based upon a territorial defense obligation, who are citizens of the Lithuanian Republic, are not younger than 19 years, who possess the state language, and who are suitable for this service.

Staff workers of the Border Guard Service may not be members of political organizations. Persons fulfilling an active duty obligation for defense of the territory suspend their membership in political organizations for the entire period of service.

Persons accepted into the Border Guard Service (with the exception of those fulfilling a territorial defense obligation) conclude a term of service agreement with the Territorial Defense Department.

Article 9. Officials of the Border Guard Service wear the uniform of the Territorial Defense Service with a distinctive emblem and signs of the Border Guard Service.

Article 10. Officials of the Border Guard Service are assigned military ranks in accordance with procedures established by the Lithuanian Republic Law on the Territorial Defense Service.

Article 11. The Border Guard Service cooperates with the Lithuanian Republic Procuracy and the Internal Affairs and State Security services, the customs services, and the border services of neighboring states.

The customs of the Internal Affairs and State Security services of the Lithuanian Republic, their territorial subdivisions, city and rayon self-government, and enterprises and organizations are obligated to provide information connected with protection of the border to units of the Border Guard Service.

The activities of all departments within the border zone and within facilities of the border guard service must be coordinated with the chief of the border guards detachment.

III. Competence of Officials and Guarantees of their Activities

Article 12. In case of attack, unrest, accidents, catastrophes, a declaration of medical quarantine, administrative rule, of an extraordinary situation within the border zone, border self-government soviets, administrative organs, mayors, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens are obligated to carry out unconditionally the directives of Border Guard Service officials.

Article 13. The Border Guard Service, in providing protection of the state border and of procedures within the border zone:

- 1) independently or in conjunction with other law enforcement organs, establishes, studies, and eliminates reasons and conditions giving rise to crime, and also violations of procedures of the border zone;
- 2) foresees and implements measures to suppress violations of border zone procedures and crimes;
- 3) fulfills the functions of a preliminary investigation organ.

Article 14. Officials of the Border Guard Service are obligated:

- 1) during the period of their service, to carry out unconditionally the orders and directions of their immediate superiors;
- 2) In their dealings with individuals during their period of service, to represent themselves and, upon request of the latter, to present certification of their official status;
- 3) constantly to broaden their knowledge, to develop their skills, and to improve their physical and military preparedness;
- 4) to ensure protection of the health of detained persons and, when necessary, to extend necessary medical assistance;
- 5) to respect and protect the dignity of man, to defend the right of every person.

Article 15. During their period of service and in accordance with established legal procedures, officials of the border guard service have the right:

- 1) to suppress illegal activities of citizens and officials within the border zone;
- 2) within the border zone, to verify the personal documents of citizens and officials as well as documents for transportation means and freight.
- 3) to make arrests, conduct personal searches and property inspections, and also to convey violators of border

zone procedures to official facilities of the Border Guard Service and Customs Service units for the purpose of carrying out actions related to preliminary investigation or identification of an individual;

4) to halt transportation means located within the border zone and to subject them to inspection. Upon discovery of violations of border zone procedures, to detain means of transportation;

5) within the border zone (not within the limits of a customs house) to engage in confiscation with the goal of detaining objects or documents prohibited for transit;

6) in cases envisaged in Article 12 of this law, and also for traffic safety or for official purposes, to restrict entry into and presence within a specified territory or the quarters of a border guard detachment.

7) to perform photography, sound recording, or video recording within the border zone and in customs or border guard facilities.

Article 16. Administrative violations of the border zone regime which are perpetrated on the territory of the border post are reviewed by the chief of the Border Guard Service post who imposes the administrative penalties.

Article 17. The Border Guard service is authorized to have and use firearms and special means, conditions for the acquisition, accounting, maintenance, issue, and utilization of which are regulated in accordance with procedures established by the territorial defense department and approved by the government.

Upon refusal by persons located within the border zone to carry out the legal demands of border guard officials, the latter have the right to apply physical force, improvised and special means, or firearms, however only to the extent required by fulfillment of official duty and after having first used all other possible means of influence.

The utilization of firearms shall in every specific case be reported immediately to the city (rayon) procuracy. An official report shall be drawn up concerning utilization of special means.

Article 18. Upon the instructions of the general director of the Territorial Defense Department or the chief of the Border Guard Service, operational methods may be used for the purpose of monitoring the activities of officials of the Border Guard Service, procedures for the utilization of which are established by the general director of the Territorial Defense Department with the concurrence of the general procurator of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 19. Official premises for border guard units are provided by local self-government following general procedures.

Staff officials of the border guard shall be paid monetary compensation for utilization of a personal vehicle for official purposes.

Officials of the border service shall be provided with a telephone at their place of residence ahead of turn.

Article 20. In accordance with established procedures, the government of the Lithuanian Republic shall allocate a part of the funds received from the sale of confiscated property and valuables imported and exported illegally for the purposes of improving the material and technical base of the Border Guard Service and providing incentives to its officials.

Article 21. This law enters into force on the day of its ratification.

Lithuanian WGF Parents Visit Sons' Units

91UM0307B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major S. Popov: "Parental Instruction"]

[Text] A delegation of parents of soldiers conscripted from Lithuania visited the Western Group of Forces. For a week, divided into several groups, the fathers and mothers visited the garrisons where their sons were serving and became acquainted with the living and working conditions of their children. The delegation, which was headed by the first secretary of the Kupiskis Rayon of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) A. Petronis, was received by a member of the military council, the chief of the political directorate of the Western Group of Forces, Lieutenant General V. Grebenyuk.

On the last day of their stay in Germany, the parents adopted an appeal to all soldiers of the group. Its main thrust was that the soldiers, whatever their nationality, should let nothing divide them, that their duty was to honorably serve the Fatherland. The parental instruction was published in the group newspaper, SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA. Incidentally, this was not the first visit of delegations from the Baltics to the WGF. The first time such a group visited here was in the middle of last year. Judging from the responses of the fathers and mothers, impressions from the trip were basically positive. In any case, after examining the lives of their sons with their own eyes, they were convinced that many rumors about the "oppression" of soldiers from the Baltics which are being spread in some areas do not correspond to the truth.

Naturally, the reader will say, it is better to see once than to hear a hundred times. Although it is not so easy to arrange such a trip, especially abroad. But as we see, it was worth it, for one such "parental mission" counts more than ten articles distorting the reality of Army life.

RSFSR

Leningrad's Sobchak on Relations With Estonia, Other Issues

91UN0976A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 3 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, Leningrad City Soviet chairman, conducted by Ella Agranovskaya, MOLODEZH ESTONII special correspondent: "Scum on the Crest of the Political Wave"]

[Text] [Correspondent] As you are aware, the territories of Estonia and Leningrad border each other. It is also a well-known fact that it is best for neighbors to live in harmony expressed not only in eloquent assurances. Documents formalizing mutually advantageous ties between us have already been signed. However, does it not seem to you that at the same time quite definite economic steps have been taken which indicate that we, whether we want to or not, have begun to get in each other's way?

[Sobchak] I would not say that we are starting to get in each other's way. That is an incorrect formulation of the issue. The process of development of our mutual relations continues. Just recently I have met on more than one occasion with a minister of your government who upon instructions from Savisaar has negotiated with me concerning the establishment of a delegation representing Estonia in Leningrad. And we are prepared to do so. But not just a delegation for a delegation's sake, but instead one with specific goals, say, establishment of an Estonian cultural and economic center which could offer courses in the Estonian language, exhibits by Estonian artists, creative evenings and commercial meeting places where representatives of enterprises and entrepreneurs could meet and decide whether to open joint or wholly-owned enterprises in Leningrad. Because there are no obstacles preventing this; perhaps it would be possible, for instance, to open stores selling goods produced by Estonian industry. We are prepared to develop relations. Yet at the same time we cannot help but feel what I would call a certain sense of disillusionment with the fact that our successfully progressing political contacts have not been backed up by economic relations. And that is not happening to a large extent due to the economic policy currently being pursued by the Estonian Government. We fully support all of Estonia's claims to independence and to autonomous existence and we feel that that is a justified position; we regard that as the Estonian people's right. But as for your economic policy, it seems incorrect to me.

[Correspondent] In what way do you feel that it is incorrect?

[Sobchak] You can see for yourself that Estonia, which was perhaps one of the most flourishing republics—both in terms of the supply of goods to its people and in other ways—is today experiencing quite serious economic difficulties. And those difficulties were to a very great

extent created by measures taken by its government. That is the first thing. Secondly, price increase measures adopted on a unilateral basis when a single unit of currency is in use disrupt unified economic ties and hit hard at both Estonia's neighbors and at the republic itself. These are shortsighted measures. In this regard one must keep sight of reality. And the reality is that for decades our economy, either consciously or unconsciously, was built in such a way that no single region could live and function autonomously. All ties were established in a way intended to make regions completely dependent upon each other.

[Correspondent] In short, a common circulatory system.

[Sobchak] Absolutely correct, a common circulatory system, and one tied to a monopolistic approach under which each enterprise held a monopoly in a specific field. And if that enterprise were shut down or something happened there, then there was nowhere else we could get the goods which it produced. We did not establish systems for competition or insurance, substituting monopolistic distribution for them. As a result, at the present time we objectively cannot live without each other, that is simply impossible. Such is our economic structure.

[Correspondent] Do you suppose that our government is not aware of that and does not understand it?

[Sobchak] I believe it does understand. In our government there are intelligent, well-versed people. Savisaar himself is a well-versed economist with a good understanding of the whole situation. And at the beginning, when the new processes began to occur, I silently applauded the rational and skillful way in which the Estonian Government entered into market relationships and resolved its political problems: without needless emotion, without, for instance, the Lithuanian challenge, which can only lead to confrontation. But then, at some stage, this reason and calculation so typical of Estonians began to change. Especially the latest economic measures have been carried out without consideration for the fact that the republic today is not prepared for independent economic existence, that it will require several years to create a completely different economic infrastructure and an infrastructure of market-based relationships. And if that infrastructure were to be created according to a schedule outlined in advance, "step by step [in English]," as the Americans say, bringing appropriate enterprises together and so forth, then a completely different situation would result. In this regard it is very important to give thought to the future. Think about whether, for instance, it is efficient to have one's own communications system. Whether or not that is advantageous from a purely economic standpoint. Or whether to have one's own transportation system. Would it perhaps be better to be connected with the all-union transportation system? Take for example the Estonian Railway: can it secure for itself the necessary rolling stock and specialists? And where are those specialists going to be trained? Thousands of questions arise, and they should be answered

before any binding decisions are made in connection with a course by the republic toward a complete break with our country's economy. We are all making lots of mistakes, but right now there are some measures which have been taken by the Estonian Government of which I do not approve. Not to mention the political processes which have occurred recently.

[Correspondent] Why not mention them?

[Sobchak] Because it is clear that often they are purely provocative in nature.

[Correspondent] Is that the feeling in Leningrad, that all these cases involving border posts were exclusively provocative in nature?

[Sobchak] Personally that is precisely what I think. And I have spoken with Savisaar and with other members of the government about this matter.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that it was also a provocation directed against them.

[Sobchak] Of course it was also a provocation against the government of Estonia. Today that is going on everywhere. Unfortunately our political life has brought to the surface scum which calls itself democracy yet has nothing in common with democracy. These people are often abnormal, unable to succeed either professionally or in human terms. These are people who have lived their whole lives on grandiose pretensions yet have been incapable of self-realization. Suddenly a situation has arisen in which thanks to the passions incited at rallies, thanks to harsh criticism, they can appear to be fighters for democracy, can come to power and even be given posts in the government with nothing to offer and incapable of producing anything except talk. These are people who always know what should not be done, but never know what should. And that is our tragedy today.

[Correspondent] In a previous interview, back in the spring, you told me that there were many political dilettantes among the new leaders. Do you feel today that the problem lies much deeper?

[Sobchak] In this regard there is plenty of everything. There is a lack of experience, and a lack of a system of political views, the ability to analyze a situation and the ability to look into the future. There is predominance of emotions over reason. It is something which existed in Russian history in the past. This school of thought is called nihilism. It is political nihilism, intellectual and moral nihilism. All this has existed before, and bear in mind that it always emerges just at the turning point of historical destinies, when the need for reform has become clear. Just recall the trend toward nihilism in Russia during the period of Alexander II's reforms. It ended in nothing. The nihilists degenerated into terrorists in the end.

[Correspondent] Actually, the stage is set for that now as well.

[Sobchak] But it did nothing positive for the future of Russia. Incidentally, the office in which I am giving this interview was the office of Emperor Alexander II. On the day he was assassinated Alexander II was supposed to sign a constitution. The constitution had already been drawn up, and Russia could have set out on the path of democratic development 40 years sooner. And we would have wound up with a completely different society. I realize that hindsight always simplifies things. It seems that things would have been better if a certain thing had happened instead of something else. But nonetheless there are still some lessons which we can draw! We should think about the fact that what has happened before is a possibility now! And has been possible more than once. When we recall the Decembrists we ponder the fact that even then it was absolutely possible that Russia might have been turned toward a democratic means of government. But that did not become a reality. Later there was a possibility of perestroika from above in the reign of Alexander II, at a time when the processes of putting Russia on a democratic track had become natural and essential. Both the czar and those around him realized that. But it was precisely this czar-liberator, this czar-reformer, whom they murdered. And he was murdered for the purest and most sincere of revolutionary motives. Just as today our nascent democracy is being destroyed for the purest of motives.

[Correspondent] I do not believe in terrorism based on pure motives. Even potential terrorism.

[Sobchak] But among those people there are in fact those with pure motives.

[Correspondent] Are you referring to narrow fanatics?

[Sobchak] Narrow, if you will. But even a narrow person can have pure motives, and ideas, and ideals. Because ideals and ideas are not just restricted to highly intellectual individuals.

[Correspondent] Permit me to disagree with you, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich: wretched fanaticism is never a testimony to purity of intent!

[Sobchak] Well, of course that is true. But we are not going to talk here about what it is that motivates people, we are going to attempt to give an objective assessment of them. Nonetheless, the ways in which those motivations are formulated is attractive: democracy, freedom, equality, independence, sovereignty and prosperity. That is what they are talking about. Yet in actuality what happens is that democracy becomes discredited.

[Correspondent] I personally have not yet seen any political leaders who used unattractive words to formulate their ideas as they urged their people toward inequality and enslavement. Nor, I believe, have you ever seen any politicians like that. Of course, I do not recall the speeches that your Romanov gave here in Leningrad, but I do not believe that he ever urged his countrymen to turn Leningrad into a garbage dump. Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, back in the spring you told me with great hope

that democratic forces had been completely victorious in Leningrad and that happiness was, so to speak, just around the corner. The victory was won, but what about the happiness?

[Sobchak] That was an impressive moment and a very optimistic one. Quite frankly, why did I do such a stupid thing as agreeing to become Leningrad City Soviet chairman? Because I felt that by joining the Leningrad Soviet, the most democratic soviet of all, I would find people who shared my views.

[Correspondent] Did you seriously think that?

[Sobchak] Otherwise I simply could not have made that decision. You understand that all my colleagues in the Supreme Soviet and all the major politicians were simply amazed that I would make that decision; they said that my departure from the Supreme Soviet would be a great loss, and that therefore I should not leave. For instance, I can well understand the surprise of Senator Mitchell, the leader of the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate. We are well acquainted, and when he found out that I was moving to the municipal level, he said: "I do not understand you. In America leaving the national political arena for the municipal level is political death. Why are you doing it? You have essentially just begun your political work." I replied: "Under our conditions the most important thing is to achieve success in a specific place, to demonstrate through specific work that democracy can triumph and can produce a better result than the previous system."

[Correspondent] Have you achieved a better result in a specific place?

[Sobchak] I was enthused and certain that I would succeed in accomplishing something precisely through the support of those who shared my views. Yet from the very first day I met such resistance from those who had previously supported me, with whom it seemed I had made common cause, that I was really disheartened by it. Then when I attempted to analyze the reason for this conflict I realized that unfortunately it was all rooted in purely egotistical considerations. Some people had counted on receiving a certain post when I arrived but for some reason or other were unable to fill that post. Some groups were counting on getting priority and being dominant in the soviet. Most importantly, they failed to comprehend my fundamental goal, even though I spoke of it immediately. I said that when I joined Leningrad's democratic soviet I would make it my goal to create proper conditions for the formation of a multiparty power structure. To create perhaps the first multiparty soviet in the country. But from the very first day I ran into the fact that in place of the Communist Party's monopoly in the soviet there was a clearly evident striving on the part of the People's Front to achieve monopolistic control of all the levers of power. And I opposed that.

[Correspondent] Let us clarify at once, though I understand quite well what you are saying, that despite that

you have nothing against the People's Front itself, because both here and at home there are plenty of people looking for words that they can twist and use against you...

[Sobchak] You see, all the people in our country today are still living on the stereotypes of the past. We still all carry around inside us to a certain extent an authoritative way of thinking which has been instilled over decades; we have Stalinist ideology to thank for that. And that results in democrats, perhaps unconsciously, imitating the Communists. They are striving to do all the things which they have always seen, all their lives. Yesterday the Communists were dominant; supposedly that means that they must be pushed aside and that we must take their places and do the same things with the same methods that the Communists did in the past.

[Correspondent] What is the present status of the conflict within the Leningrad City Soviet, and how might it develop?

[Sobchak] You know, I believe, that it is a natural state. Until we create a normal multiparty soviet this will all continue and will look like "a conflict between Sobchak and a group of deputies." In actuality it is a much deeper and much more natural conflict. It is a struggle between various political forces in which I today am merely serving as a non-party individual. I defined that role for myself in advance. When we—Yeltsin, Popov and I—quit the party we specially emphasized that in our opinion at this stage in the emergence of a multiparty system in our country the heads of soviets should not be party members. One of the main goals of quitting the CPSU was to create new multiparty structures.

[Correspondent] But is there a conflict with Shchelkanov? More precisely, not with him personally but with his jurisdiction?

[Sobchak] That is an objective conflict resulting from the imperfect nature of soviets' very structure, a situation in which parallel power structures have been created. For instance, the collective organ of the ispolkom and the collective organ of the soviet presidium, the one-man leadership and chairmanship of the soviet, the one-man leadership and chairmanship of the ispolkom. Furthermore, one structure is formed by the other, not elected directly by the public, therefore it is dependent, yet at the same time it is supposed to function independently. The principle of separation of powers dictates that we draw a definite demarcation line in this area. But it is very difficult to draw that line, because the operations of local soviets are dominated by the executive aspects, not the legislative. And the deputies simply cannot tolerate that.

[Correspondent] But why do they not perform executive functions, why can they not see that their official duties require executive action?

[Sobchak] That is a complex problem. To a great extent it results from the fact that the apparatus is experiencing turnover. The old apparatus is expecting changes and

realizes that many people will have to go, and it has stopped functioning. Right now the greatest sabotage of all is the sabotage of inactivity, of a wait-and-see attitude. They think, let us watch which direction things will take, and then we will see. We have a colossal number of officials, but no one is doing anything.

[Correspondent] But is it not possible to clean up the city while they are waiting to see which direction things will take?

[Sobchak] But cleaning up is specific work. And no one has any interest in specific work, because rayispolkoms and rayon soviets are struggling to take control of property and become property owners. Cleaning streets, repairing buildings and supplying heat are such mundane tasks. But becoming a property owner, having the chance to lease a building to a foreign enterprise, to earn hard currency—that seems to take priority nowadays. For that reason this unfortunately is also an objective conflict and can only be resolved by a reform of the soviet power structure. What we have encountered demonstrates the crisis of the very idea of the soviet power structure. Remember how Lenin put forward that idea. It was the idea of a working corporation. "All power to the soviets!" meant soviets as elective organs which create legislation, carry out their own decisions and monitor the implementation of those decisions. Real life has demonstrated the absolute groundlessness of that idea.

[Correspondent] Are you saying that "All power to the soviets!" no longer works and should be replaced?

[Sobchak] No, right now I am talking about something else. I am talking about the fact that from the standpoint of the technology of power a system of soviet power which creates legislation, performs executive functions and monitors itself does not work. It inevitably leads to dictatorship. The best thing that we can do right now is to return to a normal democratic republic, a parliamentary republic with all the attributes thereof and with separation of executive and legislative powers at all levels. As for the slogan "All power to the soviets!" we must be dialectical. You know that I am often reproached for this; people say: "Just yesterday, when you were elected, you were saying 'All power to the soviets!' and were fighting for that slogan, yet today you are starting to criticize both soviets and the slogan." But it should be understood that any slogan, any idea, is correct only as applied to a specific situation. Yes, I and all the other democratically-inclined politicians did fight for the slogan "All power to the soviets!" Why? Because it was necessary to take power back from the party and give it to the state. Therefore the slogan "All power to the soviets!" was objectively progressive. But today there is no longer a party monopoly, and our primary task is to begin the process of restoring the state. Because the disintegration and chaos which exist today indicate that we have no state. In our country state institutions were supplanted by party institutions, and when the party withdrew it turned out that state institutions were incapable of functioning, that we have individuals, we have

duties, yet we have no state institutions as such. Therefore now we must revitalize state institutions. So today the slogan "All power to the soviets!" is an incorrect slogan.

[Correspondent] How can we restore a democratic republic if we have never had one?

[Sobchak] Then we must create one. And restore the state. What has passed as a state until now was merely a screen. Because until very recently all decisions were made by party obkom and central committees or by the Politburo, not by the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers merely received instructions and carried them out; it made virtually no decisions on its own. It was for that reason that all decisions were drawn up as joint Central Committee and Council of Ministers decisions. Therein lies perhaps one of the greatest difficulties.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, in the spring you said that on the one hand a paralysis of power was setting in, while on the other there was a vacuum of power, and that this was leading toward anarchy. What is your present prognosis for the near future?

[Sobchak] What do I predict? Well, we have already seen anarchy. Now this process will proceed objectively as follows. Today an overwhelming majority of the people already realizes that further existence in this state of affairs is impossible. That means that we must work to restore real state authority which will not just proclaim laws but will actually monitor their implementation. Right now the whole problem lies in the fact that we are passing a huge number of laws, resolutions and decisions, but no one is carrying them out. But just how could they be carried out? By penalizing people for not complying with them, if they do not do so voluntarily. That means that we must apply the whole power of state authority. The question arises of when that will happen. That could happen either through intensification of authoritarian power, or through establishment of a strict, strong authority, say with the aid of the armed forces or the state's punitive organs, or it may happen from below by democratic means as a result of reinforcement of the appropriate state structures. That means that in this regard there exists the possibility of either a democratic or an anti-democratic path to stronger authority.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, which scenario is most likely?

[Sobchak] Today the need to reestablish order and to punish violators are about the most important thing of all, because Soviets have lost confidence in their personal safety, in the safety of their loved ones, in the safety of their property. Today criminal elements can virtually dictate the system of our lives and their substance. Let me give you just one example. The court system is presently paralyzed. As a result of what? As a result of the simplest thing: enterprises are refusing to select people's assessors and pay them for their time in court. As a result we cannot get convictions even in those

crimes which have been solved—there is no one to try the cases. And the criminals, nowadays mainly guilty of economic crimes, consequently get an opportunity to appeal their sentences on the grounds that their trials were not properly conducted. I get the impression that this is being done quite intentionally, that we are talking about fully conscious acts by the mafia aimed at discrediting our law enforcement organs and disrupting their operations. In this sense recent events give great cause for alarm. Therefore I have no doubt that within the next few weeks and months things will take a turn toward strengthening of state authority. Time will tell whether it will happen through totalitarian or democratic means. That will depend on the balance of political forces.

Sverdlovsk Political Situation Described

91UN1112A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent A. Pashkov: "The Contours of Power: A Year After the 'Wine Uprising'"]

[Text] SVERDLOVSK. The people of Sverdlovsk have always believed that many of the oblasts of Russia and the country are getting a free ride at their expense. The statistics have convinced them of this as well: the good people of Sverdlovsk produce 40 percent more products than the average for Russia, and they consume—by virtue of different commodity circulation—seven percent less. There are politicians who, roused by regional patriotism, have made their career on these statistics. You see, on the whole it does not require anything in order to change the present situation: you take from the "fat" and give to the "thin."

But one can always find inquisitive economists, who as a propagandistic device, want to look at the essence of the phenomenon one more time—what causes it and why. One of them, S. Guryanov, after conducting voluminous research, suddenly discovered the annoyingly obvious fact that the net contribution of his fellow-countrymen to the national income of Russia is even less than the average statistic. And this impressive twist came about by virtue of the cost of expensive raw materials and supplies from which the machinery, equipment and so on are made.

S. Guryanov, who has been thoroughly schooled professionally, has drawn a practical conclusion from his free investigation: It is time for the local politicians to determine where to lead the people of Sverdlovsk—either to try to get more at the expense of others (the pauper beats the beggar); or, to restore the incentive and the requirement to work and to earn in order to live better and have more, in order that those with plenty might share with those who are hungry, if that person is not hungry because of laziness but because of illness or old age, or because he has a hard row to hoe in this life.

The first is unquestionably more advantageous on the propaganda plane; for the "red eye," as the Chinese call

envy, has literally hypnotized Soviet society. The second is more complex—after all, no one believes that he is frittering away his time. However, you will agree that if there were yet anything left to divide up in Yekaterinburg Gubernia since 1917 (It was not for nothing that there was fierce opposition to the Bolsheviks here—there were many well-off people, and they were opposed to the changes), today there is really nothing left to divide, much less food products.

To take away or to give? This is the Hamlet-like question of our political-economic life.

Thus, it came to pass that life staged an historic pure social experiment in Sverdlovsk Oblast. In December 1989, the famous "wine uprising" [vinnyy bunt] took place when the townspeople, dissatisfied with their situation, went out onto the main square (1905) and demanded that the city authorities and the highest oblast party leadership retire. It was precisely then that G. Burbulis, presently an active assistant of Boris Yeltsin, and B. Isakov, then the democratic favorite and today "not a democrat" any longer, received powerful support; moreover, the name of Boris Yeltsin himself was heard with new force.

The "Movement for Democratic Choices," which took shape on the wave of those events, achieved a clear-cut victory in local and Russian elections, and people came to real power quite rapidly and decisively, who only yesterday were considered street people. After these events, the party structure, although it was replaced, had somehow tangibly lost weight in the life of Sverdlovsk. And, we recall that a year ago, the representatives of all the democratic movements, who had assembled on the initiative of B. Isakov, were discussing the problem of relations with the CPSU.

Today they are faced with another question: What to do further?

Surely they did not assume power in order to just provide jobs and good salaries and so on for all the members of the movement. And surely not just in order to take and divide on the principle of social justice the privileges of the previous party and state functionaries. One of their immediate goals was to eliminate the reasons which had pushed the people into taking part in the "wine uprising."

In a little over a year quite a few important political events have taken place in Sverdlovsk. The list of CPSU obkom first secretaries was preempted, the oblast soviet relieved the chairman, and combined in one person—Eduard Rossel—both legislative and executive power. The constituent assembly of the Russian Social Democratic Party was held here. Mikhail Gorbachev's first visit in his capacity as President was to Sverdlovsk. And Yeltsin has been to the oblast several times.

Meanwhile, the economic situation got worse. It was practically impossible to redeem coupons for meat, sausage, vodka and cigarettes. It was even hard to get vegetables. The houses of Sverdlovsk got colder, and the city—dirtier.

And those who had been in power yesterday are declaring: You see what these democratic games lead to? Somehow, V. Romanov, their principal ideologue, openly stated that such soviets are not suitable to the people, and that we must consider whether they are worthy of being in power or not. Romanov, by the way, during all his years as agricultural secretary, was somehow unable to feed the people of the Urals.

Upon the initiative of the party obkom, the enterprise directors were united in the order of "Industrial Knights," and some of them are seriously proposing walling themselves off from the "democrats" in order to thereby overcome the chaos of economic life. Oblast ispolkom chairmen and Council of Ministers chairmen of the republics in the Ural region have also created their own alliance—the Greater Urals Corporation—in order to conduct coordinated policies. At the same time, the chairmen of the Soviets and Supreme Soviets of these republics formed a Ural Parliament. All three have their headquarters in Sverdlovsk.

Does organizational activity on such a scale not signify a new "division of spheres of influence," and the formation of separate principalities according to the departmental principle? Whereas previously, party generals would assemble at the congresses and plenums, those who are assembling now are generals whose subordinate armies, divisions, regiments and companies have no rights in their economic aspirations and interests, just as in the past.

"In essence, the apportionment of political forces in the Soviet reflects the situation in society," Oblast Soviet Chairman A. Grebenkin told me. "We have 12 groups registered. They are quite often organizationally and politically amorphous: one and the same person belongs to several groups at the same time—to 'Constructive,' to 'Position,' to the 'Yeltsin District,' and so on. The groups have no firm platform-owners who could represent and defend their positions—with the exception, perhaps, of the agrarians, who are basically kolkhoz chairmen, sovkhoz directors, and secretaries of rural CPSU raykoms."

Gathering in groups in the Soviet, the deputies do not so much represent the opinion of the voters, as they do a certain political trend in society. Truly, whose interests does the large, organized group called "Consolidation" defend, the basis for which consists of representatives of the oblast party-economic aktiv? Or the "Constructive" group, under whose banner the technical intelligentsia has gathered? Or "Position"—the liberal intelligentsia? It is good to have such a variety of voices, but how will

it work in drawing up the general policy in the work of the Soviet, and more importantly, in putting the decisions into practice?

I asked A. Grebenkin on which forces the Soviet would rely if it intends to conduct a firm policy of "not to take, but to give"—land, enterprises, banks and so on? The actual apportionment of forces is hardly in favor of this policy. The "Agrarians" do not plan to give land to free farmers, and "Consolidation" sees the path to privatization in its own fashion, and its forces are powerful. At the party conference at which the new obkom membership was elected, it was probably no accident that V. Romanov's candidature passed only on the second ballot—when the Agrarians and Industrialists gave an ultimatum. They understood full well that the departure of this secretary would signify a "volte-face," which they did not want at all.

Anatoliy Grebenkin did not entirely agree with me, considering that the mechanism of taking decisions and carrying them out is quite a bit more complex than the simple arithmetical composition of forces. For better or for worse, the question of a variety of forms of property has penetrated the consciousness of the masses. And one can no longer fail to consider this. In addition, the Soviet does not plan to call for a repeat of the events of 1917: to give, while taking from the forms of property that have evolved.

"Many of us are more accustomed to being in opposition, than to sharing responsibility for power," noted Professor Grebenkin, a doctor of economic sciences. "But if it comes into our hands, it will first of all be necessary to put an end to the myth of national property. Only by having something and reflecting some kinds of forms of property will those same deputies seek a compromise. For is clear that in the course of 'military operations' unleashed by people who are not responsible for anything, a nation cannot raise grain and children, nor reason properly and act in the way that one's conscience dictates."

True, in a year the democrats have not been able to achieve any kind of cardinal changes in the structure of economic relationships. One can speak seriously of the fact that many good intentions have been drowned in words and vanity. But on the other hand, even the introduction of the presidency has done little to change the lives of the people of Sverdlovsk. And if they actively support Yeltsin today, it is chiefly because they do not sense the constructive support of the center; on the other hand they clearly see how the shoots of initiative in the "localities" are being choked off at the roots.

During his visit to Sverdlovsk, Gorbachev authorized the region to make use of five percent of all above-plan production for barter deals—and this is more than a billion dollars. More than a year and a half was required for the promise to pass through the state structure and take on some kind of real outlines. It was with great difficulty that the "Barter" Program was formulated and

began to operate. Sverdlovskites managed to conclude an agreement for delivery of 40,000 tons of meat, which literally began to save public catering, and children's hospitals. The agreements reached with the enterprises: half for yourself, half for the territory, compensated for the goods shortage at least to a certain extent. "To a certain extent" because in accordance with state funds the oblast received only 83.4 percent of the non-food goods in all.

But when the barter began to work, the President issued an Ukase forbidding it. The territory and its foreign partners are in shock. E. Rossel, the oblast soviet chairman is urgently trying to get an appointment with Gorbachev, who is promising to extend the barter deals for the people of the Urals this year. The corresponding document is being held up in the Prime Minister's office.

Today Eduard Rossel is studying the language of his forefathers in order to freely communicate with Helmut Kohl: wealthy Germany is promising Sverdlovskites a billion dollars in credit. Gorbachev and Yeltsin have given their blessing to it. Perhaps a "Marshall Plan" on a regional level will to a certain extent ease the accumulated fears connected with the confrontation of the Russian and union governments. But one would think that the rising chaos, destabilization, and lack of faith can hardly be choked off by money from abroad. In a conversation with me one of the representatives of a repressed people—Russian Germans—brought up the name of Stalin who, in his opinion, had a positive side—consistency in the realization of his ideas. It is alarming that nostalgia for a firm hand is manifesting itself more clearly in various strata of the populace. It is also alarming that it is felt by people who consider themselves democrats, an example of which are the frenzied attacks on B. Isakov, who yesterday bore the banner of the democratic movement, but today is held as nothing less than a traitor. And only because he dared to publicly disagree with Boris Yeltsin's methods of operation. But you see, the contours of democratic power have only begun to be traced on the political map of the oblast.

RSFSR Party Secretary on Women's Issues

91UNI055A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 9 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nina Silkova, member of the Politburo and secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, by Anna Andryushina; place and date not given: "It Is Immoral To Feed Promises to the Hungry"]

[Excerpt] *As we have already reported, the recent joint plenum of the RSFSR CP Central Committee and party Control Committee discussed a wide range of burning issues. Among other things, they talked about the tasks that are facing communists as they aim to stabilize the socio-political situation in the country. Here is one of the plenum's conclusions: to restore popular trust in the party and to strengthen its influence on the people it is necessary*

for the party to improve its ties with working people everywhere, to share in their lives, and to defend their interests and rights in a more active way. This conclusion sounds similar to the thoughts expressed to our correspondent by N. Silkova, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee.

[Andryushina] You are in charge of the Central Committee commission for the women's movement. Our newspaper is concerned about the following trend: More and more often women write to a newspaper just "to have it all out," "to tell it all," without expecting any tangible help or support. That is understandable; our country has been swept with total shortages; everything has become an unsolvable problem—from a box of matches to the people's assurance of their future. How can they go on? Where can they get clothes for their children? Where can they get food for their families? Our woman readers are searching for the answers to these agonizing questions and, in most cases, they do not find them. What can you say to our female readers, what kind of hope can you offer them?

[Silkova] I do not side with populism. I consider it immoral to feed a diet of illusory promises to hungry and exhausted people. It is not just facts that hide behind such letters, each of these cries from the heart—they are phenomena. There is a whole folder of them on my desk, the bitter statistics of our days. More than 11 percent of our population has a total per capita income of R75 a month or less. Most of them are new families or families with many children. Almost 25 million Russians are among the poor, nine million kids are growing in their families...

It is not by choice that only three percent of working women use their legitimate right for preferential working conditions. And if you think of the 44 percent of all female employees in the industry who are working in hazardous, intolerable conditions, you will be terrified, honestly. It is not only that millions of our compatriots are in a danger zone, it is the gene pool of our nation that is being threatened!

[Andryushina] You have painted a depressing picture, Nina Prokopyevna, if not a hopeless one. You do a lot of business traveling, you meet a lot of workers. You must have had to respond to numerous reproaches claiming that it was the party that brought the people to this dead end street.

[Silkova] Yes, I have had to. But, in my opinion, this is not a dominant mood in the provinces. However, when somebody tries to blame the party for all of our present troubles, I do not rush with an answer. Instead, I suggest that we all think together, talk about it as a group. As a rule, we come to the conclusion that the situation reached the boiling point just as the party relinquished its administrative functions which, according to some people, are not inherent in it (I personally categorically disagree with this; can any policy be conducted separate from economy? It is absurd!).

The party did relinquish these administrative functions but, as it turned out, nobody was prepared to take them on. They were sort of forgotten in the heat of the fight for power and of rally demagoguery. Later, the centrifugal, separatist moods and "the war of laws" pushed any prosaic and routine work totally out of the way. For the first time Russia entered a new year, 1991 without any plan, or budget, or a viable government. The joint plenum of the RSFSR CP Central Committee and party Control Committee, by the way, recognized the fairness of all reproaches expressed by our people to the Communists for their withdrawal from administrative work. It was said openly that the party had no right to watch passively as the economy was collapsing and administrative links were being destroyed.

[Andryushina] A heavy burden of unsolved problems and an empty wallet—that is what our average statistical compatriot is taking with her to the market. But, without any doubt, she would be the first to be fired when a mass reduction in force starts...

[Silkova] This is the very thing we are not going to accept! Social protection for women during the transfer to the market economy is the main direction of our work. How are we going to put it to practice? In a very simple way: through party committees, through Soviet deputies, through women's councils, through clubs and associations. Men will support us, without a doubt. Together we will search for ways to retrain and we will advertise them; we will help to organize small businesses, we will teach our women the basics of commerce and enterprise.

Are you wondering if this is our business? Yes, it is! For the simple reason that women make up one third of all Russia's communists.

We have already gained some experience. I visited Adygey recently. At a confectionery factory I was shown a new shop for the production of medicines. That is how the factory is going to deal with the problem of employment for disengaged workers. A "Woman and Reality" society has appeared in Moscow, for instance, based on five rayon women's councils. They have organized five small businesses and set up training courses which could be either paid for or free, paid by charity. All this is headed by Evgeniya Ivanovna Smetannikova, an economist by profession, former secretary of a party raykom.

Actually, it is not all that important for us whether this or that movement works within or outside of the CPSU framework. At the first meeting of our commission we decided to join efforts with any organization if the ways and methods to realize them are sensible and humane.

Our maximum program is to achieve real freedom, real equality in rights for our female compatriots. I do not mean to say that we need to be generous and allow them to lay down railway tracks working next to men—I consider this to be our national shame. We have to guarantee for our women a possibility to accomplish whatever they desire. If a woman wants to work half a day and to stay home half a day she should be able to do

it. If she thinks she is capable of becoming an outstanding administrator, we have to help her develop and utilize this quality. If a woman thinks her utmost goal is to raise children, she should be able to do that too and her mother's work would be socially protected and respected by everyone, just as any other job.

[Andryushina] But for that we need an economic basis...

[Silkova] You are quite right. We also need seats in our parliament. We have already lost three election campaigns. In the Supreme Soviet of our country 18.5 percent are women. You have to agree that this is not much. But there are even fewer women in the Russian parliament—only 6.5 percent. It would be naive to think that our voice may be heard through this, I would say, symbolic representation. The Moscow City Soviet beats all records altogether: They only have 0.8 percent women. That is why they are making all these curious, to put it mildly, decisions.

[Andryushina] That is putting it more than mildly. I cannot forget one woman, the wife of a serviceman. Last summer she was travelling through Moscow, together with her daughter. They went to the Detskiy Mir [Children's World] department store, of course. At that particular time they were selling GDR-made dolls in the store to those people who had Moscow residency cards. You can imagine the grief of the child that had been promised a doll like that many times if the mother took the trouble to locate a working pay phone and the telephone number of our office so that she could call our social policy department. How could I console her? I told her that in similar situations I feel ashamed, very ashamed of being a Muscovite...

[Silkova] That is why we have to fight for deputies' seats, so that the problems of family, of children, of women are solved in a more professional way. My position is very near that of Larisa Kuznetsova, co-chairman of the Union of Russian Women, who says that she knows only two entirely women's fields—gynecology and politics. Even Klara Zetkin used to say in her time that one needed no special training to be in politics, one only needed one's common sense. I think, however, that you do need some training.

Have you noticed that those who study the Margaret Thatcher phenomenon never forget to emphasize that she was leader of the Conservatives? To me it does not seem accidental. Healthy conservatism is really inherent in the feminine manner of political behavior. Men prefer a different way; radical reforms and reckless dashes into the unknown are their element. Logically speaking, such policy simply ought to be counterbalanced by reasonable caution and discretion.

However, we are anxiously sticking to the patriarchal way of life. It was only recently (and that after an interval of almost 30 years!) that a woman again became a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It was Galina Semenova. We dared to appoint Zoya

Novozhilova as an ambassador 34 years after the legendary Aleksandra Kollontay. Meanwhile, there are ten women ambassadors in the United States and 14 of them in Italy. Zoya Grigoryevna, by the way, is a member of our commission.

I do not think it is accidental that more and more women's associations, movements, and societies are starting to appear in our country. There has been no powerful and strongly organized women's movement in Russia so far but it is emerging and that process is going fast as it makes itself felt in one region or another. Whether it will be a spontaneous movement or will acquire well defined forms and what forces will head it—all this depends, in many ways, on the RSFSR Communist Party.

[passage omitted]

Russian Communists' Appeal on South Ossetia

91UN1099A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Appeal of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee and Central Control Commission to the Supreme Soviet, Communists and all working people of Georgia]

[Text] Blood has been shed for several months now in South Ossetia. The national discord between two fraternal peoples is daily costing human lives, causing old people and children pain and suffering and doing tremendous damage to the economy. There is no family that has not been visited by sorrow and misfortune. As a result of the blockade and the actions of extremist forces people have been deprived of food and water, light and heating. Schools and hospitals and transport arteries have been destroyed, and telephone communications have been cut. Many families are without shelter. The lives of thousands and thousands of people are in danger. To the more than half a million refugees seeking refuge in the cities and villages of Russia have been added refugees from South Ossetia, and their numbers are growing by the hour. Citizens' elementary rights guaranteed by the USSR Constitution and documents of international law are being trampled. Lawlessness and tyranny, robbery and killing, animosity and intolerance truly rule the roost in the autonomous oblast today.

The basis of this internecine fratricidal war are political ambitions, the great-power complex of the leaders of nationalist formations and groupings, the reluctance of some leaders to heed the voice of reason and disregard for the interests of all nations and nationalities that have populated this region from days of yore.

It is impossible to remain dispassionate toward the tragic events in South Ossetia. It is not difficult to foresee and predict that unless this "local" interethnic conflict is extinguished today, it could also pull other peoples into its abyss tomorrow. This is why it is tremendously

dangerous for the whole country, and this cannot fail to evoke feelings of Russians' alarm and profound concern.

We members of the RSFSR CP Central Committee and Central Control Commission address to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the people's deputies of South Ossetia the insistent proposal that they display wisdom, political good sense, and farsightedness and immediately take all necessary steps to put an end to the senseless bloodshed. In the interests of the establishment of civil peace and social harmony in the cities and villages of the autonomous oblast subordinate their feelings and actions to reason and, casting aside hostility and prejudice, sit down at the negotiating table. Reverse (or at least suspend until the complete normalization of the situation) decisions that have been adopted in defiance of the will of the peoples and that have caused the exacerbation of interethnic relations. Decisions entailing the death and suffering of innocent people cannot be considered humane and lawful.

We appeal to the Communists of Georgia that they be steadfast at this difficult time for them, find within themselves courage and intensify work in the masses. Reveal the entire unnaturalness of the current confrontation. Influence by their own example of internationalism people's hearts and minds. Relying on their own experience of life and also on the party's historical experience, contribute to the rapprochement and cohesion of the peoples and show the practical paths of a solution of the crisis.

We appeal to all political parties and public movements of Georgia and South Ossetia with sincere wishes that roads to mutual understanding and cooperation may be found and that people may be restrained from blind hatred and insanity.

We appeal to the conscience of the nation—the artistic intelligentsia—and to the mainstay of the might of the republic—the worker and peasant provider—and to all working people of Georgia that they prevent the center of the conflict from growing into the raging flame of civil war. And revive on the ancient land the traditions of friendship, good-neighborliness and fraternity primordialy inherent in them.

We appeal to M.S. Gorbachev that he use the full force of his authority and the fullness of presidential power to put an end to the hostility, arbitrary actions, and violence and bring peace and harmony back to the villages and cities of South Ossetia.

Let us by common efforts do everything possible to stop the fratricidal war. May political and human wisdom, love for one's near neighbor, justice and goodness and respect for the dignity and rights of the individual triumph.

Polozkov on Russian CP Program, Sovereignty, Press

*91UN1067A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian, No 9, Feb 91 p 6*

[Interview with I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, recorded by V. Khrebtov; place and date not given: "I. Polozkov: The Communist Party of the RSFSR Opts for Socialism"]

[Text] Krasnoyarskiy Kray—A seminar-conference of the secretaries of city and rayon committees of the Communist Party of the RSFSR from East Siberia was held in Krasnoyarsk recently. I. Polozkov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, attended and spoke at the meeting.

Ivan Kuzmich also visited Abakan, Shushenskoye, and Norilsk where he met with Communists and representatives of labor collectives. The questions they asked the leader of the Communists of Russia are precisely the ones on which this interview is based.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] Ivan Kuzmich, a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission proclaimed the need to reinforce the offensive role of the party in the life of our society and the need for forward-looking actions by the party in the sphere of setting tasks and working out the strategy and tactics of work today, tomorrow, and in the immediate future. What caused the issue to be raised in this harsh manner?

[Polozkov] It was caused by the complex internal political, social, and economic situation that our country is facing. As I am firmly convinced, perestroika as conceived in 1985 and initiated by the party and the people in the name of renewing socialism, using its tremendous potential more completely in order to enhance the economy, the social sphere, and culture, and to expand democracy—this kind of perestroika has not been accomplished. We probably made a mistake in allowing ourselves to be led from the sphere of economic reforms to the sphere of political struggle. Antisocialist and antipeople forces, many among whom refer to themselves as democrats, skillfully exploited our oversight and delays. They managed to seize the initiative from the CPSU and to foist on our society their ideas which are carefully camouflaged with demagoguery, juggling, and obvious lies. According to them, everything that our fathers and grandfathers did and built, and all that our generation has managed to accomplish—all of this is no good.

The party did not detect in time the beginning of the degeneration of perestroika. Our political adversaries have now cast off the masks of democrats, having proclaimed anticommunism to be their ideology. They are not averse to winning over to their cause the heirs of

the deposed classes, shadow-economy operators, and nationalists. We hear from them more and more often that full employment is bad, whereas unemployment "expressed" in the future of millions of people is virtually beneficial; a single federated state is not our cup of tea—it will be replaced by sovereign republics structuring their mutual relations as those of foreign states. Can the party go on tolerating a passage that open? No, it cannot! This is why the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission that analyzed the causes of the universal crisis affecting our society and state was convened, and why it set forth the strategy and tactics of actions for the party in the long run. The word "to go on the offensive" became a key to most of the decisions made. Without retreating another step, we should rally around the CPSU all truly democratic forces, regardless of differences in ideological and political views. There should be one criterion for evaluations in this matter: If you are in favor of the people being in charge of everything in our state you are our ally.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] Does the RSFSR CP Central Committee have an action program for the immediate future?

[Polozkov] Yes, of course. The following are among the main tasks that need to be accomplished locally, taking local conditions into account.

First, the party should not by any means walk away from the economy and from practical solutions to specific problems in the national economy. Second, we need to set up an absolutely new system for our work in the soviets at all levels. Finally, it is important to review and renew the practice of ideological efforts by party commissions and primary party organizations.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] Could you elaborate please?

[Polozkov] With regard to the economy, our main task is to protect the working people against the chaos of the market. Those who are saying that this is not possible, that we ought to take the market as it is, with all the ensuing consequences, are not being straight. Countries using market relations have long "reigned in" the market and subordinated it to their interests. We also need to work out defense mechanisms for the working people in anticipation of the events rather than after the fact.

It is important to prevent a transfer of enterprises to private owners in the guise of privatization and denationalization. They should end up under the control of the labor collectives themselves retaining complete property rights to the results of their labor. Of course, we cannot by any means allow the appearance of the unemployed at the gates of plants. In this instance, the party committees should participate vigorously in setting up special insurance funds of enterprises and in developing and implementing plans and programs for the economic and social development of collectives.

At present, it is very important to prevent the ultimate severance of economic relations. In this instance, we should act using communist-workers, collective farmers, specialists, and leaders. Let us go back to such fundamentals as roll calls of production sharing, mutual inspections, workers' relays, and appeals of labor collectives to each other through newspapers. After all, we cannot give up all of this just because it "smacks" of the old times.

We will also have to handle "operations" and "current business" until a new system of economic relations kicks in. We should not fear being rebuked for supposedly interfering with the economic operations of enterprises. If it is beneficial, why not interfere?

Is it not our concern to set up universal economic training? Who will explain to common workers and collective farmers what individuals and collectives stand to win from introducing particular forms and methods of operation if not communist-managers and specialists?

The issue of mutual relations between the party and the soviets is ripe. The soviets have now acquired independence and extensive rights. Unfortunately, quite a few of them have not learned how to use this power skillfully. This is why it is precisely the party, which has tremendous experience in this sphere, that should help them to really get on their feet.

In some soviets, noncommunist and sometimes openly anticommunist forces are getting the upper hand. Well, we should have our strategy and tactics for such cases as well; we should know how to act as the constructive opposition. It is necessary for the Communists to learn to form preelection and parliamentary blocs and to agree to reasonable, expedient compromises. Life itself has made it necessary for us to create communist factions in the soviets of all echelons. Incidentally, this was said directly at the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] Many of us remember heated debates at the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies on the issue of adopting the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia. At the time, you voted against it. Why?

[Polozkov] I am not against the sovereignty of Russia on the whole. Any republic, and especially one as large as ours, should have a right to certain independence. However, I oppose individual articles of the declaration that are capable of causing serious consequences and have already caused them.

Let us look, for example, at Article 5, which affirms the supremacy of the laws of subordinated territories over those of superior territories. What does this result in? It results in any national okrug or republic being able to pass their own laws, which will enable a given territory to not comply with a USSR law, for example, on universal military service obligation.

Right there, at the First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, the Communists of our republic warned that this article would inevitably bring about the destruction of our entire legal mechanism. At present, we are "reaping the harvest" in the form of "a war of laws" both along horizontal lines—between republics—and vertical lines—between the republics and the center. It has come to absurdities: At present, Moscow has "sovereign" streets, and one of the capital city rayons even proclaimed the "sovereignty..." of its airspace.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] Many Communists ask why the Russian CP Central Committee did not adopt its own program and statute.

[Polozkov] We get similar questions at the Central Committee. We have a certain position on this issue. What is it?

At present, the Communist Party of Russia exists within the framework of a unified, integral political force in the USSR. An overwhelming majority of republic party organizations are likewise integral elements of the CPSU. Had we, the Communists of Russia, become the first to offer our own program and statute, we would have initiated the disintegration of the CPSU. This cannot be allowed to happen because the disintegration of the USSR and its transformation into some kind of union of parties will not facilitate the defense of the interests of the working people.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] We may frequently read in the press that the Communist Party is supposedly losing its members rapidly. Is this so? What is the situation with the numerical strength of the Communist Party of the RSFSR?

[Polozkov] Unfortunately, we have not yet drawn up the final balance of departures from and admissions to the Communist Party of the RSFSR for last year. However, preliminary results indicate that by the end of last year the number of departures from the Communist Party of Russia declined precipitously. Moreover, a reverse process was registered whereby individuals, disenchanted with unsubstantiated promises by all kinds of pseudodemocrats to feed, clothe, and provide footwear for the people, joined the Communist Party. In Krasnoyarsk Kray alone, more than 2,000 people joined the ranks of the party last year. Add to this more than 600 people who retracted their petitions to quit the party.

In a word, we are regaining our former stature and authority in our society. The main point is to bolster this authority by specific deeds.

[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN] The discussion turned to the mass media and its influence on the domestic political situation in our country during virtually all meetings with the Communists of Krasnoyarsk Kray...

[Polozkov] Those who treat the press on a par with political organizations are right. Assertions to the effect that the press merely reflects reality are at the very least

naive and unsound. "The fourth power," as the mass media is frequently called, cannot "reflect." It always shapes public opinion. The question is how.

The press often becomes the mouthpiece of people who pursue clearly destructive goals, organs of professional journalists who represent only themselves but, of course, claim to express public opinion and claim the right to speak on behalf of the people. I dare to suggest that, perhaps, you will not find anywhere in the world a press as viciously anticommunist as our domestic pseudodemocrats publish. I would call the operation of our press information terrorism.

Of course, the democrats will be outraged when they read this. However, take, for example, the case of the Lenin-grad journalist Nevzorov. After he produced just one broadcast which was not in their interest, they proceeded "to sling mud" at him the very next day. However, look at how the so-called "independent" press tries to whitewash those who turned out to be involved in the scandalous affair with 140 billion rubles?!

The RSFSR CP Central Committee feels particularly keenly how false the myth of "independence" of the mass media is. Most of the media either boycott us or attack us harshly. They probably fear that our firm position will interfere with the execution of their plans aimed at abandoning socialism and the united USSR. They are right to fear this. The Communist Party of Russia will always rise to the defense of the interests of the working people and the renaissance of Russia.

Democratic Party of Russia's Travkin Interviewed

91UN1066A Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 9 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR and RSFSR People's Deputy Nikolay Ilich Travkin by LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondent L. Teselkina; place and date not given: "The Tide Ebbs and Flows"]

[Text] On 29 December 1990, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA published a note from an engineer from Kaliningrad entitled "Double 'B' Nikolay Travkin" in which the author severely criticized the activity of the people's deputy. USSR and RSFSR People's Deputy Nikolay Ilich Travkin responded to his opponent, also through our newspaper (No. 300 for 30 December 1990) in a rejoinder entitled "For the Sake of Truth."

As one might expect, opinions were divided. M. Klimov from Drezna wrote: "I read N.I. Travkin's statement, apparently made at the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies. I think that N.I. Travkin is one of the most intelligent deputies. And his statement was intelligent. To supplement the president's report he both analyzed the situation and suggested a path to overcoming the crisis in the country. And regardless of many other speeches at this congress, his could by no means be called a rally speech." The same viewpoint was shared by V. Svistunov from

Mizhayskiy Rayon, the village of Pavlishchevo, V. Ivanov from Kolomna, and L. Kozlov from Mytishchinskiy Rayon.

"I am a former CPSU member but I left the ranks of the CPSU of my own accord in the middle of 1982," writes A. Ptitsyn from Shatura, addressing N.I. Travkin personally. "...Now I would not leave the CPSU, but would share its fate with it. But I am sure that you could just as easily leave your brainchild, the Democratic Party of Russia, if you felt that the selfish advantage of belonging to this party were slipping away... You were a good builder of residential and industrial facilities but you have not worked out as a politician." And this is not the only case in which this opinion is expressed in the editorial mail. With variations, it is supported by A. Shashlov from Fryazino, Shornikov from Podolsk, A. Pankov from Noginsk, P. Belomytnyev from the village of Shaturturf, Yu. Uchayev from the village of Bolshevo, and N. Kuskov from Zagorsk.

All these opinions, which are so diverse, have in common the people's indignation and their unwillingness to put up with injustice. We are grateful to the readers who responded to the articles in *LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA* and we have asked Nikolay Ilich Travkin to answer a number of your questions.

[Correspondent] People's deputies are frequently reproached for inactivity, poor organization, rambling on about decisions that have already been made, and so forth. How do you assess this situation?

[Travkin] I shall begin with the fact that it was absurd to place excessively great hopes in past elections. What kind of elections were they? There were primarily the formation of power organs. These could not have been formed as they should have been, primarily for the dynamic development of the society, by electing individuals. The voters should have been voting not for individuals but for programs. There is nobody the deputy must answer to today. Let us say that the voters ask him at meetings why he is not fulfilling his election promises. He will answer: "I made my suggestions but the majority did not support me." When we have all gathered in a single parliament, each has tried to prove that his program is the most intelligent... These disputes are going on to this day, and there is essentially no point to them at all.

It is another matter when elections are conducted on a multiparty basis. First of all, the party could then hold its representative in the power organs responsible for how he is fulfilling or why he is not fulfilling the program for which the majority of voters voted.

But I would not want to dramatize the situation. After all, our society has known no democratic institutions for 73 years. Therefore, you will agree, it is impossible to change and do everything the way it should be done in just a moment. Yes, today the deputies get each decision through with a great deal of difficulty. But even the decisions that are made are not always implemented,

because the old structures stand in the way of the executive authority. In a word, only the first step has been taken in the renewal of our society.

[Correspondent] People everywhere are talking about the atrophy of executive authority, but things have not changed a bit. What, in your opinion, must be done in order for the mechanism of executive authority to become flexible and effective.

[Travkin] To begin with, this will require changing the Law on Elections and the entire authority structure and system as well. It is my conviction that the executive power organs must be elected by the people directly and not appointed by the soviets. Executive power cannot be effective in the role of a handmaiden or in opposition to legislative authority. And this is the reality in our country. But when the people themselves choose their president, governor, mayor, or the leader of an executive power organ and the soviet is elected directly, then we will have two independent constituent authorities. Incidentally, this system has been established for a long time in world practice.

[Correspondent] So we cannot get around modernizing our institutions. But does it not seem to you that the convulsions of these, to use scientific terminology, super-structural elements, is the result of a deep crisis in the base? After all, our designs all come—from life...

[Travkin] I do not agree. In our country economic problems depend on the solution to political problems. Until we determine in the political arena specifically what we intend to construct, we will not take a single step forward in the economy. I am convinced that our main problem is that we have measured all of our actions against ideological standards. One need not look far for an example. Just recall the idea about introducing private property, which has been accepted here. They dug in their heels saying that this was a restoration of capitalism, and nothing could budge them. But in order to make a significant breakthrough in the economy, we must remove the ideological "flags" from the political arena. In other words, the tasks of the economy can be carried out only if political problems are resolved.

[Correspondent] In that case, what is keeping us from accelerating these interconnected processes?

[Travkin] First of all, the monopoly on ideology held by the CPSU for many years. Look at what has happened: People look to the future with fear precisely because this notorious leveling system will disappear and, naturally, some will suffer. But, after all, with the old system there is no possibility of living at all: The people have ceased both thinking and working. Well, why work hard and increase labor productivity if it ends up the same for everyone with respect to wages, pensions, rates, vacation passes, and so forth whether their work is good or whether it is just so so. The society was gradually being transformed and almost was transformed into a consumer and not a producer. To unravel this knot of false ideas about well-being is also a political task.

[Correspondent] You are one of the founders of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] and have been elected its chairman. In an interview for another publication you repeatedly emphasized that the DPR is a party of soviets. In the first place, what does this mean, and in the second place, what do you see as your party's strategic line?

[Travkin] It is a party for democratic soviets. Today we have a fairly spotty picture in the soviets, along both the horizontal and the vertical. Some soviets contain democrats while others have conservatives. And we have created the ideological and social structure with which the democratic soviets could implement their decisions. For you will agree that it is not enough to adopt a good law in the Supreme Soviet of Russia; it must be implemented through the people. The DPR will contribute to this.

[Correspondent] Of course, and the main target of any decisions is man with his pains and hopes. And people's faith in the future actually has diminished appreciably. And the market is starting to "cut its teeth" on pensioners, large families, and the underprivileged... Personally, I doubt very much that market relations in the form in which they are beginning to develop here now will lead the country to rapid and inevitable prosperity. What do you think?

[Travkin] I share your doubts. I will explain why. It would be stupid to speak seriously about imposing the model of the social structure of America or Sweden, say, on this same Russia—and expect everything to turn out all right: Prosperity is ensured. But this will not happen! The conditions are too different: national, psychological, historical, and so forth. We should not look here for the type of economy we should create. There are two: the market economy, which exists throughout the civilized world, and ours—which is not working. The main thing is to adjust an effective mechanism for the transition from one type of economic relations to the other. Incidentally, we can learn something from the United States, something from Sweden, and something from the FRG. For example, I would borrow the taxation system from the United States. It is the most merciful, with the largest part of the output in monetary terms staying with the producer. This system provides a good incentive for expanding the tax base.

The Swedish taxation system lies somewhere between the American system and ours: 50 percent goes to taxes and 50 percent goes to the producer. In our country 90 percent of the money we earn is taken away from us and only 10 percent is left with the producer. I think we should focus on the American system and even today we can start to move in the direction of reducing the tax schedule.

But now let us ask the question: Why must the underprivileged suffer from the forthcoming market? We must ultimately understand that not a single disabled person, not a single elderly person, and not a single child will be

able to begin a better life until the producer begins a better life, since the underprivileged segments our population are "fed" with taxes, money transfers, donations, and so forth from the workers. Incidentally, the DPR considers its main duty to be to increase production effectiveness. And this is also the source of the social protection of the people.

I think we can and should find funds as a result of redistributing the budget as well. For we still spend up to 50 percent of our national income on maintaining the military and industrial complex, even though no civilized countries are threatening us. Expenditures on the apparatus are also great. Expenditures are still being made on state programs that are producing no returns. I have mentioned only the reserves from redistribution of funds that lie on the surface. But it is possible to find many others as well.

But I want to return to the main figure in market relations—the producer. For it is the market with its laws that forces people to work more intensively and produce high-quality products, for otherwise their standard of living will decline sharply. But I am speaking only about those who really want to and can work. But let us admit that we still have a lumpen proletariat, lumpen engineers, lumpen physicians, and lumpen teachers who are completely satisfied with their quiet life and their wages of 140-160 rubles [R]. Of course, the market will have a painful effect on them. But possibly many of them will also be motivated to increase their qualifications and become more active, for there will be a labor force market as well.

[Correspondent] What you are saying sounds very basic. But all this is still in the realm of theory, intentions, and expectations. Do you consider yourself a realist or a...romantic or, perhaps, even a utopianist?

[Travkin] By no means. On the contrary, I am too earthbound in my thoughts and actions. I use as a basis only the experience I have as a person and a production worker.

I do not have my head in the clouds and I am profoundly convinced that market relations will be provided if we have a redistribution of power. Even today we have already run up against a brick wall: The president and his team do not want one iota of redistribution of power with the republics. The whole world is laughing at us because such a large country cannot feed itself.

[Correspondent] Laws on ownership and land have been adopted. The doors have been opened to private entrepreneurship, including in agriculture. But for some reason the prospective farmers are not crowding into the administrations of our Moscow-area kolkhozes. Perhaps this idea is doomed to failure in our country?

[Travkin] Let us not be too hasty. Give people complete freedom of choice. The law gives the individual the right to decide whether to remain in the kolkhoz or start his own business. If he decides to become a Western-style

farmer, according to the law he must be provided with the corresponding plot of land. Russia intends to make sure this law is enforced! Special land commissions for these purposes are now being created under the soviets, and if necessary judicial organs and the procuracy will be brought in.

But it is naive, to say the least, to expect that everyone inspired by the laws will immediately run to sign up for farms. For a lack of confidence in the authorities has become firmly rooted in our people. God willing, there will be at least 100 Western-style farms in Moscow Oblast. And we must meet them half way: We must provide normal conditions for their work, help by supplying them with technical equipment, erecting structures, and so forth. And in places where a year later you look and see that they have already developed their activity and received an annual income of R100,000, bought machinery, provided themselves with garages, and taken care of their family—then our envy for our neighbors that has been cultivated over the decades will play a positive role. When everyone is able to see a strong, flourishing farm, if they themselves are not peasants, their wives are, and I am sure that they will quickly figure out that it is more interesting to go around in fur coats driving their own cars than to spend their whole lives wearing padded jackets and wade through mud in their boots. There will undoubtedly be a chain reaction: There will be thousands of Western-style farms.

[Correspondent] Your optimism is also enviable. But does it not seem to you that we will be unable to reach the desired result speedily through democratic methods. This requires the strong will of specific people who are capable of realizing the articles of the laws. Do you agree?

[Travkin] Of course, reforms are either conducted all the way or not at all. Therefore, it would be desirable to change the power structure, change over to a presidential form of rule in Russia in the spring, and change the rest of the structure by autumn. The executive power should be elective and small and inconspicuous, and the legislative organ at the level of the city or oblast should include 400 people (state authority at the level of the rural soviet is nonsense). Let us say that 40 professional people's deputies are elected to the Moscow Oblast Soviet and a chairman is elected for the ispolkom [executive committee]. Directly! By the people! But... that is tomorrow...

[Correspondent] Let us return again to our Western-style farmer. It is difficult for him to survive today also because industry is oriented as it was before toward large farms and their volumes. But you cannot produce the same Niva combine for the conditions of a Western-style farm. It is not advantageous for either side... And the solution to the problem of small-scale mechanization has been dragged out for an unjustifiably long time. What is the matter?

[Travkin] The eternal question: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? There are models of small-scale technical equipment but you cannot order them from the enterprises because they do not have the client—the Western-style farmer. The state is afraid of ending up the loser: If it orders the technical equipment, nobody will buy it. But the paradox is that state thinking has not changed. We have the Law on Land and the existence of the Western-style farm has been proclaimed, but what do we see when the budget is distributed? They are allotting R23 billion for rural areas, but for the development of Western-style farming—only one billion.

[Correspondent] You are a state employee as well, and it was probably within your power to change the situation. Or was it not?

[Travkin] All elective power organs are temporary, and one should not expect a real practical result from them. We must remember that now it is very important to move up the times of the next elections.

There are no miracles in life: You adopt a good law today and tomorrow the shelves in the stores are loaded down with goods. It is necessary to break down a machine that has been nurtured for 73 years. This is a lengthy process, and it is very important to dismantle the old building peacefully, without bloodshed. Good things do not just fall down out of the sky. They can be created and proliferated only if we proceed toward radical reformation of the power organs, redistribution of the national income, and revision of our relationship to the world economy.

[Correspondent] As an individual you have been a revolutionary in your development. How do you understand the concepts "democrat" and "conservative?"

[Travkin] I call a conservative a person who adheres to ideological dogmas, above all the socialist future and the socialist option. Conservatives are scared to death of any changes and consider the social system that has been created to be excellent. To this day conservatives are trying to provide security for loafers. They are the champions of the ossified system.

Democracy is a capacious concept. In my view, it includes the social institutions of power that provide freedom for each individual: civil liberties like changing residence and choosing an occupation, economic freedoms with the developing market, and freedom of conscience—nobody can persecute me for what I believe, whether I am a Communist or a believer in religion. But I associate all the freedoms and the concept of "democracy" in general with man. Democracy must be developed so that it is easier for man to live. And here is where we have serious differences among the movements and parties that proclaim themselves to be democratic.

I spent two days at the congress of democratic forces in Kharkov. The DPR refused to become a member of this congress (I completed my participation in the congress as

an observer). Why? Because our party could not subscribe to the congress decisions.

We have now formed something like three levels of democracy. The first includes the DPR. We think that this is included in our program documents and that democratic processes must develop for man, in the name of his basic interests. The second level of democracy includes structures and people who perceive democracy **only** in connection with the sovereignty of the republics. Still others understand democracy on the worldwide scale: For example, in China they shot students and in Moscow there are rallies. Blood has been shed in Lithuania and in Moscow again there is a rally. That is, there is a reaction to events taking place **outside** the republic, country, or region. I ask these democrats: "You in Lithuania are adopting antidemocratic laws that encroach upon the interests of people who are not of the indigenous nationality, customs duties are being introduced, which limits economic freedom, and you do not 'wage war' against representatives of your own power. Why not protest there, in your own country?" In Kharkov I proposed an amendment to the basic documents of the congress to the effect that participants in the congress take responsibility and counteract any attempts to encroach on the rights and freedoms of citizens, regardless of where they may come from: the center, the republic, or the local authorities. The amendment was rejected right away. Because it is not popular to fight for your own power, especially when that power is called democratic. It is unpopular not only for democrats but also for Russians to fight for the interests of Russia and the Russian-speaking population and to fight against the democrat Landsbergis. This is politically disadvantageous—your ratings might fall. But, excuse me, this is not politics but pure politicking.

[Correspondent] You give the impression of a person who is confident of himself. But still there is probably something that keeps you awake at night. What is it?

[Travkin] I am not without times of indecision, just like any other person. A good deal of my energy, of course, is taken up by work in the party, which includes 28,000 people today.

My greatest misgivings are about the idea that we might possibly overstep the boundary in our psychological condition beyond which we are incapable of following the path of civilized countries. I even think sometimes that perhaps the leveling system has changed something in the genetic fund of the generations. Then we would have to be "diluted" with fresh blood from the East and West. Hence we would not be capable of doing anything practical ourselves. I am giving you a candid answer. But time will tell...

[Correspondent] And the last thing. What would you like to say to your constituents and the readers of our newspaper?

[Travkin] There is no need to panic! We have now entered a very lengthy process. This is life itself, and

perestroika has not ended—this is simply the way it is proceeding, and this is the way it had to proceed.

You know there are ebbs and flows in the ocean. We are now experiencing an ebb tide, and this is to be expected. We, including the democrats, must understand that now we must gather strength, develop new structures, go to the labor collectives, and explain to the people that the amount of anger has reached the critical mark, and we must put a stop to it—otherwise there will be bloodshed. And then, inevitably, a rising tide will begin and then, from a new position, all of us will also have to make qualitative changes in the society. I repeat, if we understand the dialectics of these processes and stop shouting "dictatorship" at every turn and tearing our hair out, we will at least clear the way to a peaceful civilized world for our children.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much.

Details on Association of Russian Cities

91UN1058A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Dergachev: "Southern Russia Is Coming Together"]

[Text] Krasnodar—The AGYuR [Association of the Cities of Southern Russia and North Caucasus], an association of 19 cities in the south of Russia and North Caucasus, which cities from Astrakhan to Rostov-on-Don and Nalchik joined, was set up at a founding conference.

As AGYuR President, Chairman of the Krasnodar City Soviet V. Samoylenko believes, the main task of the interethnic AGYuR will be to defend the interests of the residents of these cities in all echelons of power—from an individual city soviet to the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as, of course, to strictly comply with contracted delivery arrangements and to pool capital with a view to creating, as soon as possible, enterprises and systems for processing and storing agricultural products. For example, plans of the association call for producing plastic joinery.

The AGYuR charter calls for organizing an information service and a common-use "memory bank," and rendering organizational and methodological aid to the members of the association. Development of foreign economic relations is also envisaged.

V. Sizhazhev, chairman of the Nalchik City Soviet of People's Deputies and a cofounder of the association, is definitely right in referring to the fact that an economic union of cities in various ethnic republics of Russia will facilitate both the preservation of the existing, age-old ties and the emergence of new relations between the ethnic groups and nations of the largest southern region.

Democratic Russia Rally Viewed

91UN1058B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Viktor Andriyanov: "Riding the Rally Wave: The Politics of Sound Recordings"]

[Text] It was funny at first. The professor said that he would turn on a recording with the voice of Boris Nikolayevich, who was sick. I smiled, recalling how Konstantin Ivanovich Chernenko was introduced to us in a similar manner, in absentia, not so long ago. Later, I recalled some emergencies, for example, "an attempt" near a brook in Uspenskoye, after which Boris Nikolayevich was "sick," too. However, the people around me displayed gloomy concentration. As they talked, they only regretted that the recording was poor, that the resonance was bad, and, supposedly, nothing could be heard because of this. I understood that they did not laugh at "their own" in this place, even when the chairman of the Moscow Soviet failed to put his phrases together quite right as he explained an increase in egg prices.

It appears that anticommunist rallies are becoming as common a feature in the Soviet capital as the lines in front of empty stores, trash on the streets, roads with potholes, and "contract" prices. Democratic Russia held yet another rally in Manezh Square on Sunday, 10 March, one week before the referendum. There were the usual speakers: Afanasyev, Travkin, Gdlyan, Popov, Stankevich...

The phraseology was familiar: As had happened before, Travkin conjectured that the "Vremya" program would try to belittle the scale of this rally. As had been the case before, he made a mistake. The "Vremya" program showed Manezh Square packed with people, and, to my mind, conveyed correctly the mood of the crowd that was beginning to be possessed by extremism.

I was in the square too, and I saw with my own eyes that anticommunism is no longer camouflaged. Anticommunism has shed democratic phraseology; it is elbowing its way to power over the heads of the people, as if a hard-core alcoholic to the alcoholic beverage counter, and it is threatening to deal with those who stand in the way. (These advocates of the people even had the following poster: "Have you built gallows for Communists?")

I would like to see a democratic country in which opponents of constitutional power openly incite the people and call for toppling the state system and the legally elected president and government. This is to say nothing about dozens of insulting posters and banners which are altogether inconceivable in a civilized society.

"Everything is clear as far as the Union is concerned" to Chairman of the Moscow Soviet G. Popov, who outlined the anticommunist action program. On the 17th, he will cross out both "in favor" and "against" on the ballot.

Indeed, what use does a democrat of his caliber have for Soviet power?! In general, what use does he have for any power at all? This also goes for T. Gdlyan, who proposed that the current system be abolished, that an appeal for the people to go on strike be made, and that "the communist plague of the 20th century" be counteracted.

I saw that many people brought children to Manezh Square. Certainly, they were proponents of de-party-ization and depoliticization of schools. Children and adults chanted in a chorus of voices: "Resignation, resignation!"

Suddenly, an announcement was made on the public address system during a pause: "A girl, Olya Sergeyeva, six years old, wearing blue overalls has been lost..."

God willing, this girl would be found. However, what is in store for hundreds, thousands, and millions of those facing the threat of a new tyranny? After all, as history indicates, anticommunism does not restrict itself to rallies and declarations.

In our society, people are already being targeted on account of their nationality.

People are not yet being targeted on account of their party affiliation, but their jobs, housing, and education are already being taken away.

A crown fluttered among tricolored flags over Manezh Square. The public-address system treated us to "The Truncheon" for dessert.

A crown and a truncheon... in whole-hearted unity.

Are we going to wait for them to follow through on the threats? Or should we recall that the revolution that they intend to settle scores with should be capable of defending itself? The revolution has enough laws to do this.

Western Republics

Belorussian Front Accused of Inciting Desertions

91UM0307A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
23 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col. V. Zhitarenko: "Instigators, or Certain Secrets of the Anti-Army 'Machinations'"]

[Text] There have been more than a few reports of some soldiers leaving their units. Mentioning the forces that provoke such crimes, while themselves remaining unpunished, is another matter.

...A leaflet written in the name of the Belorussian People's Front appeared in the military construction detachment commanded by Lt. Col. V. Antsiferov and garrisoned in the city of Kmelnitskiy, which is in the Ukraine. Its sense: Belorussians facing military service should serve only in their own republic. Compatriots looked the

paper up and down, then passed it on to the company commander, Sr. Lt. I. Baybuz. That was in September.

On 14 October military construction personnel Privates A. Bogdanovich, S. Borisov, and V. Slepnev went AWOL. Inquiries from the detachment were quickly made at their place of residence. "Messengers" were then dispatched. The searches brought no success. In Minsk only one thing was told them: all three fugitives were under the "protection" of certain officials of the BNF [Belorussian People's Front].

On 18 October, a group of people's deputies of the BSSR, Ye. Novikov, V. Radomylskiy, and others, went to the Main Military Procuracy with information about the reasons why the above military construction personnel had left the unit: ridicule and harassment of Belorussian service members. The newspapers ZNAMYA YUNOSTI (an organ of the LKSM Central Committee of Belorussia) and "7 DNEY" (BSSR Telegraph Agency) published materials on this same topic in which they gave a more concrete interpretation of the reasons: unbearable living and working conditions in the military construction detachment, the continued "hazing" there, and interethnic hostility.

The Main Military Procuracy reacted immediately. Through effective investigative measures it was learned that one of the fugitives, Borisov, had in fact once been beaten by his fellow service member Private I. Pastelyak. Pastelyak was subjected to criminal prosecution. But something else also turned up: the reaction of the latter was the consequence of the fact that Borisov had often been sought high and low by the entire squad, and even the platoon, after regular formations at which he failed to appear. And indeed this was not his first flight from the unit. He also went home in early September and for several days the detachment was in a turmoil, there was no sleep or rest for the men because they were looking for the young construction worker. Privates M. Titov and A. Khakiyev were not restrained in their emotions, although this did not take the form it did with Pastelyak.

However much they tried, the investigators found no other information testifying to ridicule and harassment of Belorussians in the unit. And indeed, they were not at all convinced that what they did find had anything directly to do with Borisov's leaving the unit. Soon afterward he himself confirmed this when he was "returned" to the unit by his mother. Raisa Demyanovna was upset as soon as she learned of the incident from a telephone call from the detachment's chief of staff. She sought out her son in Minsk. She had a meeting with people's deputies of the BSSR who were representatives of the BNF. But even after hearing those same promises of granting her son a place of service closer to home, she saw things her own way: he would serve where he was ordered.

Perhaps she also decided this because she herself had recently visited the detachment? She saw that the military construction workers were living much better than

in other families, that the barracks were quite comfortable and the food was good. And the work conditions in the plant where the detachment worked, which produced reinforced concrete items, every civilian construction plant should have it so good, as they say.

And one other thing became clear: her son had been exposed to the same verbiage from the creators of the aforesaid leaflet, as well as the agitation of his two pals, Bogdanovich and Slepnev. Thus the earlier he returned to the unit, the better off he himself would be. Going to the procuracy of the Carpathian Military District, she demanded only one more thing, that the assailant of her son, that same Pastelyak, not escape responsibility. They convinced her that he would not. She saw her son off [saying] serve, don't fool around!

In consideration of this and other circumstances, a criminal case was not instituted by the military procuracy against Borisov for AWOL.

A different fate awaits the two other fugitives. Their fault? Indisputably. Irresponsibility of their parents? This too is inescapable, for even when unit representatives traveled to Belorussia and appealed repeatedly to them, the parents of Bogdanovich and Slepnev did not disclose the addresses where their sons were hiding. But there is also a third party responsible for the military crime committed by the fugitives, the extremist portion of the Belorussian People's Front.

After all, it was with their blessing that the "canard" of the unbearable service in a military construction detachment made the rounds of the Belorussian newspapers.

On 22 October a detachment commander hastened to Minsk in readiness to explain all the absurdity of the accusations put forward. He also met with a representative of the BNF, Z. Poznyak, and with People's Deputy of the BSSR V. Gribanov, incidentally a service member who could and should immediately have distinguished the "grain from the chaff," for the absurdity of a whole group of accusations was obvious at once. But the named BNF officials did not want to listen seriously to Lt. Col. V. Antsiferov and did not consent to meet with his subordinates. The detachment commander had to operate in a manner which seemed strange at first glance. He had color photos made of the attributes of the military camp and sent them to Minsk in order at least to prove that the living conditions of the military construction personnel were better than normal. They asked the Vitebsk oblast military commissariat to send representatives to the unit. They came, including the assistant of the oblast military commissar for legal work, Soviet Army employee M. Rodin. They looked into all the questions and spoke with officers, warrant officers, and with all Belorussians. At departure they gave their opinion: the campaign started by the extremist wing of the BNF was no better than nonsense.

Well, what was the upshot of all this? Nothing. The "popular front" people continued their campaign. Was it

not with their "example" that Slepenev wrote a letter to the detachment, saying everything is fine, they are letting me and Bogdanovich serve in Belorussia, so follow our example! One of them "took the bait" then, military construction worker Private A. Dvorniyakov. After running away from the unit—incidentally this was not the first time for him either—he made his way to Minsk. The soldier lived in one conspiratorial apartment, then at another, then at third. A "sweet life," it must be said: he didn't do a thing, but every day received ten or twenty rubles. Why such a varying "rate"? Was the twenty for when he distributed leaflets?

Aleksandr Dvorniyakov related something else as well to the author of these lines. Those who sponsored him and supplied him with money for some reason categorically forbade him to visit home even for an hour. But only his aging father remained at home after the death of his mother, and the trip was some two hundred kilometers. Didn't they forbid him because they did not expect "solidarity with them" on the part of Dvorniyakov's father, because they most likely feared that the latter would force his son immediately to return to his unit?

Nonetheless Dvorniyakov decided to visit his father.

There is yet another circumstance which probably influenced this decision. The fact is that Dvorniyakov was cruelly beaten. The crime was committed at one of the conspiratorial apartments.

They lived together, Bogdanovich, Slepenev, and Dvorniyakov. One day they did not simply use alcohol, they clearly misused it (they were allowed to be extravagant with the presents of their sponsors practically every day). And "scores" were settled: by all appearances, about who was "earning tips." Alas Dvorniyakov could not compete with his partners when it came to lying, and he was beaten soundly. All the more so because his criminal skills were not like those of Bogdanovich and Slepenev.

... From a report: "I Bogdanovich, A.Ye., use narcotics..." In the autumn of last year, V. Slepenev wrote the same. But they were inducted into the Army in the summer. One could of course put a good face on it, telling journalists that they got addicted to drugs in the barracks. But the facts say otherwise: from their first days of service they combed the district villages looking for cannabis. And wasn't that also the reason they went AWOL, to obtain purer narcotics?

Slepenev had already had conflicts with the law before induction. As had Bogdanovich. Incidentally, soon after his "political flight," a so-called individual instruction arrived in the name of the Orsha municipal department of internal affairs of the BSSR, asking to interrogate Bogdanovich regarding the facts of his crime. Back on 10 October 1989 he and an unidentified individual had threatened citizen R. with a knife and stole his things—a warmup suit, books, a radio, tape player, cassettes... A fact indicating not only the moral aspect of this individual. In the words of the deputy commander of the

military construction detachment, Capt. V. Semenchatenko, it is not absurd to think that the person who sent the BNF leaflet to the detachment could have warned Bogdanovich also about the threat of impending arrest for his pre-induction crime.

But here is something which is quite beyond argument: those who invited these two "rights defenders" to Minsk—if not immediately then after the arrival in Belorussia of the detachment commander, as well as the unit political officer Captain A. Artamonov, and Sr. Lt. D. Ulitov, and Sr. Warrant Officers M. Oros, V. Rudnitskiy, and V. Utkin—had a very good idea of whom they were turning into all but "national heroes. So is it possible that the detachment command was not right in drawing its own conclusion: other officials of the BNF, unable to find persons for their anti-army propaganda who were truly suffering from disorganization and disorder in the army ranks, would clutch at anyone, not shrinking even from such as Bogdanovich and Slepenev.

And indeed, ultimately the BNF gave up the services of Bogdanovich and Slepenev. Allegedly after they beat up Dvorniyakov. But perhaps again the detachment commander was right in assuming that they gave them up only after these two had "exhausted their usefulness" and become expendable, when they were unable to provoke a mass flight of Belorussians from the unit? And the statement that Bogdanovich and Slepenev had been promised they would "serve only in Belorussia"—this was simply deception. The BNF has no legal basis nor authorization for this. They were only hoodwinking others.

I want to talk of something else, the current status of officers and warrant officers, including those of this military construction detachment. You see, they are sparing no efforts to ensure that their subordinates are healthy and suffer no inconvenience in service and work. In a conversation with the procurator of the garrison, Col. of Justice V. Mayborodov, I learned that while two years ago there really was "hazing" in the detachment, now the incident with that same I. Pastelyak was really a one-time occurrence. If drug addiction is penetrating the barracks, it only arrives with the regular conscription.

But that is not the only thing that comes from the "civilian world." Before induction every seventh young military construction worker had undergone criminal prosecution. But if some continue to "go their own way" in the process of service, these are isolated instances, while others, thanks to the close collective of officers and warrant officers, have come to their senses, so to speak, and are discharged to the reserve as truly reliable people.

But how much the negative tendencies occurring in our society influence the life of the detachment! I am not even mentioning the fact that stories like the above damage the honor and dignity of commanders and chiefs—after all, undeserved accusations that "hazing,"

interethnic hostility, violation of legal rights of subordinates, and inattention to their needs are flourishing in the detachment are simply insulting. Very well, if two years ago there were non-regulation relations here, one can accept the present criticism as a retribution for past sins. One can even understand it thus: it is good that criticism for deficiencies has touched the army first of all, and that it has been the first to start putting itself in order. And if order exists at present, it is simpler to respond to tardy criticism by saying, why bother heaping abuse on us, it is better to come to the detachment and see how things really are!

But it is much more difficult to react when they do not come, but go their own way, and not simply that, but try to shake those foundations which the army long ago laid down and has recently strengthened.

Certain BNF officials are trying this, as we see. As are politicians from other regions of the country, the Baltics, Transcaucasus, and Moldova.

Recently the head of Russia, B. Yeltsin, all but called for disobedience of service members conscripted from Russia. A certain portion of the mass media rushed to "support" this campaign, including once again by means of various kinds of conjectures and fabrications.

...Only the weak in spirit, or those who have acquired some experience in shady dealing before induction, leave their units. Is there damage to combat readiness? Of course. And one must also consider that even a trip by one platoon commander in search of a fugitive forces the other officers and warrant officers to do their duties and his as well. Again there are traveling expenses...

And what's the point of the platoon commander, if the chief of staff of the detachment Major V. Novchenkov is forced to act in the role of the senior vehicle officer in order to bring the deserting soldier to the unit when it is more than two hundred kilometers away. Go by train? Captain A. Artamonov tried that, and two ran off. The same Bogdanovich and Slepnev—old hands! Bring them back in handcuffs? By what right? And as for legality and observance of the rights of subordinates, these are now sacred to the officer and warrant officer.

But if this is so, then why can legal demands not be imposed on those who introduce dissension in the army, who do not shrink even at outright lies and deliberate provocation for that purpose? Why are our moral losses, and financial ones too, not compensated?

Why not file suit, for instance? Why not obtain compensation at least for the travel expenses of unit officers and warrant officers for their numerous trips to Minsk and Vitebsk, out of the pocket of that same BNF? After all, if this front was prepared to pay up uncontrollably for everyone who is ready to bring false charges against the army (and incidentally, where does such easy money come from, anyway?), there must be very precise financial documents...

Perhaps this will sober up, at least to some degree, the reckless heads of those who are fond of impugning the prestige of the army.

Snegur Defends Political Position Before Moldovan Parliament

*91UN1113A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 1*

[“Statement of M.I. Snegur to SSR of Moldova Parliament on 21 February 1991”]

[Text] Dear deputies! It is very hard for me to do this but I have been put in a situation where I have to make the following announcement to parliament. Ever since I renounced the unitary doctrine, dominant in the USSR, and decided to join and, later, head the movement of our people to sovereignty, I have tried to be realistic. I tried to adhere to a constructive line aiming to mobilize all political and social forces through parliamentary means. In spite of all this, attacks on the president have started lately which, in an open or disguised manner, employ the mass media. They go to such extremes that one of the officials of the National Economy institute is writing the following in his letter, as he addresses the deputies of the parliament: “Do not applaud so hard, ladies and gentlemen, when the president of the republic is snapping at the government.” Even that cannot be forgiven either, though nobody, and I want to reiterate with full determination, nobody is trying to put any pressure on anyone.

Second. Recently I have been receiving blow after blow from the Communist Party. It started right after Mr. Yeremey became the leader of the party. He, by the way, was not all that excited when I was elected, as long ago as 29 July 1989, and later, at the 13th session, he demanded that I be punished for misleading the people. Now, that he is finally on top of the pyramid, he initiated attacks on the leadership of the republic and on me personally.

In this respect, I want to state the following. Recently, Moldova's CP Central Committee has intensified its attacks directed at the leadership of the republic. In an indirect or, often, quite direct, way these attacks target me personally. As soon as the day after the change of leadership in the Moldovan CP Central Committee, for instance, one of the statements issued by this body unfoundedly accused me of lack of principles in my attitude towards legislation. In a veiled form, it contained instructions regarding my further actions as the president of the republic. These attacks did not stop even after the above-mentioned actions were recognized as insulting and aimed toward misleading public opinion. Moreover, in his comments on my visit to Romania, the new leader of the Moldovan CP Central Committee insists, in a mentor's tone, that “everybody should do his own work at home” (TINERETUL MOLDOVEI of 20 February). The hint is as transparent as it is nasty. When the same leader spoke to the activists of the Kishinev City party organization he also said that “we have to put

an end to political speculations around the suspension of party membership." This position of his became more concrete in the form of a rather transparent warning made at a recent meeting of the Moldovan CP Central Committee bureau. I quote: "If no positive results are achieved, he should be expelled from the party and the press should announce the fact."

The present leaders of the Moldovan Communist Party, possibly based on some considerations known only to them, are trying to use all possible means to aggravate the sociopolitical atmosphere in the republic; for that purpose they are creating a confrontation of opinions on problems especially important for the republic's sovereignty. Being critical of this fact, I strongly protest such actions and declare that I consider myself to have left the ranks of this organization effective the moment that my membership there was suspended, i.e. from 4 August, 1990. (Lengthy applause)

Third. I am addressing the parliament with a request not to discuss and not to consider the draft law proposed by the prime minister "On Improving the Systems of the Executive and Administrative Power in the SSR of Moldova." I request the same regarding the proposals on amendments and addenda to the Constitution (the Basic Law of the SSR of Moldova)—dealing with additional powers for the president, in other words. I especially request that because I am aware of the moods of some of the deputies' clubs and also of the Supreme Soviet Presidium which do not accent such amendments. Many of the parliamentarians benefit from the fact that I have no power, as the case is at present. Moreover, certain work is being done behind the scenes, together with certain political movements, to discredit the president who is seemingly unable to oppose the Kremlin. My words are founded on reliable sources of information. The same issue emerged during my visit to Romania, while I was absent from the Republic.

Thus, the lack of trust lives on. I think that the ideological center related to this issue may be found nowhere else but here, in the building of the parliament.

Talking about power: Many people, and that includes Prime Minister Mircha Druk whom I had nominated to this post, see me as a figurehead. At the same time, all executive power remains in the hands of the government. The so-called figurehead, meanwhile, is to learn of its decisions *ex post facto*, so to speak. However, it is not every decision of the government that is satisfying as, for instance, the one about organizing cooperatives and export-import associations; as a result we have already gained notoriety everywhere.

Here is more. Moldova's National Television finds it possible to provide air time to some people who are mixed up in all of this so that they can justify themselves by their statements, poor things. In this respect, I consider that the National Television does not have any leader at all and the long standing issue of strengthening

the National Television and Radio leadership should be discussed and decided in the parliament.

I am not watching things as an outsider, I am trying to see that everything goes well; I summon members of the government, the prime minister, and vice prime ministers and we discuss our actions as they should be given the present crisis.

Certain individuals from the government, however, take independent decisions and then we all get hit, most of the time morally. It is very hard to work with Mr. Druk. He flares up and raises his voice at anything you tell him. As I consider myself a calm person, many times I simply fail to finish what I am trying to say. When we have to complete the discussion, my request to remain calm does not work longer than half a day.

I want to be understood correctly: I am not trying to cast any doubt on the qualities of mister prime minister. If you remember, I agreed to all of his proposals to the parliament and asked you to treat positively everything that had been suggested by the government.

However, one cannot always do everything only on one's own volition, one cannot stay up nights worrying about the destiny of the republic and its people and remain, at the same time, nothing but an ideological inspirer capable of promising and promising but doing nothing in reality.

I want to work and to see the fruits of my work. Therefore, as I remain true to all of my declarations on the national revival and Moldova's full sovereignty, as I speak against the dictatorship of the center, against the referendum, etc., I consider it necessary to declare that the president of the republic can feel a true leader if he enjoys the trust of the people and also if considerable changes are made in Moldova's Constitution with respect to this system of leadership.

Our republic is in the state of a crisis. The parliament should also bear responsibility for that. In this respect, it is most important for the current session to adopt urgently a law on the general election of the president and avoid, therefore, any speculations done in the name of the people. I think the time has come to follow this up with an election, in accordance with the Constitution.

Proceeding from all I said, allow me, dear deputies, to announce my resignation from the post of the president. I want to reassure you that I will continue to work with full effort and utmost responsibility until the new president is elected.

This is nothing out of the ordinary; this is the way they do it in all democratic countries.

This is the statement I wanted to make today. Thank you for your attention.

Zlenko Details Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Functions*91UN1116A PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 2 Mar 91
p 3*

[Interview with A.M. Zlenko, Ukrainian SSR minister of foreign affairs, by unidentified UKRINFORM correspondent; place and date not indicated: "On Principles of Cooperation Based on Equal Rights"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Dear Anatoliy Maksimovich. The other day the mass media reported a meeting that was held in Moscow between foreign ministers of the Union republics and the USSR. The news, in my opinion, is very important, and I would like to find out some of the details.

[Zlenko] I share such an assessment of the Moscow meeting. I think that it can quite rightly become historical. And this is not an exaggeration. It all depends on whether all of the constructive opinions expressed there are transformed into decisions.

These opinions were concentrated on the need to find the optimal means of cooperation of the foreign policy departments of the republics and the Union under present conditions and to develop the kind of mechanism of cooperation that would promote the joint development and implementation of foreign policy. Participants in the meeting ascertained that the system that has existed until now is ineffective and obsolete, and that it does not fit the Union character of the state arrangement. It is not just a new search that is needed, but a speedy organization of the matter in a new way.

[Correspondent] What positions did the Ukraine set forth at the meeting, and what kind of proposals did it introduce?

[Zlenko] We proceed from the fact that our republic, as it is defined in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, will conduct the kind of foreign policy that will ensure its national interests in the political, economic, ecological, informational, scientific, technical, cultural, and sports spheres in the most effective way. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is guided by this in its law-creating activity, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also proceeds from this. It was I who emphasized this in my speech at the meeting.

For the time being, our republic is not in a condition to realize immediately all of its sovereign rights in the sphere of foreign relations, for this requires more than financing, as appears at first glance. There is a need for well thought-out and scientifically based concepts that demonstrate the necessity and fruitfulness of establishing a particular set of bilateral or multilateral relations, and a study is needed of their mutual advantages and prospects. In addition, at the present stage consideration must be given to the reasons for the geopolitical

and economic order and the presence of specific stereotypes in the international community. Thus, the requirement arises today for a joint resolution of certain problems in international life, first and foremost those of a global nature. More specifically, questions could have been raised on a Union level: strategic armaments, disarmament, regional conflicts, outer space, global ecological programs and projects, and the world ocean.

Does this mean that the republic will be excluded from the process of making decisions on these questions? Not at all. If for no other reason than that it is a member of the United Nations. But who will decide these problems and also at first the important questions of bilateral relations of the Union? We think that this can be done only by a council of foreign affairs ministers in which there are both Union and republic leaders of foreign policy departments.

The functions of this council, besides the adoption of political decisions on the principal questions mentioned above, in our opinion could also include the coordination of the republics' foreign policy actions, the development of joint positions in the area of bilateral relations and in relations with economic organizations that have an effect on the interests of all republics, consideration of the candidacies of ambassadors to prominent countries, questions of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union, and the like. We are not laying claim to the compilation of an exhaustive list, but we believe that indeed it should be exhaustive. So, all other questions outside its scope will fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the republics.

This approach, in my opinion, will make it possible to utilize with maximum effectiveness the rich experience of the Union ministry and the existing foreign policy and foreign economic infrastructure, and it will contribute to the fullest and most harmonious consideration of the interests of the Union and the republics in the foreign policy sphere, and the protection of the specific interests of all republics and their common interests at the same time. Of course, this is only an idea, which was positively received at this meeting, and its implementation will depend in many ways on the definition of the legal framework of the conduct of foreign policy of the future Union.

[Correspondent] How were the proposals of the Ukraine perceived?

[Zlenko] In many cases, similar or approximate ideas were expressed by ministers of other republics. In almost all the speeches the main theme was the search for ways of effective implementation of the sovereignty of the republic in the sphere of foreign relations and forms of joint participation in the implementation of the foreign policy of the Union. For us, this is an indication that our understanding of the resolution of existing problems is not the local desire of beginning politicians but an objective necessity. This is also an indication that we are on the right path in the development of the concept of

the international activity of the Ukrainian SSR, which is based specifically on the aforementioned principles.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Maksimovich, allow me a touchy question.

[Zlenko] Please.

[Correspondent] One has occasion to hear sometimes, and this is not only from nonprofessionals but also from highly placed government individuals and deputies at various levels: The Ukraine, they say, is not minding its own business, let it resolve its own domestic problems. As for foreign policy, it is not envisaged in legislation and, in addition, it will not have a practical return...

[Zlenko] Unfortunately, one has occasion to encounter such views. They indicate most of all that over the years the people, even state people, have been brought up on this kind of "narrow-minded" complex. I should mention that Article 80 of the currently active USSR Constitution states that a republic has the right "to enter into relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties with them, to exchange diplomatic and consular missions, and to take part in the activity of international organizations." This is also repeated almost word for word in Article 74 of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, in which it is written: The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties with them, to exchange diplomatic and consular missions, and to take part in the activity of international organizations.

Finally, I will also turn to the already cited Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine and the Supreme Soviet decree on the implementation of the provisions of the declaration in the sphere of foreign relations. Consequently, the legal basis is quite adequate.

As for the requirements... All the countries of the world, from the very smallest to the largest, strive in a maximum way to expand their foreign ties: political and, after them, economic, trade, scientific, cultural, etc. This is done most of all for better support of national interests. Here is a straightforward example. Recently, a joint Ukrainian-Hungarian statement was signed at a high level which contains provisions about respect for territorial integrity, plans to promote trade exchanges, joint ecological and technological programs, etc. Thus, by this one international act alone we "economize," if it can be put this way, on a stable sociopolitical atmosphere in those regions that some would like to consider debatable, on the financing of projects for the ecological safety of the Carpathian region, and we jointly, and this again means "more cheaply," develop plans for the economic use of basins of border rivers and so forth. I assure our readers: Foreign policy is bilateral relations in particular. Of course, if they are open, scientifically reasoned, and humane, they are an extremely beneficial matter! And the fact that the Ukraine, of course not on its own initiative, practically did not take part in them could not fail to have had a negative effect on its development. This situation requires the quickest possible correction.

[Correspondent] Can we expect that matters will move ahead?

[Zlenko] I think that we can. This is indicated by the atmosphere of mutual understanding that reigned at the meeting of the ministers, and by the understanding and support with which Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh met the proposals of colleagues and, in fact, by the simple objective necessity for cooperation on the basis of equal rights, which alone can serve as the basis of a Union of sovereign states. It was recognized that the republics must come out onto the broad field of active foreign policy activity. It can be said without exaggeration that the Moscow meeting demonstrated the presence of a concerned approach of the ministries of the republics in the construction of a new Union and, at the same time, it was an example of how it would be possible for the Union republics and departments to search for the most optimal approaches to building new and mutually acceptable organizational Union structures.

Caucasus

Georgia Passes Amendments, Additions to Constitution

91US0331A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
2 Feb 91 p 2

[Law of the Georgian Republic on Making Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Georgian Republic]

[Text] In connection with reorganization of the system of local bodies of state government and administration in the Georgian Republic, the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet resolves:

I. To make the following amendments and additions in the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Georgian Republic:

1. Substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in Article 2 by the words "representative bodies of state government—Assemblies and Supreme Soviets."

2. In Article 6:

substitute the word "parties" by the words "parties of the Georgian Republic";

substitute the words "in the soviets of people's deputies" by the words "in bodies of state government."

3. Adopt the following wording for the second part of Article 7:

"Creation and the activities of parties, organizations and movements having the goal of violently changing the constitutional structure of the republic, violating the republic's territorial integrity, undermining its security and inciting national and religious enmity are prohibited."

4. Delete the word "Soviet" from Article 27, the word "socialist" from Article 38, and the word "state" from the third part of Article 59.

5. In Article 46:

substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in the second part by the words "bodies of state government"; add a third and a fourth part to the article with the following content:

"The right of electing deputies to bodies of state government of the Georgian Republic is possessed by citizens of the Georgian Republic residing permanently in the territory of the corresponding body.

"A citizen of the Georgian republic has the right to be elected to bodies of state government of the Georgian Republic irrespective of his permanent place of residence in the Georgian Republic."

6. Delete the words "Soviet Socialist [feminine]" and "Soviet Socialist [neuter]" from the title of Chapter 8 and the first part of Article 79.

7. Substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in the title of Section IV by the words "organs of state government," and the words "soviets of people's deputies" in the title of Chapter 10 by the words "organs of state government."

8. Adopt the following wording for Article 85:

"The Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic, the supreme soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar Autonomous Republic, and rayon, city, city rayon, tem [translation unknown], settlement and village assemblies organize a system of representative bodies of state government."

9. In Article 86:

adopt the following wording for the first part:

"The term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic and the supreme soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar Autonomous Republic is five years, and that of the assemblies is three years";

substitute the words "people's deputies in local soviets" in the second and third parts by the words "assembly deputies."

10. In Article 87:

adopt the following wording for the first and second parts:

"Important matters of republic and local significance are resolved correspondingly by sessions of the supreme soviets and assemblies.

"Supreme soviets elect the chairmen of the supreme soviets, while assemblies elect secretaries. The supreme soviets have their own presidiums";

substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in the third part by the words "supreme soviets";

substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in the fourth part by the words "bodies of state government."

11. Substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" in Article 88 by the words "bodies of state government."

12. Adopt the following wording for Article 89:

"Organs of state government manage, directly or by way of bodies they create, all spheres of state, economic, social and cultural development on their territory, make decisions, ensure their execution and exercise control over fulfillment of these decisions."

13. Substitute the words "of the soviets of people's deputies," "soviets" and "soviets of people's deputies" in Article 90 by the words "of organs of state government," "organs of state government" and "organs of state government," and the word "collective" by the word "collegial."

14. Delete the word "people's" from articles 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 and 97 and the title of Chapter 12.

15. In Article 92:

substitute the words "local soviet" in the second part by the word "assembly";

adopt the following wording for the third part:

"A citizen of the Georgian Republic may not be a member of more than two bodies of state government concurrently";

substitute the words "in the composition of executive committees of local soviets, departments of executive committees of local soviets" in the fourth part by the words "in the composition of executive bodies of assemblies, with the exception of the town council chairman (administrator), and departments of the prefecture"; add the words "his deputies" after the words "general procurator"; substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" by the words "organs of self government."

16. In Article 99:

adopt the following wording for the first part:

"Deputies are authorized representatives of the people in bodies of state government";

substitute the word "soviets" in the second part by the words "organs of state government" and "these organs."

17. Substitute the words "local soviets of people's deputies" and "of the local soviet of people's deputies" in articles 100 and 101 by the words "assemblies" and "of the assembly."

18. Substitute the words "soviet of people's deputies" in Article 103 by the words "organ of state government."

19. In Article 104:

adopt the following wording for Paragraph 14:

"terminates the authority of the assemblies";

substitute the words "rayon, city (republic-subordinated city) soviets of people's deputies" in Paragraph 26 by the words "assemblies of the rayon and the republic-subordinated city";

adopt the following wording for Paragraph 27:

"27) schedules elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic and approves the composition of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic, schedules elections of deputies to assemblies."

20. Substitute the words "rayon, city (republic-subordinated city) soviets of people's deputies" in Article 111 and in Paragraph 2, Article 119 by the words "assemblies of the rayon and the republic-subordinated city."

21. In Article 113:

substitute the words "people's deputies" in Paragraph 4 by the words "members of the Supreme Soviet";

substitute the words "local soviets" in Paragraph 5 by the words "in assemblies";

add the following paragraphs to the article:

"19) appoints and dismisses prefects upon representation by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic;

"20) repeals instructions and orders of prefects."

22. Supplement Paragraph 3, Article 115 with the words "and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—for appointment to the position of prefects."

23. In Article 118:

add the words "and between session meetings" after the words "between sessions" in the third part;

supplement this same part with the words "except in those cases when a member of the Supreme Soviet is detained at the place of a crime."

24. Adopt the following wording for the first part of Article 128:

"Within the limits of its competency, the Council of Ministers of the Georgian Republic suspends execution of decrees and instructions of the councils of ministers of the autonomous republics, as well as instructions and orders of prefects."

25. Adopt the following wording for the first part of Article 135:

"The councils of ministers of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar Autonomous Republic are entitled to suspend the instructions and orders of prefects within the limits of their competency."

26. Adopt the following title for Chapter 17: "Local Bodies of State Government."

27. Adopt the following wording for the first part of Article 138:

"Assemblies resolve all matters of local significance in accordance with national interests and the interests of citizens residing within the territory of the assembly, on the basis of legislation of the Georgian Republic, they participate in examination of issues of republic and union significance, and they submit proposals in regard to them."

28. Substitute the words "soviets of people's deputies" and "local soviets of people's deputies" in articles 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 and 154 by the word "assemblies," and delete the word "USSR" from articles 140 and 141.

29. Delete: the second part of Article 140; the first part of Article 141, the second sentence of the second part, and the third part of this article; articles 143 and 144—in their entirety.

30. Adopt the following wording for Article 142:

"The powers and working routine of an assembly and its bodies are determined by the Law on Local Administration and by regulations drawn up on its basis, as approved by the corresponding prefect."

31. Adopt the following title for Chapter 18: "Local Bodies of State Administration."

32. Adopt the following wording for articles 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 and 150:

"Article 145. The body of local administration in a rayon and in a republic-subordinated city is the prefecture, headed by a prefect, while in cities, city rayons, towns, villages and settlements it is the council or administrator.

"Article 146. The prefect is the supreme official of rayons and republic-subordinated cities.

"The prefect is answerable to the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic, its Presidium and the Council of Ministers of the Georgian Republic, while the council and the administrator are answerable correspondingly to the assembly and the prefect.

"The term of office of a prefect is 4 years. The same person may be appointed prefect for not more than two consecutive terms.

"Article 147. Local bodies of state administration manage the state, economic, social and cultural development of the corresponding territory on the basis of decisions of higher bodies of state government and administration, and decisions of assemblies.

"Article 148. A prefect publishes instructions and orders within the limits of his competency, while a council (administrator) adopts decisions and publishes instructions.

"Article 149. A prefect is entitled to repeal acts of the corresponding assemblies as well as acts of lower bodies of local administration that are inconsistent with legislation of the Georgian Republic.

"Article 150. The structure of bodies of state administration and the procedure by which their subdivisions are formed are determined by legislation of the Georgian Republic and the autonomous republics."

33. Delete Article 151.

34. Substitute the words "executive and administrative bodies of local soviets of people's deputies" in Article 176 by the words "local bodies of state administration."

II. This law becomes effective from the moment of its adoption.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic Z. Gamsakhurdia.

Tbilisi.

29 January 1991.

Central Asia

Tajiks Verify Kievan MD Treatment of Draftees

91UM0449A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by TASS correspondent S. Ergashev: "They Serve and Get Along Well"]

[Text] A public delegation from Tajikistan returned home satisfied with its visits to the units of the Kiev Military District. The delegation was led by Tajik SSR People's Deputy Colonel M. Mamadzhanov, military commissar of the republic.

Colonel Mamadzhanov said in an interview to a TASS correspondent: "Our delegation spent one week familiarizing itself with the service and living conditions of our young fellow countrymen in ethnically diverse army collectives. There is a reason why we selected the Kiev District: Thousands of draftees from Tajikistan serve there."

Further Details on 2 December Namangan Disorder

91US0325A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Dec 90 p 4

Article by I. Khisamov, PRAVDA VOSTOKA special correspondent, under the rubric: "Namangan: Versions and Facts": "Mob Rule"]

[Text] The tragic events of 2 December in Namangan may receive fresh illumination in conjunction with the statement made recently by Major V. Tezikov, commander of a battalion of internal troops. He reported that at about 1200 on 2 December, that is six and one-half hours before the incident, he received instructions from the head of the oblast directorate of internal affairs to prepare 150 people in the event of possible disorders in the city.

Having received the instructions, the commander of the battalion made the decision to summon officers and soldiers on liberty back to duty with the unit.

We have not been able to find out on what the supposition of upcoming disorders was based. They refused to comment on the statement at the Namangan Oblast Directorate of Internal Affairs. In response to our questions, B. Khakimov, first secretary of the Namangan party obkom [oblast committee] answered that he himself had only just learned of it, and that the information is being verified. We received the same answer from I. Shilov, first deputy minister of USSR internal affairs.

It is striking that such an important detail has not been analyzed. Despite the fact that a sufficient number of commissions and investigative groups are working in the city.

We found out that a thief was caught on the morning of 2 December at the city "flea market." The thief was brutally beaten by a crowd of people who refused to turn him over to the militia, and tense negotiations, which even involved spiritual authorities, went on for several hours. In the end they managed to rescue the man. In the process, many uncomplimentary things were said to the militia and stones flew.

This incident was quite able to heat up the situation in a small city. It is possible that this is why the militia resorted to the internal troops. And, perhaps, this explains why a huge crowd assembled in such a short time.

There are subjects with respect to which the reporter should say to himself those words used in American courts: "From this time on your own words may be used against you." One such theme is the excess of the crowd. It seems that ever since Sumgait no article on mass disturbances has slipped by without angry denials and accusations against the authors of endless political, ethnic, or other biases.

And so in Namangan several days of discussion and condemnation of individual articles has almost obscured analysis of the events themselves. Respectable generals have been arguing with no less respectable citizens about whether the bus turned off the highway or not. It was necessary to verify it with my own eyes. It turns out that it did not turn off, but rather stopped in an unauthorized place—right at the crossing where the sidewalk is separated from the thoroughfare by an open-work fence. That is, it was fenced in. The crowd knocked down the fence.

Very different versions of what happened have been circulating. We will try to pick out those fragments upon which everyone agrees. Six soldiers, returning to their unit from liberty, climbed aboard a PAZ [Pavlov bus factory] bus that was operating as a fixed-route taxi (which is interesting in and of itself). They rode in it for less than a block. That is, the conflict with the local passengers inside it could have only lasted a minute or two. Then the driver stopped the bus at that same fence (incidentally, the driver has carefully been kept away from meetings with the press, in the interests of the investigation, as they explained) and called for people to come. There are different opinions as to whether it was he who called out.

However it happened, people quickly arrived. They battered the soldiers for more than an hour. Only two survived. Militia employees were unable to help—stones were thrown at them. The names of the victims have already been listed in the press. The reader is also familiar with what happened afterward. We will clarify only the numbers: Twelve civilians received gunshot wounds. There were 27 people arrested, and all were soon released “at the request of their parents and leaders of educational institutions,” as we were officially informed. In short, at this moment not one of the participants in the slaughter is isolated from society. However, as Deputy Minister I. Shilov has said, the investigators of the various departments are working hard, criminal proceedings have been instituted in cases of participation in the mass disorders, and the guilty are being exposed.

Views on what happened diverge tremendously.

“My experience with many conflicts in the recent past permits me to affirm that we are not dealing with a spontaneous incident here,” said Major General Ye. Nechayev, deputy chief of the political department of the internal forces.

Abdulakhat Mamadzhonov, imam-khatib [as transliterated], put it the same way. In his latest sermon he condemned the presently unknown organizers of the savage violence and called upon people to repudiate the provocateurs.

“We have arrived at the deep conviction,” said I. Dzhrabekov, chairman of a commission to study the causes of the disorders and first deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers under the president of the republic,

“that the incident does not have any political, ethnic, or antimilitary tones. It was motivated by hooliganism.”

“These events will not affect the political situation in the republic,” stressed D. Khamidov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. “It was and remains stable.”

There are various idle rumors concerning some ultimatum of the local authorities addressed to the military unit. Right this moment I have in my hands a document addressed by S. Tashpulatov, chairman of the Namangan Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], to V. Tezikov, commander of the battalion. It is dated 3 December. It proposes that the battalion be immediately transferred to another place to avoid tragic consequences. In the event that this is not done, says the document, all responsibility lies with the leadership of the unit.

We asked S. Tashpulatov to comment on the document.

“We did not intend for the battalion to leave the city for good. Under the tense circumstances we considered it necessary for the unit to leave for a few days while people calm down,” said the chairman.

Let us recall that this battalion has been in Namangan by request of the administration of Uzbekistan since December of last year. Members of the republic-level commission did not support the demand of the chairman of the oblispolkom. The battalion is remaining.

The city looked forward to Friday with some concern—it is the day of mass prayers. Tens of thousands of people went to the mosque. The sermon at the time of the noon prayer was given by Mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad-Yusuf, head of the Muslims of Central Asia. He called upon people to show mercy. There were no disturbances in Namangan.

Nor are there any today. I can say officially that the situation has become normalized.

Authors of Anti-Rashidov Article Berated

91US0337A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Jan 91 p 3

[Editorial: “What Is the Nostalgia About?: To Whom Stabilization in Uzbekistan Is Frustrating” (See FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-91-006, 9 Jan 91, pp 72-73 for translation of original IZVESTIYA article.)]

[Text] For the first issues of any new year, every newspaper—trust our experience—saves something of a sort that will catch the readers’ attention by its sensationalism from among the old year’s accumulated materials. Several of the first January issues—and there you have an illusion of the novelty that is so much desired, especially in our perestroyka era.

The newspaper IZVESTIYA acted just this way in publishing, in its fifth issue for this year, the article "Nostalgia for the 'Boss,'" by which it apparently intended to astound its readers with new sensations concerning Sharaf Rashidov, and also disparage certain other problems at the same time.

Who are this article's authors? They are our fellow countrymen and cochairmen of the "Birlik" [Unity] Movement. However, the authors were "modestly" silent about their being leaders of the informal [neformalnoye] movement—this was not the proper occasion.

It might have been possible, of course, to ignore this publication—We are already accustomed to Uzbekistan's being a constant object of the central mass information media's criticism. This time, however, we simply do not have the right to remain silent, because the sorts of questions and problems that affect the interests of all of the republic's workers, and alarm its entire public are touched upon in "Nostalgia for the 'Boss.'"

Let us proceed objectively—reprint the article from IZVESTIYA in its entirety. This, moreover, will free us of the necessity to follow the authors' thinking and of explanations as to who needs the All-Union myth about Sharaf Rashidov's "rehabilitation."

So—about the myth. Like any half-truth, it has its sources. They are named in the IZVESTIYA article: "As some of the first, a group of USSR People's Deputies from Fergana Oblast started this campaign (rehabilitation of the deceased—Ed.) in the oblast newspaper KOMMUNA," "a session of the Dzhezakskiy Rayon Soviet and a rayon conference of Communists urged that the attitude toward their fellow countryman be reviewed," and, finally, "the republic weekly UZBEKISTON ADABIYETI VA SANATI [UZBEKISTAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE] devoted one of its full pages to a former party apparatchik, who weeps bitterly for his 'modest and wise' chief."

So—these publications occurred, as there probably also occurred what is said further in IZVESTIYA: "Some Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Deputies are asking themselves the same question: Is it not time (to rehabilitate Sh. Rashidov—Ed.)?"

It happened. But whence, in short, arose the question about Sharaf Rashidov? We shall explain—It is the Ferganans' reaction to an interview with R. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, by a correspondent of the IZVESTIYA supplement SOYUZ (No. 1 for 1990). In the Fergana KOMMUNA of 10 February last year, an open letter of the USSR People's Deputies from Fergana—"Concealed Malice" ["Kamen za pazukhoy"]—was indeed published. In it there is talk, not about the possible rehabilitation of Sh. Rashidov, but about charges against the then recent Uzbek leader R. Nishanov: Among us, they say, there are quite a few of those who are gifted with hindsight.

Now, about Rashidov himself. In speaking of the attitude toward his person, we consider it appropriate to return to the evaluations which resounded at the 22d Congress of the Uzbek Communist Party and at the third session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

We quote: "We condemn everything negative that is connected with Rashidov's name. It is unacceptable to us. We must free ourselves from the routine of the past; otherwise we shall be unable to move forward. However, we cannot tie everything that was done during that period to one deceased person...."

And further, "...if there is a higher justice, a higher truth—and this, in our conviction, is the people's opinion—it cannot negate those tremendous changes, having great significance for the republic's life, which are linked to this person's name."

There you have the evaluation that was given from the lofty speakers' platforms of a forum of the republic's Communists and People's Deputies. And it—this is our deep conviction—is singularly true and absolutely honest.

Indeed, it is intolerable to exploit the name of one who does not exist today by hanging various abusive labels on him and accusing him of that of which he is not guilty. We are not talking about the issue's moral aspect: Self-respecting people would never cast aspersions on a deceased person. That is condemned by all peoples.

Do not attempt to shift all of the guilt for what was committed by us to our predecessors—in this there is decency, tact, and responsibility for today and tomorrow! Why does it not suit the democrats of "Birlik"? Maybe they just have not realized that it is time, not to topple monuments—with a noose on the neck!—but to evaluate the decades of their own history.

It is pointless for us needlessly to offend even the memory of the deceased or to long for his stagnant era, just as it is to accuse him of Uzbekistan's "Russification," the Uzbek language's repression, and the rest of the other absurdities, of which there has been no sign, and of which the authors of the article in IZVESTIYA try so hard to speak. All of this stems from an inflamed imagination, and from the principle "the more you tell lies, the better." Besides, the addressee cannot respond. Are you not ashamed, leaders of "Birlik"? As they say, have a conscience.

Today's perestroika, including that in our republic, is in no way based on shades of the past. It has enough glaring present-day problems. We should rally around these—today's problems—and shun the destabilization and shy away from the disorder that—perhaps less than other regions—have indeed stricken our Uzbekistan, which has become firmly established in both sovereignty and responsibility to the country. However, a nostalgia has appeared even among us. A nostalgia has appeared—it must be admitted—for normal, competent authority. Without this, neither the economy nor morality can be improved. And if this nostalgia were to be clothed in

some motto, the motto apparently would be: "I am willing to pay any price, sacrifice everything, if only there can be plenty, peace, and concord in the republic and the country."

Do the IZVESTIYA publication's authors have an urge toward this?

This question, however, is superfluous. The answer to it is contained in the article. It is—a nostalgia for street rallies, and displeasure with order and discipline and the demand for responsibility for their deeds and actions.

Some people very much dislike the situation that has taken shape in the republic recently: calm, steady, built on mutual understanding, open, and principled. Some people would very much like for everything to bog down in chaos and anarchy, and for the blood of innocent people to flow; for people to glance apprehensively about themselves and not trust one another; and for mothers, fearing for their children's fate, to be unable to sleep soundly.

Every worker in the republic, regardless of nationality, age, or religion, knows the role of these people, and also knows the role of their politics.

They are constantly telling us about the banning of rallies and meetings. Democracy, you see, has been destroyed.... And when those rally passions turn into disorders, hooliganism, arsons, and even murders? The question arises: Who needs the kind of "democracy" from which the common people suffer. By the way, the ban on unsanctioned street rallies—street rallies only—this is the will of the People's Deputies. Thus everything is not honest and sincere on the part of the article's authors even in this case. Will we, moreover, learn to respect elective authority in order to respect ourselves and our own civic worth as well?

Yes, to some the stability in Uzbekistan is repugnant, and it has already been given the epithet "neostagnation." To them, the positive changes in the republic are unacceptable; therefore, "the Russian-speaking population's unrest because of the well-known events in Fergana" is again causing alarm. They very much want to catch fish in troubled waters.

By the way, concerning the attitude toward national minorities in Uzbekistan, is it not true that "Birlik" Cochairman Z. Khaknazarov declared before journalists, in the presence of his colleagues, that Russians should get out of Uzbekistan? Is it not true that D.

Khasanov, one of "Birlik's" founders (at least he so represents himself), is making extremely questionable appeals to the residents of Fergana Valley, and propagating a myth about the Great Turanian [Turan] within the confines of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran, and in other countries neighboring us?

Suddenly, from IZVESTIYA's pages, "Birlik" activists have begun to burn "with warm feelings" toward the republic's Russian-speaking population, and have declared themselves its protectors.

For whom are these political tricks intended? Who do the article's authors want to deceive? And yet another question: Is it true that a self-respecting organization can be so unprincipled, and change its position several times in a single day? Can it be that all means for achieving its ambitious ends are good?

The "obedient local press" was also taken to task. It is unimportant that it has stopped operating on orders from its colleagues at the center and reprinting any remark, even the most insignificant, as before; that it does not rush to "take measures"; and that it has its own position and its own opinion, and does not conceal these. And is it not true, under these circumstances, that the desired is misrepresented as the actual when the cochairmen doctors do not want to see the independence of the Uzbek press, and consider it obedient to the republic's leaders as it once was to "Rashidov's command"?

There you have the crux of the matter! The shade of the deceased is needed only in order to bad-mouth the republic's present leadership and "fully interpret" its line. But, after all, there is too much business to be concerned with ghosts and myths.

It may be time for all of us, regardless of party affiliation, views, and ambitions, to ponder—what we are giving the people, and how to bring peace and plenty to our common home.

So, enough, cochairmen democrats! Everything about you is clear. And, if there are questions for you, they are only rhetorical. To whom, and for what reason, is all of this necessary—the nostalgia for a firm hand and the longing for rally euphoria?

Nevertheless, the main point does not lie in this.

The main point is—the caravan is proceeding independently.

Turkmen Police Cite Evidence of Drug Trafficking Upsurge

*91WD0511A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91
Union Edition p 8*

[Article by V. Kuleshov, IZVESTIYA staff correspondent, from the Turkmen SSR: "With a Sack of Narcotics and Grenades"]

[Text] "People armed with grenades are riding on the Tashkent-Volgograd train." The person who reported this information to the Railroad Line Department of the Chardzhou Station Police [Militsiya] wished to remain anonymous. Nevertheless, an operations group, headed by Major A. Aminov, was quickly formed to check out the report.

In one of the cars, sacks and handbags concealed on the upper berth in the conductors' compartment attracted the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] officers' attention. Three persons—A. Biryukov, A. Frolov, and I. Istomina—all Volgograd residents, were chatting peacefully in the same compartment. "Open your baggage!" demanded the police officers. "This is despotism! We are going to complain!" was heard in response. But the bags had to be opened. What was the policemen's amazement when, inside them, along with the grenades (in reality, training grenades were found there), almost 17 kilograms of marijuana were discovered.

An investigation is now being conducted in the case of the drug pushers [narkodeltsy]. However, initial results have shown: the Tashkent-Volgograd train passengers are far from novices in the narcotics business. Several kinds of firearms, ammunition, tear gas, and narcotics have already been discovered in their Volgograd apartments. In short, they had seriously prepared for delivery of the dangerous drug, and had even stocked themselves up with grenades.

At the Turkmen MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], they admit that this case is not the first in which a drug has been delivered to Central Asia, the main narcotics consumer, from other regions of the country. The prices on a narcotic are really insane today, so the narcotics racket continues. Whereas six cases of narcotics transporters' arrest were registered by LOVD [Internal Affairs Railroad Line Department] officers last year in Chardzhou alone, three such groups have already been discovered in just January of this year.

Indeed, whereas a kilogram of geryak [not further identified—possibly a slang term for heroin (geroin)] cost 3,000 to 5,000, or 10,000 rubles at most five years ago, it is no longer sold for less than 100,000 today. The fast ruble and the propensity to steal are outweighing fear and conscience, and are making the pushers of the narcotics racket operate cunningly in drug production and sales. The police alone, admit the Turkmen oblast UVD leaders, are no longer able to cope with the growth of drug addiction and the narcotics racket.

Presidential Press Spokesman Interviewed on Responsibilities

91UN1080A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 91 p 6

[Interview with V.N. Ignatenko, head of the USSR president's press service, by PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK correspondents L. Chernenko and V. Yurteyev; place and date not given: "Information of the USSR President's Press Service..."]

[Text] Our press is beginning to claim the status of the fourth estate also. At the same time, it is trying to get closer to the first estate. This became possible after the USSR president's press service was established. It is headed by V.N. Ignatenko, a well-known journalist who has been schooled by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. He gained experience in TASS, where work requires quick reaction and responsibility. He mastered the methods of in-depth political analysis and the art of international contacts during his work on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee. In recent years he was editor in chief of NOVOYE VREMYA magazine. His versatile journalistic experience serves him well in his new job. This is the first time that we have established a president's press service in our country. What is its purpose?

[Ignatenko] Our task is to help the president establish the most meaningful contacts with the press, which will be filled with good will. We have to inform people about what is happening at the very top, but we also have to explain sometimes why all this is happening. It is of extreme importance for us to make the president's position come through, in its exact focus; we need to explain what concerns the president at this particular time and for what reason.

We prepare for our every encounter with the press, and every day we process an enormous amount of information. It is a big load. Apart from me there are only three other journalists in the press center who are very experienced in their trade, both in our country and abroad. They all have a fine command of several foreign languages and are familiar with the psychology of their domestic and foreign colleagues.

[Correspondent] In order to inform the know-it-all press you have to be well informed yourself. What sources of information do you employ?

[Ignatenko] Yes, we receive our information from the most competent sources. We get the data from the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR Procuracy, and the departments of the USSR Council of Ministers staff. We work in very close cooperation with Ye.M. Primakov, and we have established good contacts with I. Belousov, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman. As tensions were growing in the Persian Gulf conflict we were and still are receiving the most objective and complete information from Igor Sergeyevich. The USSR Navy Headquarters allowed me to know exactly where each of our ships in the region was

positioned and what it was occupied with, from destroyer to fishing schooner.

Another ordeal faced us at the press conference that took place after the test nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya. Everybody was, of course, interested in the president's position and not mine. To present it in the most exact way I had to collect huge amounts of auxiliary materials, even though I knew what M.S. Gorbachev was thinking about the issue. In a word, in this we were also helped by government officials, who were well aware of all the "reefs" in this respect. I had all the information about nuclear testing in other countries at my disposal, down to the minute details. That allowed me to be prepared for most unexpected questions, of which there are many at every press conference.

[Correspondent] It happens, of course, that you are asked questions to which you do not know the answers. How do you get out of such situations?

[Ignatenko] In this I use one single rule—"No lies!" If I do not know something, I just say "I do not know." If I did not discuss some subject with the president, this is exactly what I will say about it. All my comments at briefings are based on four rules: "This I learned from the documents I read," "This I know myself," "This is my speculation," and "I will study this issue and report to you." Any journalist who reports incorrect information at least once loses his reputation; he loses his credibility with his readers and listeners. The journalist, in his turn, will stop trusting me. At every briefing I hear an average of 30 to 40 questions. As a rule, I manage to foresee the majority of them. To do this, I have to be in singular political-informational shape from day to day. I find it helpful to read coded messages and other materials and to communicate with the Presidential Council members and ministers.

[Correspondent] Do you manage to talk often with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev?

[Ignatenko] I try to meet with him regularly, to do so every day, if only for a short while. But it is only natural that I do not try to abuse the president's attention by any means. What is most important here is to sense how necessary this contact is. If the president needs me for anything, he will, of course, find me immediately. I have to be prepared for this all the time and I even have to anticipate such occasions. People working for the government are quite familiar with the feeling of permanent readiness, the sensation of being always "on the mark." It is a very delicate matter to know what subject must be discussed today and at what time and what can wait until tomorrow. Journalists also possess this sixth sense.

But when some critical situations arise, such as, for instance, was the case with V. Bakatin and E. Shevardnadze, I can gain immediate access to the president to get his response. M.S. Gorbachev is fully aware how important it is to have an exact interpretation of his position on any issue.

[Correspondent] Any journalist may call the press service of the White House to ask a question that might be of interest to his readers and to learn the official point of view in the matter. Do we have a similar practice?

[Ignatenko] My colleagues, the press service officials, provide competent answers to various questions asked by the press 12 hours a day. A consultant on duty can give more detailed information. If warranted by the situation, I may join the conversation.

I meet with the journalists here, in the Kremlin, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center. I also talk with them in the NOVOYE VREMYA office, where a small room is still being kept for me. Some meetings occur "by the Kremlin wall," as I call them. The BBC, for instance, urgently needed to learn the reaction displayed by our leadership to Margaret Thatcher's resignation. I am convinced that in a case like this we have to hurry and go into the square to those who are waiting there and give them an interview, instead of waiting until the passes are issued. Live broadcasts have a lot of credibility and, I think, we can only win if we use such opportunities.

As we were taking our leave, we agreed with Vitaliy Nikitich that PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK will now regularly publish materials under the rubric "Information of the USSR President's Press Service..."

Latvia's Left-Wing Press Claims Discrimination, Views Options

91UN1034A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Ye. Yelkin and Yu. Chernyavskiy: "Put the 'Sixth Monarchy' in the Service of Democracy: The Leftist Press Needs Its Own Distribution Network"]

[Text] A typical picture. The newsstand shelf is full of various publications. There is BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA and RIGAS BALSS, DIYENA and SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, which usually ashamedly calls itself SM in order to avoid another mention of the despised word "Soviet." The customer looks in vain for the leftist forces' newspapers—TSINYA, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, NOVOSTI RIGI, UTRO JURMALA, AND YEDINSTVO. If it is even possible to obtain these publications, which enjoy reader interest, it is only by chance, so to speak, in the morning hours and mainly in the center of Riga.

Even the uninitiated person realizes that the demand for these publications is not being met. Yet the amount of the party and democratic press that is offered for retail sale is being reduced. Thus, since last fall the number of copies of the newspaper NOVOSTI RIGI received by Soyuzpechat newsstands has been reduced by 6,000 copies (which is one-fifth of its circulation). In August

the Jurmala and Riga branches of Soyuzpechat undertook to distribute a total of 17,000 copies of the newspaper UTRO JURMALA. Gradually, in several stages, they cut retail sales down to 11,000 copies. The explanation was the same: "Your newspaper does not sell. Thank us for taking as many as we do."

Well, thank you. However, let us take a look at what lies behind the claim by Soyuzpechat employees. For all intents and purposes, an efficient and carefully thought-out system has been put into operation for stifling the press that is not to the liking of the Latvian People's Front. The overall plan is as follows: First, steps are taken so that certain newspapers do not sell out, and leftovers remain; then the Soyuzpechat officials wring their hands and say: "Cut your printings; why should we have to haul your unsold newspapers around filling up our newsstands and warehouses?" In fact, it is very simple to create an artificial surplus of newspapers. Instead of the aforementioned publications' being "spread around" evenly among all newsstands with a view to potential customers, excess numbers of them are deliberately delivered to several central newsstands. On the other hand, the new neighborhoods and industrial zones are kept on "starvation rations." Yet it is there in the workers' neighborhoods that the main readers of the publications in question are found.

The opposition press does not enjoy sympathy with the postal department either, to put it mildly. There have been numerous cases in which people were not allowed to sign up for TSINYA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA during the subscription campaign, and in some cases NEATKARIGA TSINYA was forced on people or simply palmed off on them in place of TSINYA. At present postal workers frequently "tamper" with deliveries. SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA's offices, for example, receive phone calls almost daily complaining that the newspaper has not been delivered. Local authorities have also become actively involved in hounding the party press. Orders not to deliver SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA to the residents of Preylskiy Rayon smack of the Middle Ages. There you have democracy in the style of the Latvian People's Front! The authorities are now deciding for people what they can and cannot read! It is with good reason that rural residents are afraid of subscribing to and buying TSINYA. A person might suddenly become known as an enemy of the nation. Attacks on the Communist newspapers have especially picked up since the events involving the House of the Press and the special-purpose militia unit [OMON].

Against the backdrop of discrimination and all-out infringement on the rights of the leftist press, the touching concern that surrounds official and loyalist publications cannot help evoking tears of sympathy. At many public-transportation stops in Riga stands have been set up for RIGAS BALSS where that terribly "independent" newspaper is punctually displayed. One naturally wonders who is paying for all this. The city's residents, out of the city budget? Then why isn't NOVOSTI RIGI there alongside it? Or is RIGAS BALSS

to be considered another official newspaper, an organ of the city soviet executive committee in the worst of traditions? And that is not even to mention DIYENA. It is presently pasted all over the newsstands that previously carried various newspapers and, as already mentioned, piled up on all the shelves.

The instances cited above eloquently attest to the fact that there is not even a semblance of freedom of the press and equal access to information in the republic. What is going on is a planned offensive across a wide front against the democratic press and publications whose opinion is not to the liking of figures in the Latvian People's Front and the government. After TSINYA, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, NOVOSTI RIGA, UTRO JURMALA and YEDINSTVO, the next victims of the totalitarian regime that has arisen in Latvia will be PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and such patriotic central publications as LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, NASH SOVREMENNİK and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. We have already seen how scores were settled in the republic with the inconvenient program "600 Seconds."

Under these conditions, in our view, there is an acute need for the party press to immediately set up its own distribution network, including both retail sales and deliveries to subscribers. Strictly speaking, this should have been done long ago. Tomorrow will probably be too late. The editorial staff of NOVOSTI RIGI has made attempts to distribute the newspaper at enterprises. Yedinstvo has done the most to develop this strategy. On the whole, however, the leftist press is defenseless in the face of the tyranny of Soyuzpechat and the postal department. And by itself no newspaper will solve this problem. What is needed is the coordination of efforts, and the active participation of all the republic's party organizations.

At one time distribution of Lenin's ISKRA was a cause that united the Bolsheviks' party. Now distribution of the party press can be considered a test of militancy and of the ability to work among the masses of many party organizations, which are in a state of confusion, and of the party apparatus, which still, to put it frankly, has insufficient work to do.

Evidently, it would be a good idea to begin setting up the party periodicals' own distribution network by establishing a coordination council consisting of authorized representatives of the Latvian CP Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee's Latvian Izdatelstvo, the periodicals' editorial staffs, and the gorkoms and raykoms. God himself has ordained that this network come together at the House of the Press. The first job in the rayons and large cities is to open the network's own newsstands, at least one or two, which would operate daily and be open all day. So that people will know that they can always buy the publications that they need, including regional newspapers, there. A rayon network should subsequently be developed around these newsstands. The distribution of the party press should

become the first duty of Communists. That has already been mentioned at several plenums of the Latvian CP Central Committee. But what has been done in practical terms?

The publishing schedule of the newspapers also needs to be changed. Why shouldn't TSINYA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, for example, come out daily, with no days off, with a second edition on some days? Now that the House of the Press has been returned to its legitimate owner, there should be no obstacles to that. Having our own distribution network will help circumvent the unjustifiable restrictions that the postal department and Soyuzpechat have imposed on the publication of party newspapers. In what civilized country do newspapers fail to be published two days in a row because postal employees have days off?

Paper for additional printings can be made available by reducing the publications' format, a step to which some newspapers have already resorted. Having up-to-date information is what is most important today. It cannot be ruled out that some thought should be given to reducing the number of party publications, as blasphemous as that might sound. Let there remain even two newspapers for the whole republic, but let them be newspapers that will bring together the best journalists—the sort who will be able to provide timely coverage of events that merit attention in every corner of Latvia—and that will literally knock at their readers' doors with the news. Newspapers that every party organization will come to view as its own.

The press has rightfully been called the "sixth monarchy" in tribute to its enormous influence on people's attitudes. Today the rule of the mass news media is, unfortunately, directed by and large against the people's fundamental interests, toward changing the state system and the disintegration of the country. The voice of the progressive, leftist press is intolerably weak. If we want to change unfavorable trends in the development of society, we must first and foremost see to it that the truthful word reaches every republic resident.

Lithuanian Officials Discuss Press Ruling

*PM1503094691 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
1 Mar 91 p 3*

[Interviews with Viktoras Baublys, chief of the Lithuanian MVD Press Control Administration; Pranas Damijonaitis, general director of the press department; and Juozas Jermalavicius, chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department, by L. Filipaviciene—date and place of interviews not stated: "The Conflict Continues, or About the Main and Subsidiary Arguments"]

[Text] As the newspapers reported, the Lithuanian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Control Administration issued an order, which specifically mentions the suspension of the operation of the founding credentials of the mass media of the Lithuanian Communist Party

(CPSU). The interpretation of this decision and opinions on it are mixed. In order to get to the bottom of this question, we proposed that representatives of the interested parties, so to speak, give their opinions on it.

The first question went to Viktoras Baublys, chief of the Lithuanian MVD administration: On what basis was the order issued?

[Baublys] The operation of the aforementioned credentials was suspended on the basis of the recommendations—approved by the Lithuanian government (there is a protocol decision on this)—of a commission set up by the Lithuanian government to reorganize the publishing enterprise "Spauda" and to study property claims. We are the executors of the commission's recommendations, approved by the government, to whose laws we are subject.

Our next question was directed at Pranas Damijonaitis, general director of the Press Department: What lies at the heart of the commission's recommendations which have been approved by the government?

[Damijonaitis] An appeal by "Spauda's" labor collective to the government with a request to protect its rights (it was adopted unanimously at a meeting of the collective where about 700 people were present) lies at their heart. As we know, after the House of the Press was placed under guard by the military, almost 1,200 people lost their jobs, more than 800 of whom—employees of the printing plant—are idle to this day. The argument over dividing the property between two parties has not been resolved in a year now, and the government till now has not intervened. But what is the upshot of this? After 11 January, the burden of this argument fell on the shoulders of the workers who had been deprived of normal labor conditions. If parties that declare themselves to be defending the working people's interests in actual fact ignore them, then the state must take on these functions. The commission took as the basis of its actions the workers' demands: To restore to them the labor conditions which existed on 10 January; to tackle all remaining problems across the table in talks with Moscow, at which the Lithuanian Republic will be represented by the press department and the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (an agreement with this party has already been signed on this issue).

The commission took up these issues so that the incidence of lawlessness did not multiply: On the one hand, in the building placed under guard, editorial offices are at work whose publisher—the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU)—is not registered in accordance with Lithuanian laws, people from other republics are working, and material damage has been caused; on the other hand—how can we fulfill our duties to distribute the press output of a publisher which does not have a legal status on the republic's territory? This is how the question of a temporary suspension of the publications'

rights arose, as they are organs of a party which is not registered according to the established Lithuanian procedure.

[Filipaviciene] You mean that you do not see any political subtext in this issue?

[Damijonaitis] Of course not. You see, an unregistered organization's press publication is an infringement of the law. Our decision does not affect, say, "Draugiste" 's and "Yedinstvo" 's publications, which are also left radical in orientation. Nobody accuses them of this and suspends their rights to publish. They work without violating the Lithuanian Republic's Constitution or the Law on the Press.

[Filipaviciene] But the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) papers are, after all, also registered in accordance with the Law on the Press...

[Damijonaitis] We do not put the blame on the editorial offices themselves for the illegal actions of their publisher, moreover, how should officials carry out their duties with respect to their functioning, how can this be done in the face of their publisher not existing on a legal basis?

[Filipaviciene] But what way out of this situation do you personally see for these newspapers?

[Damijonaitis] Either their publisher registers, or, and this is also possible, they become independent founders and publishers, i.e. legal entities—then their rights will be restored. Their political views are unimportant to us, if Lithuanian laws are adhered to.

Our next interviewee, Juozas Jermalavicius, chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department, expressed his opinion in this matter in a fairly emotional way:

[Jermalavicius] This is an antidemocratic step. In Lithuania no laws are being applied—neither Soviet nor Lithuanian ones. There is a state of lawlessness. The opposition is being deprived of all mass media organs. But this will not happen, the newspapers will appear. The chief argument in the decision to suspend the newspapers' rights is that the Lithuanian Communist Party is not registered as a social organization. Our opponents have a poor knowledge of history. The Lithuanian Communist Party was registered at the Lithuanian Republic's MVD 25 June 1940. The registration act was confirmed by a Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 7 December 1989 "On Political Parties," where the Lithuanian Communist Party is recognized as the successor in rights to the Lithuanian Communist Party registered 25 June 1940. We consider that the issue of registration is dead. The decision adopted is an attack on the Lithuanian Communist Party, but it has not frightened us.

As we see, the desire to lend the matter a specifically political coloration is present in this opinion. In the Lithuanian Communist Party secretariat's statement on this matter which was made the day after our conversation, the MVD Administration's order is called "a flagrant suppression of freedom of speech and human rights in Lithuania." However, while talking about the untenability of the Lithuanian government commission's arguments and enumerating the dates of the party's registration, J. Jermalavicius for some reason avoids analyzing the events after such a lawful event in the Lithuanian Communist Party's life as the 20th congress, at which it split into two independent parties, one of which (the present Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party) reregistered immediately after the congress, and the other one, changing its name several times (and certainly not at congresses), ignored this. Moreover, the Law on Political Parties was adopted in Lithuania, and whether it was bad or good (the Lithuanian Communist Party also had the right to contest this)—it too necessitated legitimizing the existence of social organizations. Though... the Lithuanian Communist Party has its own argument to advance—that it lives by the laws of the USSR, and not those of the republic in which it exists.

The Lithuanian MVD Administration order is a juridical act. And it is a completely logical decision with respect to a social organization which ignores Lithuanian laws. However, from a political point of view, this decision is possibly worthy of criticism. In accordance with the Lithuanian Communist Party secretariat's statement, and taking into consideration the disposition of forces, we are sure even that all newspapers mentioned in it will go on being issued, but nevertheless the government, in the shape of the press department, will not take legal responsibility for the fulfillment of all the functions connected with their issue and distribution.

Lithuanian CP Newspaper Distribution Ban

91UN1018A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak under the rubric: "From Vilnius": "LIETUVOS SPAUDA in the Role of Censor"]

[Text] Once again the newsstands of Vilnius do not have the newspapers of the Lithuanian Communist Party TARYBU LIETUVA (LITVA SOVETSKAYA) and OTCHIZNA, published in Polish. Nor have subscribers been receiving these newspapers since 14 February.

S. Reznik, an employee in the production-printing section of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, explained to me that this is an action proceeding entirely from the republic Supreme Soviet. According to the law on political parties adopted in September of last year, activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party, "as an organization of another state in the territory of the republic," is prohibited. Consequently, LIETUVOS

SPAUDA, the republic press circulation agency, is refusing to circulate these newspapers.

That same day I had a conversation with a member of the editorial board of the newspaper PERSPEKTIVOS of the Lithuanian Realists Society. It turns out the deputy director of LIETUVOS SPAUDA has refused to allow delivery and circulation of this publication too through the newsstands.

This piece of news astonished me—a newspaper being considered among the objectionable ones whose first page is adorned with the Sajudis symbol, with nowhere near a communist orientation...

PERSPEKTIVOS employees believe the reason for the refusal is the fact that they published the statement of a faction of communists from the Democratic Labor Party in the most recent issue. I would note that only the name of this faction rings of communist. And then this immediate reaction...

"Now LIETUVOS SPAUDA is requiring us to submit the proofs of every issue of the paper," the PERSPEKTIVOS employee told me (at his request I am withholding his name).

I quote from the document which dots all the i's and crosses all the t's:

"Order No. 3 of the Press Supervision Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic. 22 February, Vilnius.

"Guided by recommendations of the Commission for Reorganization of the SPAUDA Publishing Enterprise, established by the Lithuanian government, I order:

"Temporary suspension of the validity of the charter certification credentials submitted by the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), as an organization not properly registered in Lithuania, for the newspapers LITVA SOVETSKAYA, TARYBU LIETUVA, radio Tarybu Lietuva, KLAIPEDA SOVETSKAYA, SOZVEZDIYE [CONSTELLATION], NASHA POZITSIYA [OUR POSITION]...

"V. Baublis, director of the Press Supervision Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic."

Lithuanian CP Newspaper Ban Protested

91UN1018B Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by G. Koncius: "Lithuania: Conflict Spreads"]

[Text] Vilnius—A few days ago the Press Supervision Administration of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an order suspending the validity of the charter certification credentials of the radio station and newspapers of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU). In response, the Secretariat of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee issued a

statement calling the order "a gross suppression of freedom of speech and human rights in Lithuania."

Lying at the basis of the order were recommendations of the Commission for Reorganization of the SPAUDA Publishing Enterprise approved by the republic government and investigations of property disputes between the CPSU and Lithuanian Communist Party (the CPSU on the one hand, and the SPAUDA labor collective and Democratic Labor Party (the former independent Lithuanian Communist Party) on the other). As we know, on 11 January this year the military seized the Vilnius press center, "protecting CPSU property." Since that time more than 800 printing workers and almost 400 editorial office personnel have been without jobs. All the newspapers published there, except for Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) publications, are now published in other printing shops, not suited for this purpose, in reduced volume. The printing of TRUD, IZVESTIYA, PRAVDA, and other central newspapers has been terminated because telecommunications workers servicing the phototeletype refuse to work under military guard. In this context, the suspension of validity of the charter certification credentials issued to newspapers of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) should be seen as pressure whose aim is to move the Communist Party leadership toward negotiations on the future status of the press center.

Authors of the ban repudiate the true political state of affairs behind this decision. The Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) is not a registered political organization in the republic and we cannot permit circulation of its publications—states Press Department General Director Pranas Damijonaitis. There are two ways out of this situation: either for the publisher himself to become registered, or for the editorial collectives themselves to become founders and publishers. Then they will obtain the right of circulation—like, for example, publications of another left-radical movement—"Yedinstvo."

Juozas Jermalavicius, head of the Ideology Department of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee, considers this an illegal demand, since the Lithuanian Communist Party was registered in 1940. Although it must be noted that there occurred a split in its ranks after the 20th congress. The names changed and one segment of the party—today the Democratic Labor Party—is in fact registered according to established procedure.

Lvov Subscriptions to Communist Party Newspapers Decline

91P50128A Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian
29 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Robert Ihnat: "The People Read The Truth"]

[Text] The latest data on periodical subscriptions has arrived from Soyuzpechat. We could refrain from commenting on the diagram which we are printing below—the decline in interest in communist party publications

by readers in the Lvov area is obvious. However, it is worth making several observations.

Every publication is experiencing a paper crisis today. In such a situation, newspapers supported by the CPSU have more of a chance of surviving, since the party still controls the paper industry. I will not spare their feelings: the press run of the bolshevik press in the Lvov area is laughably small.

This is especially true of those newspapers which lamented over the "falseness" of the newly formed democratic publications, including ZA VILNU UKRAYINU. However, the people have figured out the tone of these newspapers quite well. Barely 1,500 subscribers will be reading the chauvanistic PRAVDA UKRAINY, while PRAVDA will not even have 10,000 subscribers...

We do not intend to gloat over someone's fiasco. We simply wanted to remind our opponents that one must be wise, tactful, interesting and convincing in order to conduct political discussions on the pages of a periodical. Why has the circulation of KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA and MOLODA HALYCHYNA increased so much? The former comes out in Russian, while the latter is in Ukrainian, so obviously it is not a question of language. These publications have found their audience and have attained wide popularity.

Thus, ideology has become bankrupt, as have those publications which support it, and which still seek the smallest opportunity to pollute the brains of the people further. The voice of truth, as attested by the people's wisdom, is heard through this. The people are throwing off the cataract of mental torpor and are striving to read only the truth now, without quotation marks. Our credo is to lead history out of the bolshevik darkness and to foster a modern era for the Ukraine along with you, my dear readers. No pro-Kremlin publications have the power to overshadow this, our common progress.

	1990 (in thousands)	1991 (in thousands)
PRAVDA	53	8.9
IZVESTIYA	83	2.9
TRUD	142	71
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	143	63
RADYANSKA UKRAYINA	12	3.4
PRAVDA UKRAINY	2.7	1.5
ROBITNYCHNA HAZETA	14	3.9
SILSKI VISTI	154	70
MOLOD UKRAYINY	54	39
KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA	11	20

	1990 (in thousands)	1991 (in thousands)
ZA VILNU UKRAYINU	100	440 (70 outside Lvov Oblast)
MOLODA HALYCHYNA	166	214 (3.4 outside Lvov Oblast)
LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA	101	58 (1.6 outside Lvov Oblast)
VILNA UKRAYINA	182	29.8 (3.8 outside Lvov Oblast)

Press Committee Head on Amending Press Law

91UN0898A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Mikhail Nenashev, chairman of the State Committee for the Press, by Aleksandr Tsyganov; place and date not given: "The Law Needs To Be Amended"]

[Text] [Tsyganov] Is it true that in order to ensure "objectivity" of the press so dear to the conservatives, plans are being made to appoint to various periodicals certain editors in chief, similar to those that Leonid Kravchenko is using to censor TV stories?

[Nenashev] No, I do not know anything about this. Honestly speaking, I do not believe this either...

[Tsyganov] In your opinion, what does the concept "objectivity of the press" mean? Does objectivity contradict individuality and the right to have one's own opinion?

[Nenashev] How do you understand individuality? We have to distinguish a creative, or professional, or social individuality. To me, objectivity means the newspaper's ability to stand on realistic positions which reflect the interests of the majority in our society, the interests of our people. Today, when our country finds itself at the adverse stage of extreme contradictions and of extreme crisis, I link the objectivity of the press with the problem of society's destiny.

[Tsyganov] What should we do then about political likes and dislikes—we cannot expect to have identical newspapers published, say, by anarchists and communists?

[Nenashev] Objectivity does not mean that everybody has to say one and the same thing and provide the same evaluation of it too. In such a case we cannot even talk about any objectivity or dissent. But I think that some major, basic problems linked to the destiny of society, to its future and its concerns about that future, are always present. The suggested methods of dealing with these problems may vary because people have the right to express their own opinions, and that fact may be reflected in different ways in the press. But our goals, the final goals which express concern for our society and our people—to feed the people, not to allow a collapse of our society, not to allow a collapse of the Union and of the state—these goals should be the same for all.

[Tsyganov] But will there be censorship to help attain this unity?

[Nenashev] No. I do not think so. The reason is the Law on Press, and I do not think we are going to try to repeal it now. However, some time has passed since it was adopted and it needs to be amended somewhat. We can see now that its mechanism is imperfect to a certain degree. Look, for instance, at the price-setting or the subscription regulations. The law should protect both the journalists and the newspapers in this case.

Thus, I am convinced that the Law on Press is a phenomenon that determines the content of our life today and is in no danger. However, I want to repeat that it needs to be somewhat amended, to be developed...

Newsprint Producer: Shutdown Threatens

91UN1011D Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by TRUD correspondent V. Dolgodvorov: "Stoppages—A Telegram to USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov"]

[Text] "We inform you that the All-Union Novoeksport Association has refused to sign any contracts for the supply of foreign-made netting and cloth for paper-making machinery due to the lack of hard currency. The combine does not have its own hard currency resources. Numerous appeals to the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry has brought no results. Unless some urgent measures are taken, the combine will stop production in April..."

This was the text of a telegram that the workers' collective council of the Balakhninskiy paper and pulp combine had to send to USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov.

The situation there is truly critical. The combine itself cannot earn any hard currency for the simple reason that it has not been licensed to sell its paper to other countries (given our shortages, this would not have made sense anyway). The Ministry has practically removed itself from all of its problems and needs. Let us remember here that all equipment at the Soviet paper and pulp combines is foreign-made and it is impossible to maintain it in a working condition without receiving spare parts from abroad.

Realistically speaking, the Balakhninskiy combine is already working at half of its capacity. All the machinery was idling last night because there were no raw materials on hand. For the same reason they have produced 10,000 tons of newsprint less than planned since the beginning of the year. Representatives of publishing houses are literally besieging the facility but nothing can be done for them. Timber is being processed the moment it arrives; the state reserve was exhausted a long time ago. The Kirovlesprom concern alone failed to supply 40,000 cubic meters of timber in January and February. All that in spite of the fact that prices for timber have been tripled.

As we can see the problem does not lie in prices, but in the lack of elementary order and discipline in the industry.

What is going to happen if this combine stops production? It provides for the printing of almost every third newspaper in the country. I do not dare to do any forecasting. Let us wait for a response from Comrade Pavlov, together with the Balakhninskiy workers.

State of Local Party Publications in Moldova Described

91P50130A

[Editorial Report] Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian on 15 February 1991 carries on page 2 a 1,000-word article on the state of the republic's Communist Party press at the rayon and city level. Written by A. Semeonov and titled "Create, Don't Destroy," the article discusses the creation of new press organs of city and rayon party committees. Semeonov writes that at first only a few of these new publications existed, but now there are 25 with a combined print-run of 100,000 copies.

Semeonov contends that the creation of new party press organs is essential if the party is to defend itself against

"attacks" and "attempts to remove it from the country and republic's political arena." The author observes that within a relatively brief period, most party press organs have achieved a regular publication schedule. He singles out the publications of the Kriulyany, Keinarkiy, Kaus-hany, Oknitsa, Tiraspol, Bendery, Orkheyskiy, Khyncheshtskiy, and Chimishliya raykoms and gorkoms for special praise.

Semeonov writes that in pursuing a policy of journalistic objectivity, party papers have met with discontent in some areas. He reports that the editor of the Orkhey newspaper KODRU received threats and demands that he step down for "openly and honestly expressing his opinion on the problems of the sociopolitical life of the rayon and the republic." According to Semeonov, the editor withstood the criticism, and in the end, "his conclusions were confirmed not only by the course of events in the republic, but also by decisions adopted by the highest authorities of Moldova." Semeonov states that although both party and soviet publications should work "to consolidate healthy forces in the republic," some publications of local soviets are publishing "malicious articles about some reports in party papers, and sometimes about the papers as a whole." He also observes that "poison arrows" continue to be directed at journalists who write for party publications.

Emigration Obstacles in Estonia Detailed

91UN1062A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by O. Ivanova: "Forever?"]

[Text] The people are on the move. The eternal dream of a better future has always urged people of all countries to move to another place, on the premise that their life was not quite satisfactory for them. Estonia was no exception in the past, and it is not becoming one now either, whatever one might say. More and more often we hear ironic remarks in Estonian that not everybody, unfortunately, can move to the West. Complaints are heard in Russian also: Russia is big, but there is nowhere to go there. People are still trying to, however.

"The part of the population that is morally ready to leave their native land forever is growing," agreed Aleksey Otto, deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs foreign passports department of the Estonian republic. "More and more people are coming to us for consultations; within the last six months the phrase 'I want to emigrate to any country' has become quite familiar. But we are restricted by legal limitations: So far people can apply for permanent residency in any country except Israel only if they have an invitation from their immediate relatives—father, mother, brother, sister, husband, or wife."

The number of people leaving the country for good has been more or less constant in recent years. There was a sharp jump in it several years ago: 509 people left in 1987 and as many as 1,097 in 1988 when the procedure for issuing visas was simplified. But now this number is even decreasing; there were 1,086 applications in 1989, and 949 in 1990. But all this is just unemotional statistics. They do not show that the majority of people having relatives abroad and wishing to leave have already used the opportunity. The second wave of invitations is still gathering strength. After the police registration rules allowed it, Germans moved to the southern regions of Estonia from Kazakhstan and the Volga area so that they could move further west from there. Most of them have realized their dream already. The Persian Gulf events affected travel to Israel, the country of greatest immigration, in a negative way since according to the law people lose their Soviet citizenship the moment they cross the border. The selection of those who can be accepted by the United States has become stricter. Recently the foreign passports office had the following surprise: An application for an emigration permit was accompanied by a letter from a Senator of one of the states and signed personally by Secretary of State James Baker. It is no secret that the Americans try to choose the smartest and the richest.

People are searching for alternate routes. In 1990 we saw a doubling in the number of marriages followed by a move to Finland compared to the previous year. The Canada group appeared. The "Argentine version" rumor has been making the rounds. Argentina's immigration

terms, by the way, remained unchanged—you can only go to your immediate relatives. Against this background we see skyrocketing numbers of temporary business or guest visits to other countries: 4,266 visas in 1987, 12,949 in 1988, 37,064 in 1989, and as many as 58,647 in 1990. At the same time we see an increase, though insignificant, in the number of those who do not come back. We must give credit to the Soviet authorities; the article of the law concerning "punishment for this" is no longer being enforced and the necessary paperwork is done retroactively, though it takes a lot of time and effort. After all legal norms are finally observed, their relatives are also allowed out of the country, while such families retain the right to visit their native land.

But there is another truth also. The easier it becomes to leave the USSR, the feebler the receiving services of other countries are becoming. Estonia makes it especially "hard" for its closest neighbors, Scandinavians. Almost 90 percent of all travel undertaken by Estonians was directed to Finland and Sweden. They do not seem too happy at this, as they are taking countermeasures. Since last fall, for instance, apart from an invitation, Sweden started requiring a so-called "personbevis"—a kind of ID carrying the individual number of the inviting person. They do this to avoid falsification of invitations. That happens when you want to visit someone. What if it is love? Previously, the procedure of releasing the wife to go and join her husband, or vice versa, in Finland, for instance, was not less complicated than the world practice of appendicitis operations. Some two hours of bureaucracy. Now it takes up to six months. There are even cases of lost documents, so exceptional for the people but so dear to the heart of our local bureaucrat. The abundance of fictitious marriages resulted in the fact that to receive a permanent resident permit in Finland you have to go through three stages: first you get a three-month permit, then a one-year one, and only after that an indefinite-term one. At some point in the past the Finnish Government invited people from the Soviet Ingermanland area to come and work there, but for some reason they do not want to help them move there forever. They strictly observe the reunification of families principle only. In other words, instead of the iron curtain on our side of the border, there is a delicately patterned iron grillwork on their side.

But it is not every road that leads Estonian emigrants to Rome. We are now witnessing the remigration of certain part of the population back to the Soviet Union. Most people leave for the West for economic reasons, and they emphasize that fact so that they do not burn all the bridges leading back home. However, those who go east do it for political reasons. The unstable situation, lack of assurance in their future, inability to learn Estonian for some people and knowledge of it for others (which means constant attention to the local press, radio, and TV)—all this may become an involuntary stimulus for a move. The fact that there is no place in our country, it seems, where life goes quietly and peacefully now is their problem, as they say. We were interested in the figures.

Since April of last year an experiment has been conducted in Tallinn. They are paying compensation for vacated residential premises. According to Aleksandr Pakhmurko, deputy manager of the small business Ruum under the Tallinn City Soviet Executive Committee, the experiment has justified itself completely so far. You can judge for yourself: 49 contracts were signed during the past period. That means that 49 families decided to leave Tallinn for the cities of central and southern Russia, for the Ukraine, or sometimes for villages, if one can judge by their papers. Most of them went to their relations and left their apartments to the city of Tallinn. They did not do it for nothing, they were paid considerable sums of money. Later, these sums were reimbursed by the enterprises of the capital and the apartments were given to whoever was on the waiting list at these places.

The number of people willing to give up their apartments and to receive money for them has increased sharply since last November when the Tallinn City Soviet decided to raise the price of one square meter of residential space, all facilities included, to 500 rubles [R]. Now one can receive R15-16,000 for a one-room apartment, about R20,000 for a two-room apartment, and about R30,000 for a three-room one. There are some limitations, however. The compensation is paid only after the person who leaves Estonia produces a notarized letter from the executive committee of his new place of residence testifying that all his family members have been registered there. In short, "chairs first, then money." Nevertheless, every day there are always several people who go to a lawyer with this particular question. Recently it became necessary to give such a consultation first in Estonian.

Not everybody has a place to move to, of course. Some people must have been upset by this novel decision of the Tallinn City Soviet, some even find it blasphemous. Many people prefer the more traditional way of exchanging their apartments. Last year, by the way, in spite of the new quota systems and rigid limitations introduced in the apartment exchange procedures, the number of intercity exchanges grew from 302 in 1989 to 383 in 1990. According to A. Pakhmurko, however, even those who voluntarily give up their apartments in Tallinn in exchange for monetary compensation—and this does not happen anywhere else in the Soviet Union—leave Estonia without any resentment or hostility. Judging by the letters coming to our newspaper from other cities and villages of the republic, where the decision of the Tallinn City Soviet is not effective, it is clear that there are people who would leave if there were such a regulation there too.

Here is a total: Last year the migration balance in Tallinn was negative. There were 9,910 people newly registered in the city, while 11,669 people were removed from the books. In 1989, meanwhile these numbers were 13,333 and 12,539 respectively. Foreseeing the answer, we went to the Migration Department of the republic. In all of Estonia the migration balance was negative last year also

and, according to the department's data, it was 2,315 people less as of 1 December 1990.

Having learned all this and having done justice to the multiple new laws, we started calling Tallinn registry offices, not without some trepidation, we have to admit. How about the laws of nature? Which do we have more of—births or deaths? We signed with relief: Our city residents prefer to register in this world: There were 8,245 births and 5,550 deaths. Nymme is growing older: 462 babies were born there last year and 405 persons died. Mustamae is a bit younger: 1,415 and 1,222. The records of the central city office on the Parnu highway show that the usual correlation has been preserved—approximately twice as many births as deaths.

Well, we continue to have babies, in spite of all the problems and obstacles. We would like to hope that these babies will constitute that very future, permanent population of Estonia we argued about so much. And that population should live comfortably in its native home...

Changes in Estonian Immigration Quota System Expected

91UN1060A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
21 Dec 90

[Article by Peeter Raidla: "-2,729 in Nine Months"]

[Text] At yesterday's session of the Supreme Soviet a presentation was made by Andres Kollist, executive director of Estonia's Immigration Office. The review that follows is based on the many informational materials that were handed out to the deputies.

The immigration balance for the first nine months of this year was negative: 6,763 persons were registered as coming in, and 9,492 as leaving. Hence -2,729. The balance was positive, however, for Narva (270), Sillamäe (67), Hiiumaa (1), Saaremaa (1) and Kohtla-Järve (the table does not show a separate balance for Kohtla-Järve).

Complications regarding implementation of the immigration law passed June 26, 1990 were noted in Kohtla-Järve, Narva, Sillamäe, Tallinn and Tartu, where immigration quotas were exceeded.

The Immigration Office has had repeated negotiations with representatives of these cities, in the course of which urgent demands have been made to increase their quotas. In Narva and Kohtla Järve, immigration is tied primarily to family moves and importing foreign labor. In the case of Narva, additional problems are created by the city's close ties to Jaanilinn or Ivangorod.

The Immigration Office submitted a more detailed table for the third quarter of this year. The following are some examples taken from it.

Immigration at Kohtla-Järve was 120. There were four parents joining their children, 30 children who came to live with their parents, 43 persons came to join their spouses, 12 citizens came to work at Kohtla-Järve, 13

military retirees were received by the city, and two persons settled there as part of apartment exchanges. Sixteen people were registered for other reasons. This makes a total of 120, even though the quota was only 45.

In Narva, registrations numbered 218 (quota 42) and in Sillamäe 61 (quota 10). In Tallinn, six parents came to live with their children, and 53 children joined their parents. Moving in to join their spouses were 124 persons. Tallinn arrivals numbered 77 for educational purposes and 58 for employment. All reasons considered, 410 new citizens settled in the capital city during the third quarter (quota allowance 250). Added to these are 248 persons who immigrated quota-exempt (80 from detention facilities, 49 from the army, 106 from studies, treatment or employment, plus 13 Estonians). Adding another 104 officers and servicemen, we get a total of 762 persons who immigrated to Tallinn during the third quarter (emigration was 1,352, out of whom 1,020 emigrated permanently).

At yesterday's session of the Supreme Soviet, it was decided to change the immigration quota for several cities. This applies to Narva (1991 base quota 85, supplementary quota 395), Kohtla-Järve (91 and 189), Sillamäe (21 and 55) and Tartu (113 and 75). Tallinn's quota (504) was not changed. Next year's base quota for Estonia totals 1,576, and the supplementary quota 714. Hence a total of 2,290 newcomers. The Supreme Soviet resolution emphasizes that Kohtla-Järve, Narva, Tartu and Sillamäe, before using their supplementary quotas, would have to guarantee a negative balance for their immigration totals from outside the republic.

At the same time, the Immigration Office was also allowed to give quota-exempt temporary and short-term living permits to foreigners.

The resolution in its entirety will be published in our newspaper at a later date.

RSFSR Communist Party Roundtable on Women's Issues

91US0340A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Roundtable discussion by the All-Russian Women's Council in Orenburg, conducted by V. Vedernikov and A. Mogilat: "Does Society Love the Woman?"]

[Text] We are surrounded by lots of problems, which are reflected most mercilessly on women, falling as a heavy burden on their frail shoulders. This was the central topic of the roundtable discussion organized by the RSFSR CP Central Committee and the editors of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The discussion turned out to be meaningful, matter-of-fact, and constructive. Men also had a place at the roundtable and, we believe, this was not a tribute to elementary courtesy or some chivalrous act of nobility, but rather an understanding of the fact that the fair sex cannot overcome its problems alone.

People of different professions, different positions, and different fates gathered to talk about that which was most basic. Yet, we believe, these "differences" did not hinder them from being frank, self-critical, and at the same time kind.

The roundtable discussion was called to order by RSFSR CP Orenburg Obkom 1st Secretary A. F. Kolinichenko. RSFSR CP Central Committee Secretary N. P. Silkova conducted the meeting of Politburo members. In her introductory address she stated:

"I will try to answer the question of the purpose for which the commission was created within the Russian CP Central Committee, and in the apparatus itself—a section on problems of the women's movement. Perhaps we need not remind the listeners about the serious socioeconomic crisis which the country is currently undergoing. Each of us is experiencing it for ourselves. We also know that in the transition to market relations, many enterprise collectives are threatened by mass lay-offs, and it is no secret to anyone that it is specifically women who may become the first candidates for dismissal. However, I believe, not all of us have completely understood and interpreted the fact that many of our misfortunes stem from an incorrect attitude toward and understanding of the woman's role in society."

We have become accustomed of speaking with pride about the fact that Soviet women have the same rights as men. But is this really so? Statistics confirm the opposite. The average monthly wage of women is one-third lower than that of men. With an equal educational level they fall behind, as a rule, by two-three production grades. Women comprise only 5.6 percent of the elected membership of our republic's Supreme Soviet. With such more than humble representation, you must agree, it is difficult to hope that our voice will be heard.

Unfortunately, all this is a regular occurrence. First of all, this is because the woman has a longer work day—no less than 76 hours a week, while a man's work week does not exceed 59 hours. Add to this our endless shortages, plus the underdevelopment in the sphere of services, and how can we speak of any self-realization at work or in public life?

However, there are other more dramatic figures: One out of every 10 of our fellow countrywomen employed in industry works under conditions which are unfavorable to her health. There are 3.4 million women working in jobs with hazardous labor conditions. 2.7 million work under conditions which do not correspond to labor protection standards and regulations. It is understandable that this is not because of the good life: She tries to catch up in wages, and to retire earlier. Yet nature itself has predestined her to be the keeper not only of the hearth, but of our nation's gene pool!

This is why, having created special "women's" structures within the Russian CP Central Committee, we decided that this direction must become one of the primary ones. Having invited you to our first major discussion, we

would like to consult with you and define not only the strategy for the future, but also designate those sore points and outline those debts to women whose payment cannot be put off "until later".

French Perfume at the Slaughterhouse

A. A. SHCHERBININA, general director of the Orenburg Industrial- Trade Sewing Association:

If we had gathered for such a "roundtable" a few years ago, I would have probably begun talking about the good that the administration, the trade union and party organization are doing for our workers. And I would not have been cunning in saying this. We were not ashamed to look our women workers in the eye.

Today, however, I cannot say whether we will be able to preserve every job for our women. Yet for many of them this is their only means of existence. We have many single women who have children and elderly relatives to care for. We have over 100 families with many children... And if we must cut jobs, this will be a real tragedy for the collective.

What should we do? After all, we hear only promises on the part of the government and assurances that sometime something will be allocated, sometime something will be resolved. Reality, however, is such that literally any day now all production may come to a standstill.

After all, the entire world came to the market step by step, without destroying the old order. We, however, have destroyed everything in the absence of any discipline whatsoever. We did not even have time to train the cadres.

In January we were forced to cancel all benefits which our women enjoyed. I visited literally all the subsections, and the people understood me. They are waiting and hoping... Will we justify these hopes? That is the question.

R. A. KHOTYAN, general director of the Orenburg Silk Association:

I understand Alla Adamovna's concerns. Our heart aches for our people, and we are concerned also for perestroika. Let us recall the enthusiasm with which we first undertook it. It was specifically this, perestroika, which helped our enterprise emerge from the breach: Even three years ago it operated at a loss, but last year we received 90 million rubles in profits. There has been progress with housing, and we supply free kindergartens and dormitories for our workers.

Beginning with the fourth quarter of last year, our production life took a sharp turn for the worse. According to our predictions, we will somehow get through February, but in March we will have to start laying off people. What does it mean for a woman who today earns over 400 rubles a month to lose her job? Moreover, this is not only a job, but also a place on the waiting list for housing, kindergarten for her child, and

so forth. All this will lead to a social catastrophe. The only way out is the invariable adherence to the presidential Directive on Preserving Industrial Relations.

Of course, it is wonderful that social organizations are being created whose goal is the social protection of women. However, public initiative alone in this question is not enough—we need state programs.

B. A. ARKHIYEREYEVA, professor at the Orenburg Medical Institute, chairman of the oblast women's council:

I represent that very social organization which has set social protection of women as its goal. When, in the course of conducting women's council business, I first visited a meat packing plant, the slaughterhouse shop where women worked, I experienced a feeling of shock. After that, they had to lead me around by the hand to the other shops. A woman, a mother—her entire psychology changes when she slaughters animals... We went into one shop. There was a woman standing there sharpening a huge knife. She turned and looked at us in such a way that I shuddered. You understand, everything feminine, everything gentle is dissipated by such labor. This is frightening! We try to build a civilized state, but tell me, in what other country do women work in such shops?

I would like to tell also about the benefits. Of course, some women ignore them, striving to earn more. However, I can cite examples when even pregnant women have been refused that which is their sacred right. The managers try to hide away the resolutions on flexible schedules and partial work days. Heaven forbid the women will find out and start demanding them.

Therefore, our task is to direct the work of the women's councils at enterprises in such a way that these questions are controlled.

I am very disturbed by the mechanism of social protection of women in the period of transition to the market. What must it be? And what can the women's councils do here? In the Committee of Soviet Women they said that it is necessary for each enterprise director and economist to sit down with pencil in hand and compute how many women may be fired, how many of them will be placed in other jobs, who can be retrained so that they will not lose their job. Yet once again, without a clear law to this effect we alone will not get anything done.

A. G. IVANOVA, deputy chairman of the Orenburg ispolkom:

Yes, unfortunately that is so: The social storms have hit hardest at women. The elements of the market which today ever more greatly permeate our economy negate any financial and moral priorities directed at easing their situation. Thus, all 54 benefits which our state granted them since 1944 have today been negated. With the elimination of these benefits, the woman, who already has a wage of over 30 percent less and a pension of 29

percent less than a man, is practically defenseless in the face of the market, which is becoming a real misfortune for her.

The situation is becoming more tense with every passing day. Kindergartens, young pioneer camps and palaces of culture are being sold, i.e., specifically those social institutions which helped the woman to raise her children and allowed her to realize her own capacities, at least in some degree.

N. B. Bazhenov, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni S. M. Kirov in Orenburg rayon, member of the RSFSR CP Orenburg obkom buro:

Expressing ourselves in parliamentary language, we might say that the rural fraction's time has finally come. In general, I do not think it is quite correct to isolate some single question. Today we are speaking about women, but we also hear demands about the resolution of the youth, children's and pension questions. So, if we exclude specific examples from all these discussions, one common root will remain—that is our economic inadequacy, our poverty and squalor.

I am not a politician or a publicist. I am an economic manager. And I am specifically asked the question: How can we continue to live on the farm? The level of mechanization at many farms is zero, and a woman carries up to a ton of heavy loads in a single shift. In the summertime, with a yield of, say, 10 liters of milk per cow, she carries 4.5-5 centners of milk alone, since she is responsible for tens of cows. And how does she feel after such overexertion when she goes home, where housework awaits her, and where she still has a man to feed? How can she be a patient tutor, a loving mother, or a tender wife?

I am not even speaking about physical beauty because, having endured so much, a woman simply cannot be physically beautiful. I spoke out in the oblast newspaper and received a letter from a woman. Unfortunately, she did not give her name or address. However, there was one thing in her letter which absolutely floored me. The woman writes: "Pardon me, but how can we think of French perfume on the farm? I come home from work, and I do not have a washing machine to wash the clothes. I could wash by hand, but I do not have any laundry detergent or soap". Behind this outcry of the soul stands the absence of an elementary infrastructure which could work for the woman on the farm. We have spoken of this for more than a decade, but what good has it done?

Deprived of Power

S. V. LAYNE, dean of the journalism department, Moscow Higher Party School:

Our society does not love women. Sometimes it declares this love, but really, in such a way that every working woman would sense the concern for her with every fiber of her being—that, unfortunately, we still do not have.

The party has always shown attention to women. Both the first and second Party Programs contain an entire section devoted to the question of women. And what well thought-out positions, developed in detail, these documents contain! In preparing the new Communist Party Program, I believe, we must provide for such a strategy of actions which would consider our experience, tragic as well as positive, and especially in the resolution of the women's question.

L. N. KUZNETSOVA, publicist, co-chairman of the Russian Union of Women:

I would like to support this idea. I am the chairman of a women's political club. Representatives of the most varied parties come to us, and we try to find out from them what kind of women's program these parties have. We have been visited by representatives from the liberal democrats and Christian democrats, as well as by N. Andreyev's supporters and N. Travkin's deputy. However, not one of these political forces has a women's program. Only the CPSU has such a program. I do not want to issue any complements here to the CPSU, and God forbid that I should call upon you to unite only around this party. However, the objectivity is such that for the present, only the CPSU has a serious women's program.

I will dare to express the rather controversial, yet time-honored judgement, that the strictly women's problems, frankly speaking, are only gynecology and... politics. Everything else is our common problem. When I call upon women to go into politics, believe me—it is not for the good life. Male politics has to a certain degree demonstrated its inconsistency. Perhaps we should become involved somehow and help the men. To criticize them at times, at times to refute something, and at times—to propose something of our own. However, we are not doing this. Look at the intonations of our women speakers in major parliaments. "Yes, yes, we agree, quite right, we agree".

It seems to me that our country has gone too far with revolutions. This assortment of revolutionary decisions, sharp breaks, cataclysms, endless disruptions and rushes toward the unknown—this is a purely masculine manner of political behavior. It should have been corrected by the feminine conservative principle, which is not represented in any way in our country, neither politically nor even morally. Even at many "roundtable" discussions I did not notice anyone expressing the notion that both in 1917 and in 1985 what we lacked was a serious conservative force. Yet women could have been this serious conservative force, provided, of course, they had wanted to engage in politics.

Let us think about our political program, which we might prudently contrapose to the masculine program of endless changes. Let us think about how to preserve the barely breathing body of our Russia. After all, if the women do not do this, no one will.

L. N. SHEPILOVA, partkom secretary at the "Parizhs-kaya kommuna" [Paris commune] shoe factory, member of the RSFSR CP Central Committee, and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress:

I believe that life has taught us much in the past few years. And as for the struggle for power, I would like to express my point of view. It may be erroneous—we might argue, but it seems to me that we, the women, also have to fight for power. Today we are late. We should have done this yesterday. However, we must prepare for the future elections, because no matter what you and I decide, without the Supreme Soviet we will still never decide anything.

Therefore, already today I appeal to all of you to gear up for this, to find women who are sensible, penetrative, intelligent and analytical. We must already now begin to agitate in favor of those women whom we intend to send to the Soviets—not only to the Supreme Soviets, but also to the oblast and rayon councils. We must present our questions everywhere. We must fight for power. No one will hand it to us on a platter.

B. F. GOLUBNICHYI, secretary of the RSFSR CP Orenburg obkom:

I agree. We must all understand that our society really does owe an inestimable debt to women. Their defeat at the elections is our common fault and misfortune. In the oblast Soviet we have only five percent women, and in the local Soviets—28 percent.

I see one of the main reasons for the present unhappiness as being the untapped intellectual and moral potential of society. [This potential] is formulated not only by the family, but also by scientific workers, the general education and higher school... You must agree that the residual principle according to which we treat these spheres does irreparable damage and, unfortunately, even in the sixth year of perestroika the state policy in this sense has remained essentially unchanged.

I would also like to add the following: Among those who have left the ranks of the CPSU there are significantly fewer women than men. I would ascribe this fact to that basic approach, to that fundamentalism and responsibility with which the woman treats life, the family, her children, education, and the future of our Homeland.

Ye. I. SMETANNIKOVA, governing board chairman of the society "Zhenshchina i realnost" [Woman and Reality]:

The Moscow city council registered us as a city organization in December of last year. It all began with the rayon women's council. At first they acted timidly, adopting a wait-and-see attitude and hoping that someone would help us. But then, fortunately, they understood that they must depend only on themselves. Five rayon women's councils united with a single goal: To oppose the market spontaneity. We are conducting commercial activity and earning money. For the present

day we have five small enterprises, two of which have already repaid their credits and are operating at a profit.

Women of all ages come to us, with varying levels of development and education. Yet they all want to do something. We have set up special instructional courses for them, including a special group for women with physical handicaps. Unlike others, we educate these women free of charge.

Perhaps I will not be in error if I say that this is a new direction in the women's movement. It arose as a response reaction to those processes which are currently going on in our country. But, it seems to me, the question has come to a head about creating a special fund on a city or republic scale, a fund which would help out such societies as ours by providing credits.

N. P. SILKOVA:

At the first meeting of the RSFSR CP Central Committee's Commission on Problems of the Women's Movement, we agreed that we will support and unite with different movements and associations, even including religious ones, provided they have set humane and noble goals for themselves. For us it is unimportant that they operate outside the framework of the CPSU. It is important only that there be a real return for the benefit of women, the family, and society. So, we are your allies.

Serene Happiness?

A. V. FEDOROVA, department head at the Orenburg Agricultural Institute:

Now let us talk about more prosaic things. Our country has developed not only a masculine standard of power, but also a feminine stereotype of the educator.

How do you artists generally represent maternal happiness? A fair-haired mother with a chubby little boy in her arms, and both are smiling serenely. But where is the third happy member—the father? For some reason, he is absent. He is either away on a business trip or, at best, lying on the sofa reading the newspaper. And this is no joke. This is a real serious problem. Children are often raised without their fathers. And I believe that this gap must be filled. The child goes off to kindergarten—the teacher is a woman. He goes to school—the teachers are generally women. In the vocational-technical school—women. In the VUZes [higher educational institutions] it is the same thing. Therefore, my proposal is to do everything possible to see that there are more male teachers in schools. This is a problem which is long overdue, and here it is not enough to put out the call. We need a well-planned set of measures.

S. L. VINOGRADOVA, history teacher and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress:

I teach history in our oblast's first high school. Recently I was conducting an 11th grade lesson on the topic of "Social development of the capitalist countries". I told about Swedish kindergartens, and I talked about the fact

that Japanese women, for example, work only until they get married, and after that they raise their children. Moreover, their work day lasts only until the lunch break. And so I was telling about all this, and a mature 18-year old fellow interrupted me: "Svetlana Leonidovna, that's enough." "Why—enough?" I said. He replied, "What do we need to know all this for when we will never achieve it ourselves." I objected: "But things are also not that wonderful in their country." But no matter what I said, he would hang his head and repeat, "That is terrible—what you told us today..."

Why did I begin with this? Because today in speaking of social programs we are simply often re-inventing the bicycle. Recently, on women's council business, we had occasion to visit the dormitory of a medical institute. There the superintendent informed us: "You have heard that there is paid instruction in our 22nd school. How can I educate my child if I get 140 rubles, but there, they say, the tuition payment is 200 rubles?" Meanwhile, I have a student who "sat" [failed] in the 5th grade, "sat" in the 4th grade, but brags about the fact that his parents have 18,000 in their savings book and he will be able to go to school as long as he wants.

And what should we do with gifted children? Today we must finally determine both in the Central Committee and in the Supreme Soviet: Do we need gifted children, or will the brain drain abroad continue? We must try to create special conditions for them, perhaps provide some kind of subsidies or scholarships, because gifted children may find themselves out of school. The market will throw them overboard.

I conducted an independent sociological study on my class family, and here is what I found: Of the 33 students, only nine are from well-to-do families who will be able to withstand the market economy. Not one other family will withstand the market economy if education in the school must be paid for. How can we talk of social programs? This is why we must begin by raising our voices in defense of children against the market and against market spontaneity!

V. I. LIKHACHEVA, director of the Abdulinskiy orphanage, honored RSFSR school teacher:

I will add something about the parents. I have worked in the orphanage for 35 years, starting after the war. At that time there were very many orphans. But now we get children even though their parents are living. The parents themselves bring them to the orphanage. They are happy to bring them, and do not experience any guilt pangs... I will never get used to this—and how can one accept such a thing? Whom have we raised, whom have we educated, if these sorry excuses for mothers and fathers can so calmly rob their own children?

The government is doing much for orphanages today. We too have been transformed into a family-type orphanage. The groups have become smaller and the instructor load has been reduced. We feel that this has

had a good effect on our children. They are becoming kinder, more trusting, and less quarrelsome. If only they had mothers and fathers...

Our old friend, Ilgizar Shammatovich Zaripov, the director of the bread baking combine and also our patron, once came to me and asked: "Give me some children, as many as you can. My wife Galina Karimovna and I will try to take the place of their fathers and mothers..." We, of course, were quite surprised at first. After all, the Zaripov family already had many children. They had enough problems of their own, as they say. But Ilgizar Shammatovich insisted, and such a man can be trusted. And so, we became a family orphanage. Today the Zaripovs are raising 16 children.

I. Sh. ZARIPOV, director of the bread baking combine:

How many of our own children do we have? All 16 are ours. The oldest is 14, and the youngest is six months. So our family is rich. I understand that we belittle women—in the sense of professional growth and in the sphere of large-scale politics. But, honestly, it is painful to see how they literally tear themselves between home and work. And in general I believe that the highest, most basic calling of the woman is motherhood. Here she is unique. Here no one can replace her. And we men, along with all of our society, must see too it first of all that we allow them to fully realize themselves in their primary capacity.

Z. B. KHLINTSEVA, chief obstetrician-gynecologist of Orenburg oblast:

In general the movement under the slogans of "Women—toward equality", "From equal rights—to equality", in my opinion, is unnatural. There is no such road. There is not, nor should there be. In our oblast one out of every four women labors at manual jobs, under unfavorable conditions. In the years of the last 5-year plan, our illness rate increased by 4.8 percent due to complications in pregnancy. Out of 100 births, only 20 follow a normal course. All the rest—four-fifths!—are pathological. Think about it! Why, this concerns the mother herself, and her offspring!

For the present day, especially under conditions of the transition to a market economy, the problem of nourishment of pregnant women, children and nursing mothers is the No 1 question. Yet the stores are empty. We somehow make provision for the invalids of labor and war veterans. That means we must seek out the capacity to care also for the pregnant woman. We must resolve the problem of nourishment of pregnant women and children on an all-state scale, or at least at the level of the oblast Soviets. The problem cannot withstand procrastination. Let me cite only a single figure for our oblast: The illness rate for anemia has increased threefold as compared with last year!

For now the priority of motherhood and childhood for us is only in words. Here in Orenburg, as well as on a republic-wide scale, and throughout the entire country.

Look at what is happening: For the MNTK "Optical microsurgery" they found funds, and branches were created throughout the entire country, including here in our oblast. Yet there are only a handful of centers for protection of mothers and children throughout the country. For this there are neither means nor funds.

Following the Husband

S. F. KAVUN, RSFSR CP Central Committee member, chief of the political department at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Security Forces Department:

Each of us, rank-and-file military men, has not only his own family, but also the families of those soldiers, fellows, who are conscripts—their mothers and their young wives. And while at our "roundtable" we speak of what women will have to encounter in the transition to the market, we must say that our families have long waged the struggle for survival.

Just think, how can the family of a young officer live on a monthly salary of 170 rubles? The wife often cannot work: Either she cannot find a job, or there is no kindergarten, and then there are problems with passport registration. The transition to the market will only intensify these difficulties. But just stop and think what our wives and children experience when in some republics and regions they hear nothing but the words "emigre" and "occupant" addressed at them. The situation has gotten so bad that we must set up schools for the children and gynecological consultations for our wives in the garrisons, because the local authorities and local medical facilities refuse to care for them.

When the Russian CP Central Committee asked me to work on the Commission for Problems of the Women's Movement, I agreed without hesitation. I am not belittling the importance of these problems, since it is the fate of our Homeland which is being decided now, the fate of our socialist choice. However, I ask one thing: In formulating the policy on the women's question, we nevertheless must not call up the best half of society to go into the army and become colonels and generals. Women should not take up arms. That is our man's work.

I. V. LEBEDEVA, professor at Orenburg Medical Institute:

I believe it is very important that our economic problems not forestall the problem of instilling spiritual development and the participation of women in instilling and laying the foundations for spiritual development of the future generations.

In the old days it was for good reason that the woman was called the nurturer, since that is now nature itself created her. That is why protection of family health—physical as well as moral and spiritual—lies specifically with her.

Ye. E. VYSOTSKAYA, actress at the Orenburg Drama Theatre, honored performer of the RSFSR:

We speak of spiritual development, but what do the theatres, television, and newspapers have to offer us? How can the woman safeguard the child against lack of spiritual development and immorality if it is all around? I do not favor strict censorship on radio and television, but we must somehow oppose open banality!

L. S. MEDVEDEVA, art critic and member of the USSR Artist's Union:

This is not art. This is anti-art. And it is very frightening. Because it leaves no choice: If I want to, I watch this, if I want to—I watch something else. Banality in the literal sense is imposed upon us.

The cultural leaders and artistic intelligentsia are very much at fault in this. The Russian intelligentsia, Russian art, and Russian artists have always been the conscience of the people. They were not afraid of this responsibility. It seems to me that we showed lack of spirit when this push began, when we were simply put aside and labelled as bigots and conservatives. Evidently, not wanting to conduct debate on this level, we retreated—and in this we were wrong. We must advance. We must defend our positions. That is the only true position today for the artist as well as the citizen.

Filaret Condemns Uniate Actions

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[Interview with Metropolitan Filaret, by Aleksandr Kozlov, correspondent: "Calling for Common Sense"]

[Text] It would seem that the sharp, and frequently bloody, interethnic conflicts in our country have been augmented by yet another one—a religious conflict. The violent seizures of Orthodox churches, the insulting of believers and the clergy, and the open mockery of objects of worship—"All these unlawful acts," the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has stated, "are being committed by Christians—Eastern-Rite Catholics (Uniates) with the support of certain figures in the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika (Rukh)." The causes of these events and their possible development were discussed by our correspondent Aleksandr Kozlov with the Blessed Filaret, Metropolitan of Kiev and All of the Ukraine.

[Correspondent] Metropolitan, the events that are occurring in Western Ukraine on a religious ground are very disturbing. In order to provide our readers with a better idea of what is occurring, could you state briefly how many Uniates are there, how many people of the Orthodox faith, and how many representatives of other denominations?

[Filaret] Recently the USSR Academy of Sciences conducted a sociological study that shows that in the Western Ukraine the Uniates constitute 23 percent, Orthodox believers 46 percent (that is, twice as many), and the others are Baptists, Jews, Latin-rite Catholics,

Seventh Day Adventists, and representatives of other denominations. The study emphasizes (and I agree completely with this) that the widespread opinion that the Greco-Catholics predominate in the region does not conform to reality. That opinion is simply being forced on public opinion by a number of unconscientious Soviet and foreign mass-media agencies.

[Correspondent] Quite recently the thousandth anniversary of the introduction of Christianity into Rus was celebrated. That was a great triumph for the Orthodox Church. It was marked by representatives of all religions, including the Catholics, who gave tribute to the Orthodox Church. Then, all of a sudden, this happened... What occurred that resulted in the Catholic minority's coming into conflict with the Orthodox majority?

[Filaret] The celebration of the thousandth anniversary of the introduction of Christianity into Rus actually demonstrated the authority of our Church, the possibilities of its spiritual influence on society. The Church carries to people the ideas of unity, peace, brotherhood, love of one's neighbor, and the ideas of morality and spirituality. One can only rejoice at that. But in October 1989 the Uniates resorted to the violent seizure of churches. We did not want a conflict. On the contrary, we did everything to prevent anything like this from happening. We regret that previously the Uniates were not recognized, that they were deprived of the right to profess their faith openly, that their religious freedom was infringed upon. And the June 1990 Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church decisively censured the violence on the part of the Stalinist regime with respect to the Ukrainian Eastern-rite Catholics and every interference by the secular authorities into life within the Church. Simultaneously the Council considers it to be inadmissible to return to similar methods with respect to the Orthodox believers. It emphasized that "through state interference, violence, and the trampling of the legal rights of the believers, both Orthodox and Uniate, it is impossible to resolve the complicated problem of the relations between these two communities."

[Correspondent] Do you really mean that it was impossible to reject the old grievances and to resolve all the interrelational problems in an amicable manner?

[Filaret] Our Church recently proposed settling the problem by peaceful means. It acted as the initiator of negotiations with the Holy See about the normalization of the situation in the Western Ukraine. Patriarch Pimen sent a message to the Pope. Our delegation, which included three permanent members of the Holy Synod, including myself, visited the Vatican. On 27 August 1989 the Pope received us. We delivered to him a personal message from Patriarch Pimen. There was a discussion about the way in which we saw the resolution of the conflict. And it was surprising to us that, soon after that—a month later—the Greco-Catholics took the path of violence with respect to the Orthodox believers, by seizing the Church of the Transfiguration in Lvov.

In January 1990 negotiations between delegations from the Holy See and the Moscow Patriarchy were held in Moscow. At that meeting there was a discussion of the situation in the Western Ukraine and the prospects for normalizing it. Moreover, the representatives of the Orthodox believers and the Uniates had the opportunity to state their understanding of the situation. As a result, the Recommendations for Normalizing the Relations Between the Orthodox Believers and the Eastern-Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine were adopted. They were approved by Pope John Paul II and by the High Council of the Moscow Patriarchate, that is, by the highest authorities on both sides. A quadrilateral commission was created. It included representatives of the Holy See, the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In March that commission began its work and performed well. Everyone was satisfied with its work. The commission proposed doing things in this way: if, in a populated place, there were two churches, one was to be given to the Uniates, even if there was an extremely small number of them, and the second was to be given to the Orthodox believers. If there was only one church in a particular settlement, it was to be given to the community with the largest number of members. But the minority would also receive its own accommodations for the holding of religious services, which would be purchased, leased, or built for it. In this process the majority would render material assistance to the minority.

[Correspondent] That seems to me to be just, and to be truly a Christian thing to do.

[Filaret] Of course we wanted to satisfy both groups. But there immediately arose one "but"... The representative of the Eastern-rite Catholics, Archbishop Vladimir Sterniuk, in a way that was unexpected for everyone, including the representatives of the Vatican, left the commission, although prior to that time he had agreed with that approach and had signed all the protocols.

[Correspondent] Why did he do that?

[Filaret] It is completely obvious: those who were standing behind the Uniates are not satisfied by a peaceful resolution of the question. They need a big upheaval... And so it was precisely after the departure of Archbishop Vladimir Sterniuk from the commission that the seizures of Orthodox churches became more frequent. Despite the understandings that had been achieved, the Uniates began to make newer and newer demands on us. Now they have already begun demanding the transferring to their ownership of all the Orthodox churches in the Western Ukraine. We explained to them that in the USSR the church and cult structures have been nationalized and they are the property of the nation. The state offers them, free of charge, to the believers, and no one has the right to transfer them to anyone else.

By that time the representatives of "Rukh" had had a victory in the election in the Western Ukraine. As they

assumed power, the rayon, city, and oblast soviets made decisions that permanently assigned the violently seized churches to the Greco-Catholics. The Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet annulled their decisions as being illegal, and recognized as being void the decree by the Lvov City Soviet to transfer the Svyatoy Yur Church and other churches to the Greco-Catholics. Nevertheless the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies confirmed the city soviet's decision. The same thing occurred in Ivano-Frankovsk and Ternopol. Thus, the local authorities, despite the law and the decisions made by superior agencies, supported the acts of violence and lawlessness. Sensing that support, the Uniates began saying that they had absolutely no need to negotiate with the Orthodox believers, because, after the negotiations, they would receive only a few churches, but by force they could have all of them. And so they began acting in that way. The wave of violence began to grow. Attacks on the life of the clergymen and the parishioners began. In Lvov Oblast, shots were fired at a priest of ours, and several churches were set on fire. In Ternopol Oblast, a Catholic murdered Mokritskiy, an Orthodox layman. Real terror has been unleashed against the Orthodox believers.

[Correspondent] But aren't the Uniates afraid that the Orthodox believers will retaliate to the violence?

[Filaret] Of course they are. But we do not want that. Our leadership, sensing that the atmosphere was getting hotter, decided to have an urgent session of the quadrilateral commission in Moscow in June 1990. The Catholic side stated that it could not come until September, although the situation was getting more complicated with every passing day. We viewed that as a deliberate stalling tactic, in order to provide the Greco-Catholics with an opportunity to seize as many Orthodox churches as possible. The commission did not convene until September. The Catholic side made obviously unacceptable demands at the meeting, thus demonstrating its complete lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of the question. They demanded that we censure the 1946 Lvov Council. But how can we do that, when that Council was not one of the Russian Orthodox Church, but was a Greco-Catholic council? We cannot annul its decisions. They also demands that we recognize the seized churches as being the property of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, but that is banned by law. And, finally, they demanded that we recognize the Greco-Catholic Church as an institution, as a structure which, in 1946, at the Lvov Council, was eliminated. A discussion ensued. We could not agree with such demands and we began discussing specific questions for distributing the churches and satisfying the vital needs of the Orthodox believers, because the Greco-Catholics by that time, for example, in Lvov, had seized actually all of the 19 Orthodox churches. All we had left was one Russian church and a tiny little church. Now our bishop has simply nowhere that he could conduct services or carry out his pastoral duties for the believers. The same situation pertains in Ivano-Frankovsk, where the Greco-Catholics have five churches and the Orthodox believers do not have a single

one. The local authorities have even seized the bishop's residence and handed it over to the Uniates.

To our great regret, the harsh position taken by the Uniates and their rejection of any compromise have removed the meaning from all the previously achieved understandings. Inasmuch as the Vatican delegation could not do anything to oppose the point of view of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholics, the negotiations went down a blind alley.

It must be stated outright that the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate, which had been developing so successfully since Vatican Council II, were subjected to a difficult test. What reason do we now have for continuing the theological dialogues? What kind of unity can we talk about, when the Catholics do not want to show any good faith with respect to the Orthodox believers?

[Correspondent] Has everyone really forgotten history? Four centuries ago there had been a war between members of the Orthodox Church and the Uniates, when the Orthodox believers in the Ukraine had been forcibly converted to Catholicism. Have people really forgotten how much woe and how many sufferings that war brought people, how families were torn apart, and how people who had been close to one another had harbored such enmity and killed one another?

[Filaret] Yes, that actually occurred, and the same thing is happening today: strife in the families when, for example, the husband is Orthodox and the wife is a Uniate. There have been divorces on these grounds, the children are suffering, not to mention the fact that this leads to a schism in society itself.

[Correspondent] Who, in your opinion, now needs a situation in which, once again, a husband is pitted against his wife, or a brother against his brother?

[Filaret] The forces of good, of course, do not need this. This is advantageous only for the forces of destruction and evil.

[Correspondent] But haven't you appealed to the authorities for help in order to put an end to the violence?

[Filaret] Yes, I have. I have appealed to the highest agencies of authority in the USSR and the Ukraine. Unfortunately, no steps have yet been taken. Not a single church has been returned to us. The terror against the members of the Orthodox Church is continuing. Pavel Vasiliyev, a bishop of the Greco-Catholic Church, has demanded that absolutely all the members of the Orthodox Church leave the Western Ukraine. Moreover, the Uniate bishops have stated outright that "the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church is the only one in the Ukraine" and Vladimir Sternuk, who recently became metropolitan, has even signed documents not only with the title "Metropolitan of Lvov," but also "of Kiev and Galicia." Thus the Uniates are only pouring oil onto the

fire and are inciting Catholic extremism. We have appealed to the heads of the local churches, to the Pope, to the World Council of Churches, to the Conference of European Churches, and to the United Nations, and have received answers from them. Dimitrios II, patriarch of Constantinople, has censured the acts of violence committed by the Greco-Catholics and has come to our support. The same position has been occupied by Parfeniy, patriarch of Alexandria; Iliya II, patriarch of Georgia; Metropolitan Feodosiy, head of the American Orthodox Church; the Conference of European Churches; and many other organizations. I shall not

conceal the fact that we also put our hopes on the Pope, but his reply evoked only profound regret in us.

We call for common sense, we call for Christian conscience, because, if the Christians, who carry to people the ideas of spirituality, good, and love of humanity, do not adhere to principles of brotherly love and of the customary human emotions, then they are poor preachers of the Gospel and their faith and not only can they not be a "light to the world" and "salt to the earth" (Matthew, V: 13-14), but they also cannot reproach others for their immorality.

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